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Industrial cluster literature has traditionally focused on work-place upgrading, clusters’ ability to 
promote firm productivity, economic growth, and benefits that firm owners can or will give to 
workers. However, even in growing, productive clusters, such a work-place focus leaves out 
questions about how to situate the contribution of the firm and cluster in improving living 
standards in the wider socio-economic and spatial context of the region. By providing a 
systematic examination of the relationship between industrial clusters and poverty analyzed 
within a multidimensional frame, this dissertation attempts to close this bridge. It asks under 
what conditions firms in productive clusters pass on benefits to workers in ways that improve 
their living standards, even when they are not required by law to do so. 
 
Three hypotheses are put forward. First, firms in their own interest boost worker productivity by 
providing certain kinds of work-place benefits such as overall capability, proxied by various 
types of internal technological knowledge and skills. Second, firms choose not to give other 
place-based and work-based benefits like health or housing because social policies do not 
demand it and it has no direct benefit to the firm. Third, firms pass on these benefits because it 
costs little, and tend to deepen employee loyalty. The study analyses the case of the Otigba 
Information and Communications Technology cluster in Lagos, Nigeria and uses survey 
questionnaires, interviews, and archival research. 
  
Results confirm that clustering promotes not just firm-level productivity as literature on 
agglomeration economy highlights, but also raises workers’ living standards compared to non-
clustered firms in the same sector. Older employees, and those with prior experience in other 
firms report improvements in their living standards since working in their firms. Furthermore, 
firms in the cluster give a diverse number of non-income benefits such as housing, health 
insurance, feeding and transportation allowance, training, child care, funding for further 
education, pension and company products, based on the length of service in the firm, age of 
employee, and size of the firm. Additionally, while formal state-supported social protection 
institutions are largely absent, monetary and non-monetary benefits such as employment, 
provision of skills through apprenticeships, housing, transportation, and feeding allowance are 
channeled to employees through firms and informal institutions based on social and kinship ties. 
A high level of horizontal and collective cooperation based on professional lines has also 
emerged within the cluster in the absence of formal state institutions.  
 
The dissertation makes a theoretical contribution by bridging studies on industrial clusters with 
those on social protection policy instruments. The study gives greater evidence to the diversity of 
social protection available, as well as the opportunity for economic development planners to 
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Industrial Clusters, Institutions and Poverty in Nigeria 
1.1. Introduction 
Industrialization has long been recognized and in various forms adopted as a pathway to 
development ever since Britain’s industrial revolution (Amakom, 2008). Economic growth, 
driven by various industrial development strategies, has been considerable in several developing 
countries over the past decades. The “Asian Tigers” namely Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
and Singapore, as well as China, have set such considerable standards of dynamic growth, 
showing that catching-up with the traditionally viewed industrial leaders is possible (Amsden, 
1989; Bei, 2011; Stiglitz, 1996; Vogel, 1991; Wade, 2004; World Bank, 1993). Other Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines (to a 
lesser degree) have also emerged as “a second-generation of Asian Tigers” (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013, p. 21). Since independence, African 
countries have adopted and built several industrialization pathways into their development 
strategies as vehicles of structural transformation (Lall & Wangwe, 1998).  
 
Cluster-based industrialization is yet another pathway that can lead to increased economic 
growth and productivity. Indeed industrial clusters, defined in this dissertation as the “sectoral 
and spatial concentrations of firms” (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999, p. 1503), have been seen to 
contribute to economic growth and competitiveness in developed as well as developing countries 
(Marshall, 1890; Bianchi, Miller & Bertini, 1997, Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999). In the past decade 
for example, China’s industrialization pattern has been increasingly characterized by the 
clustering of firms (Zeng, 2011; Long and Zhang, 2012). Albeit, it is important to note that while 
 2 
some clusters are enacted by policy for example Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and industrial 
packs, others occur more organically. This study focuses on this latter category, which is those 
that occur more spontaneously. 
 
This dissertation uses industrial clusters as a lens into understanding how growth and 
productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) can translate to improved human development 
indicators. The study uses the specific case of the Otigba Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) cluster in Lagos, Nigeria to highlight how productive industrial clusters in 
developing countries impact the welfare of the workers employed within them. The challenge of 
low workers’ living standard is particularly acute in much of developing countries like Nigeria, 
because labor is largely employed in the informal sector, and in this setting the social protection 
instruments of the state are poorly constituted and/or implemented. Why then might firms in 
industrial clusters choose to pass on benefits that would impact on the welfare of their workers 
when formal institutions might not require them to do so or in situations where existing social 
protection policies are not enforced? Do they act different from non-clustered firms in the same 
sector? 
 
The main themes that frame the analysis in this dissertation are: the collective efficiency 
framework to understand the incidental and active benefits (and costs) of clustering; the 
organizational structure of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the relationships between 
owners and employees in informal business environments; human development and poverty, 
analyzed in a multidimensional perspective which includes the living conditions of labor in 
 3 
developing countries; and the institutional environment within which labor in developing 
countries work and improve their living conditions.  
 
The study of the impact of industrial clusters on poverty is important for various reasons. First, 
despite a plethora of studies and policies for promoting industrial clusters, we know relatively 
little about how the existence and productivity of these clusters might lead, not only to economic 
growth, but also to human development. That is, why might clusters be the appropriate industrial 
policy pathway to recommend to developing countries that seek to improve both economic 
growth and development? Secondly, it is vital to investigate the precise mechanisms (the how) 
through which clusters as a unique and spatial form of industrial agglomeration might provide 
socially innovative solutions to the abiding challenge of poverty, and how planners might use 
clusters to achieve social equity goals. Thirdly, given that the type of institutions in which 
industrialization takes place, or the presence or absence of welfare-enhancing institutions do 
have a profound influence on, and tend to shape the distributive structure of society’s welfare, 
this study aims to investigate how existing institutional environments might foster or hinder the 
welfare of owners, workers and firms within the clusters. Finally, the study is timely at this 
historical juncture in international development, given the currency of the debate and interest in 
human development, as evidenced by the global acceptance of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), coupled with the recent financial crisis that negatively affected and continues to 
have an effect on the labor force and human wellbeing in many countries. More direct is the 
post-2015 Agenda debate that has set a new target of the year 2030 for “finishing the job” of 
eradicating extreme poverty (United Nations, 2013). 
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Using different methodological approaches with the case study at the heart of it, this dissertation 
aimed to contribute theoretically and methodologically to understanding the link between 
industrial dynamism using industrial clusters as pathways, and the development literature, which 
lays emphasis on issues of poverty, in a multidimensional framework. In addition, at the policy 
level, it sought to enhance our knowledge of how productive and growing industrial clusters, 
being a distinctive form of industrial organization characterized by two vectors – sector 
specialization and geographical agglomeration –, can advance not only economic growth, but 
more importantly promote human development by generating wealth, reducing unemployment, 
poverty, inequality, and raising living standards.   
 
Results of this dissertation show that clustering raises not just firm-level productivity but also 
worker’s living standards compared to non-clustered firms in the same sector. Additionally, it 
shows that within the same geographical space, entrepreneurs and industrial workers face 
different types and intensities of vulnerabilities. Older employees, and those with prior 
experience in other firms report improvements in their living standards since working in their 
firms. Furthermore, firms in the cluster give a diverse number of non-income benefits such as 
housing, health insurance, feeding and transportation allowance, training, child care, funding for 
further education, pension and company products, based on the length of service in the firm, age 
of employee, and size of the firm. While formal state-supported social protection institutions are 
largely absent, monetary and non-monetary benefits such as employment, provision of skills 
through apprenticeships, housing, transportation, and feeding allowance are channeled to 
employees through firms and informal institutions based on social and kinship ties. A high level 
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of horizontal and collective cooperation based on professional lines has also emerged in the 
absence of formal state institutions.  
 
This thesis makes an argument for developing countries to find an overlay between industrial and 
social policies. One of such pathways is to take cognizance of the connections of productive 
SME entrepreneurial clusters and informal institutions and enhance their functioning by 
providing knowledge and basic infrastructure where they are missing. The study gives greater 
evidence to the diversity of social protection available, as well as the opportunity for economic 
development planners to explore ways in which firm-driven social protection can be integrated 
into social policy. However, while these informal institutions are currently playing a useful role, 
they rely on non-systematic socially shared rules – oral and usually unwritten – that may be 
impossible to replicate and enforce outside of the narrow network in which they are operating. In 
other words, it is doubtful if this system is sustainable, replicable or scalable in the long run 
especially as industrialization becomes more dynamic. This does not imply that informal 
institutions are weak or ineffective but that there is a need to interrogate their performance 
compared to formal rules that have been systematically codified over time. Further research is 
required to understand cluster dynamism, informal institutions, and inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization given Africa’s current dynamic economic growth.  
 
1.2. Background 
Structural transformation, particularly that involving the move of resources from the agricultural 
sector to the manufacturing sector, has been heralded as an avenue for growth since the industrial 
revolution. The case for manufacturing as an “engine of growth” was established long ago with 
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the arguments for it being that the faster the growth rate of manufacturing output, the faster the 
growth rate of GDP, manufacturing labor productivity (due to increasing returns), and non-
manufacturing labor productivity (due to the reallocation of labor) (Kaldor 1966, 1967). 
Empirical studies in contemporary times have also supported these arguments, with findings 
showing a clear empirical correlation between the degree of industrialization and the level of per 
capita income in developing countries (Rodrik, 2009). 
 
Consequently, and of great relevance to this dissertation is manufacturing’s impact on 
employment, job creation and subsequently on living standards. For one, the manufacturing 
sector is traditionally viewed as more productive than the agricultural sector, and therefore able 
to provide employment both directly, indirectly through forward and backward linkages, and 
through Keynesian style multiplier effects (Lavapo & Szirmai, 2012; McMillan and Rodrik, 
2011; Tyler, 1976).  
 
Industrial clusters, being one form of industrial organization, have been posited to have the 
potential to mitigate some of the constraints to industrialization that SMEs, which tend to be the 
main actors in the production process, face. These constraints can be understood as spatial and 
industrial isolation, that is a distance from the assets that are required for productive industrial 
processes. Levitsky (1996, p. 10) recapitulates “[s]tudies of recent years have led some 
researchers to the conclusion that it may not be the size as such that is the real cause of the 
weakness but the isolation of small firms.” This isolation, coupled with a poor institutional 
framework to address these issues, makes industrialization in African countries seem 
unattainable (Institute of Development Studies [IDS], 1997; McCormick, 1999). Clusters, 
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through the benefits of agglomeration, can help to mitigate the isolation that these firms 
experience.  
 
Now, while it is established that industrialization is a valuable pathway to induce growth, this 
dissertation concerns itself about human well-being and development. Traditionally, 
development economics tended to associate human development with economic growth i.e. 
equating Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth with improvements in human well-
being. However the adequacy of indicators based on the GDP as measurements of economic 
performance and societal well-being have been questioned (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010). 
Recent scholarship stress the clear difference between development and growth and the need to 
emphasize ‘human development’ separately from rising per capita income, both of which could 
occur mutually exclusively. This approach has influenced the human development index (HDI) 
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which considers human development in 
terms of education, health, and living standards.  
 
A new methodology for measuring multidimensional poverty, known as the multidimensional 
poverty index (MPI), has also been introduced (Alkire & Foster, 2009). The MPI comprises ten 
indicators that correspond to the three dimensions – education, health and living standards – of 
the HDI, and “captures a set of direct deprivations that batter a person at the same time” (Alkire 
& Santos, 2010, p. 1). There is therefore a move from conceptualizing poverty mainly in terms of 
income or an individual’s employment to viewing the phenomenon in a multidimensional form. 
This study adopts this multidimensional framework for analyzing and understanding poverty. 
The economic development and human/social justice aspects of planning are therefore both 
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integrated within this dissertation; the first considering issues of economic growth i.e. industrial 
pathways, dynamism and upgrading of clusters, while the latter concerns itself with human 
development dimensions notably equity, quality of jobs and improved living standards.  
 
In the literature on developing countries, I have not found systematic case studies analyzing the 
role of industrial clusters in poverty eradication, particularly within a multidimensional frame. 
Nadvi and Barrientos (2004, p. 2) acknowledge the dearth of such studies in both developed and 
developing countries and the need for studying the interrelationship between poverty alleviation 
and industrial clusters: 
[d]espite the progress made on academic and policy research on industrial clusters, 
poverty concerns tend to be ignored in much of the cluster literature. Instead, the focus is 
on the potential economic gains of clustering, in particular the ways in which clustering 
enhances competitiveness and promotes growth. There is an implicit assumption that 
such growth translates into rising levels of employment and incomes, with improving 
conditions and standards for labor engaged in clustered SMEs. Yet, for the most part, 
such issues are rarely explored. In particular, relationships between clustered firms and 
workers are insufficiently analysed. 
 
Fowler and Kleit (2013, p. 129) also highlighted this gap in the literature, and used “spatial 
regression analysis techniques” to find the impact of clusters on poverty rates in the United 
States of America (USA). While their findings revealed that “the presence of industrial clusters 
[was] associated with lower poverty rates” (ibid. p. 129), they recommended that local level, 
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nuanced and more in-depth information about the impact of clusters on poverty reduction would 
be beneficial. 
 
Despite the fact that there is a dearth of such systematic studies, I did find some evidence that 
industrial clusters do have the potential of improving workers’ welfare by reducing the industrial 
isolation that SMEs in developing countries face, and providing employment for workers (Mano, 
Takashi, Aya & Tomoya, 2011; Weijland, 1999). Clustered firms can also improve their 
competitive advantage because they are able to specialize, cooperate and be flexible. That is, 
they can specialize and concentrate their often limited resources on their best and core 
competencies. Through cooperation, they can “accentuate their specialization and compensate 
for any weakness”, while being flexible in their level of production by outsourcing or sub-
contracting to other firms (Bianchi, Miller & Bertini, 1997, p.9). They are also able to adapt to 
different types of production modes by producing a diversity of products, making it according to 
the specificity of the buyer (Ibid.) or change their product line entirely if need be. In essence, the 
division of labor that occurs within clusters allows small firms (measured by capital and/or 
number of employees) to grow by taking “small and riskable” steps  (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999, p. 
1506).   
 
Furthermore, the more efficient and dynamic firms have the propensity to be more productive, 
and therefore hold greater possibilities for workers to increase their income and improve their 
well-being. An example of a successful case is the leather shoe cluster located in the Sinos 
Valley in Brazil (Schmitz 1995b). Between 1970 and 1990, Brazil’s share of world exports in 
leather shoes increased from 0.5% to 12.3%, largely attributable to the cluster of firms in the 
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Sinos Valley which by 1991 was exporting nearly 100 million pairs of shoes a year, and earning 
almost USD 900 million in foreign exchange. Another example is the surgical instrument-
making agglomeration around the town of Sialkot in Pakistan. As at 1997, the cluster accounted 
for 20% of world exports, making Pakistan the second largest exporter of surgical instruments 
after Germany (IDS, 1997).  
 
However, not all clusters end up being successful, neither do all actors within the cluster benefit 
equally from the gains to be had within the cluster. Furthermore, as a cluster upgrades, there may 
be winners, losers, and unequal outcomes. Nadvi and Barrientos (2004, p. 43) commented that 
“clusters are a part of a dynamic process of industrial development. As they evolve winners and 
losers emerge. Thus, we find that particular firms, producers and workers can gain from the 
dynamics of clustering, while others are at risk of being squeezed.” Some clusters might also 
have certain disabling qualities e.g. weak labor market pooling (McCormick, 1999), while 
increased rents as the geographical space becomes saturated can occur.  
 
More generally, Nadvi and Barrientos (2004) who consider the intersection between industrial 
clusters and poverty alleviation in a bid to propose a methodology for carrying out poverty and 
social impact studies of cluster development initiatives, note that the relationship between 
poverty alleviation and industrial clusters depends on the cluster’s features (cluster’s location, 
the type of firms within it, and type of employment generated), processes (agglomeration gains, 
joint action, cluster institutions and social capital) and dynamics (cluster growth, upgrading, and 
differentiation). Certain types of clusters are therefore better able to alleviate poverty than others.  
 
 11 
How then does clustering lead not only to economic growth, but also to poverty alleviation and 
improved wellbeing? How can gains of clustering and the benefits of localization be transferred 
to gains in human development? In particular, why and how do some firms pass on certain kinds 
of benefits to workers in ways that improve employees’ welfare? Can and should the work-place 
become an avenue for providing social benefits for workers? Similarly, what motivates private 
sector firms who tend to be the main employer of labor, employing nine out of ten of the 
workforce (World Bank, 2013), to pass on benefits to their workers in developing country 
situations, where formal institutions of social protection are weak, and national social policies 
are inexistent or unenforced, or do not extend to those in the informal economy?   
 
Lund and Srinivas (2000), in addressing how protection for workers may be considered, suggest 
moving away from a dichotomous categorization of the formal and informal economy, to looking 
at each subsector of the economy on a continuum from formal to informal. For example, the 
garment or construction or Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sectors can be 
conceptualized along the spectrum of the more formal firms to semi-formal up till the largely 
informal firms/workers. This enables the question: “Under what conditions can what kinds of 
workers in the informal economy… get access to what core measures of provision, which can be 
incrementally improved upon in the future?” (Lund & Srinivas, 2000, p. 13, emphasis by 
authors).  
 
Notably, there is a crucial role for the state and planners serving as agents of the state to play in 
the provision of social protection. In developing countries where a large number of workers are 
in the “informal” economy, and the lines between the formal and informal economy is blurred, 
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governments can play a role in ensuring that basic benefits are still provided for all workers. Yet, 
when formal institutions of the state fail to ensure property rights, enforce transactions, develop 
welfare policies, and provide a safe and enabling economic and physical environment for the 
market, informal economies then form around strong ties of kinship, ethnicities, and other social 
identities. Clearly, these social identities have histories, cultures, ways of being and interactions, 
and institutions that can enhance or disrupt the workings of the market. Thus in understanding 
the role of industrial clusters in poverty eradication, I found it necessary to take account of both 
formal and non-formal institutions.  
 
The next section introduces the case study after giving some background to the Nigerian 
economy within which it is embedded.  
 
1.3. The Context of the Study: Nigeria’s Politics and Economy 
Nigeria, the “Giant of Africa”, is the most populous country in Africa, having an estimated 
population of 173.6 million as at 2013 (World DataBank, 2014). Lagos, the location of this 
study, has a heterogeneous population and was the former capital of Nigeria until 1991 when the 
capital was moved to the more geographically central location in Abuja. Map 1.1 below shows 
the different states and geopolitical zones in Nigeria. Lagos is located in the southwestern part of 
the country. Nigeria has experienced relatively rapid economic growth in the past decade with an 
average growth in GDP from 2005 to 2010 of 6.68% (NBS, 2012). The recent rebasing of the 
economy’s GDP now makes it the largest economy in Africa, ahead of South Africa (Faul, 
2014); with Nigeria’s 2013 GDP being an estimated $522 billion, as compared to South Africa’s 
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$350.6 billion in 2013 (World DataBank, 2014). However, while economic growth indicators 
have been good, human development indicators have been poor. 
 




Source: GIS map made by Archibong (2014)  
 
Nigeria’s GDP per capita in 2013 was 3005.5 while South Africa’s almost doubled it at 6617.9 
(World DataBank, 2014). Nigeria ranks low on social and human development indicators while 
poverty incidence is high; the latter rising from 27.2% in 1980 to 69.0% in 2010. Subjective 
poverty measures show that 93.9% of the populace perceived themselves to be poor in 2010 
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(NBS, 2012b). In 2012, the country had a Human Development Index (HDI) position of 153 out 
of 187, with an index of 0.471, placing it in the low human development category. The 
inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) was even lower at 0.276. As at 2008, the country’s 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) was 0.311 (United Nations Development Program 
[UNDP], 2013). Unemployment rates have also been on the rise, with national unemployment 
rates between the period 2006 to 2010 being 12.3%, 12.7%, 14.9%, 19.7% and 21.4% 
respectively. Unemployment is also highest at 41.6% among those aged 15 to 24 (NBS, 2010).  
 
In terms of inequality, between 1986 and 1996, the Gini Index2 rose from 38.68 to 44.95 and 
46.5 in 1992 and 1996 respectively. It dropped by 7.68% in 2004 to 42.93, but then rose again by 
13.74% to 48.83 in 2010 (World DataBank, 2014) reflecting one of the highest levels in world 
(UNDP, 2008/9, p.11), and that with the exception of the slight drop in the Gini Index between 
1996 and 2004, income distribution in the country has been growing more unequal over the 
years. While states like Bauchi (-28.9%), Kwara (-25.9%), Lagos (-26.2%), and Kogi (-15.7%) 
recorded a decrease in their inequality measures, others including the Federal Capital Territory 
(26%), Ekiti (30.7%), Delta (31.1%), Taraba (43%), and Yobe (59.3%) increased theirs (NBS, 
2012b); this inequality being in spite of the increased growth that has been experienced in the 
past decade. Thus, as Agu and Evoh (2011, p. 16) surmise, “2001-2010 was indeed a decade of 
jobless growth for the country given those years of economic growth were not translated to more 
wage employment opportunities and poverty reduction.”   
                                                        
1 MPI is measured on a scale of 0 (low) to 1 (high). Among104 countries reported by Alkire and Santos (2010) the 
country that was most MPI poor had an index of 0.642.  
 
2 The “Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption 
expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution… [A] 




In light of high poverty rates, where about half of the Nigerian population is living in poverty, 
social protection policies become even more important. While social protection “is now 
emerging as a policy objective” (Hagen-Zanker & Holmes, 2012, p. v), the scope and coverage 
of existing programs tend to be small, and the absence of an umbrella policy at the federal level 
constrains its implementation at the state level (Holmes, Akinrimisi with Morgan & Bulk, 2011, 
p. 2).  
 
1.4. Research Design  
This dissertation contributes to our theoretical and methodological understanding of the link 
between industrial dynamism and human development, by examining closely the case of the 
Otigba Information and Communications Technology (ICT) cluster in Lagos, Nigeria. It 
specifically poses the following question: 
 
Research Question (RQ) 
Under what conditions (what, how, and why) do (what kinds of) firms in clusters pass on 
benefits to workers in ways that alleviate poverty as evidenced by an improvement in living 
standards?  
 
The dissertation proceeds on three hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms in clusters influence the living standards of workers by passing on work-
place benefits such as their overall capability (proxied by the types of internal technological 
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knowledge and skills they possess), which they build upon and impart to workers because it is in 
their interest to raise the productivity of these workers.   
Hypothesis 2: Firms in clusters choose not to provide other work-based and place-based benefits 
like health, transportation, or housing, in the workplace though it would impact the living 
standards of the workers because social policies do not compel them to do so, and they do not 
see the direct benefit to the firm of doing so.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms in clusters pass on one or more of these work-based and place-based 
benefits to workers because it is at a low cost to the firm, and/or they seek to gain and/or deepen 
the loyalty of the workers to the firm.   
 
The independent variables in this study are the types of firms within the cluster, while the 
dependent variable is the welfare of the workers. The dependent variable is rigorously defined 
and expressed both in objective (using standardized measures of multidimensional poverty and 
slum household characteristics) as well as in subjective (based on respondents’ perceptions) 
terms. The firms purportedly impact on the living standards of the workers by passing on work-
place based, work-based, or place-based benefits to their workers; these being welfare typologies 
drawn from Srinivas (2010). Place-based benefits, which are dependent on territory, can be 
exemplified by “national insurance based on residence or citizenship.” As opposed to work-place 
benefits that are tied to a worker’s place of work, work-based benefits are dependent on labor’s 
status (Ibid. 2010, p. 457). For this study, consideration is given to what kind of benefits are 
administered by firms to their workers: work-place, place-based, work-based, within the 
institutional environment in which the firms are. These three means serve as the intervening 
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variables in our model. Figure 1.1 below depicts this analytic framing of the dependent, 
independent and intervening variables.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Variables showing the relationship between clusters and poverty alleviation 
 
 
Research methodology. For this study, several methodological techniques were adopted. These 
include survey questionnaires, formal and non-formal interviews, archival research and statistical 
analysis with the case study at the heart of it. The core and primary case, exemplifying a single 
sector, single cluster analysis is the Otigba ICT Cluster in Lagos, Nigeria (also called Otigba or 
the Computer Village, and used interchangeably throughout this dissertation). While the 
approach of a single core case study of the Otigba cluster in Lagos, Nigeria is taken, this 
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dissertation draws on both primary and secondary data, and is complemented and enriched 
through secondary literature.  
 
Otigba is itself a vibrant and spontaneous agglomeration of “self-starting and self-sustaining 
small enterprises that are in some cases family owned” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006, p. 20), and 
spread over an area of about 6 square kilometers in Ikeja, the capital of Lagos state. The cluster 
originated in the early 1990s on two streets that were designated as residential by the local 
government, but the firms now occupy at least eights streets, with Otigba being the largest (Ibid, 
2006), as seen in the sketch map below (Map 1.2). 
 
Map 1.2: A sketch map of the physical layout of the Otigba Cluster  
 




















































Fig. 3: A sketch of the physical layout of the Otigba Cluster
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The cluster lies on a scale ranging between formal and informal. On the one hand, it is viewed as 
informal by the state government because it is a residential zone converted into a business 
district by private individuals. On the other hand, it is recognized by the same state government, 
which relates with it through the umbrella association – the Computer and Allied Products 
Dealers Association of Nigeria (CAPDAN) – and collects taxes from the firms. The cluster also 
has a wide range of actors, which would be discussed later in this chapter, some more 
established, and others who are less so. The latter group are more vulnerable and usually subject 
to the government’s attempt to sanitize the cluster. This is because the cluster is in Lagos’ capital 
but can be intensely parked with the constant traffic of people and vehicles as seen in Picture 3.1 
in chapter 3.   
 
It is a spontaneous cluster, as opposed to a planned one; the latter being those that are “induced 
by public policies, or “constructed”; [and] … range from “technopoles” and industrial parks to 
incubators and export processing zones (EPZs)” (Zeng, 2008, p. 2).  The “stimulus for its growth 
was the relatively high demand for computers and peripherals from businesses and academic 
institutions – Lagos is home to 60 percent of Nigeria’s industrial production and the region also 
has the nation’s highest percentage of educated people and educational institutions” (Abiola, 
2008, p. 67).   
 
Previous studies3 gave good background information on the dynamic and entrepreneurial nature 
of the cluster. These studies coupled with my own pilot investigations assisted in corroborating 
                                                        
3 Bamiro (2004) had select interviews at the Computer Village. The second was done by the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN) (2005) on clusters in Nigeria and was the first full scale 
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Otigba as a good case study. However, these prior studies did not address human development 
issues, which are at the heart of this study. Initial site visits to the Kamakunji Metalworks Cluster 
in Nairobi, Kenya, and Otigba eliminated the former as a potential case due to the low skill and 
productivity levels, and as well the perceived language barrier4 for the author at the cluster.  
 
The first visit to Otigba in August 2011 was followed by three separate visits between March 
2012 and March 2013. During these latter visits, I carried out field studies at Otigba, collecting 
data from interviews, survey questionnaires, and general observations of the cluster, and other 
secondary data sources. A pilot study was carried out in March 2012. Questions aimed at gaining 
information on respondents’ subjective view of their living standards, as well as a more objective 
and standardized analysis of their living conditions based on multidimensional poverty indices 
and slum indicators such as housing conditions, access to improved water and sanitation. A 
taskforce member of CAPDAN assisted in employing people to disseminate and retrieve the 
pilot survey questionnaires. Two types of questionnaires were administered – one targeted at 
employees and the other at employers. 40 out of a total of 50 questionnaires were retrieved and 
analyzed.  
 
The findings from the pilot study provided persuasive support that Otigba was an appropriate 
cluster for the dissertation. It had the dynamism (seen through increased growth in size over the 
years, and availability of up to date products), and variability of firms and workers needed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
work jointly done by academics and an important government agency which also fully involved all the related trade 
and professional associations. The data from the SMEDAN study is what has subsequently been used for other 
publications (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006, 2007; Abiola (2008); Adebowale & Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2012)). This same 
data set is that which Abiola used in the chapter for the Computer Village for the World Bank edited by Zeng 
(2008).  




define and organize this study. As opposed to many African clusters characterized by low skill, 
and utilizing low technology manufacturing techniques, Otigba employed both low and high 
skilled labor, had high prospects of further upgrading, possessed a necessary technological 
dynamism and seemingly held the potential for wealth generation and poverty alleviation. In 
addition, the cluster was a heterogeneous mix of Nigeria’s ethnic nationalities with different 
approaches to business, learning and collaborative behavior.  
 
Justification of the single case study. Industrial clusters, sectoral and geographic 
agglomerations of firms, differ in various ways including in their technical and production 
features, depth of skill and knowledge, historical origin, formation trigger factors, policies that 
sustain/hinder them, and the institutions within which they are embedded, among others. As 
individual occurrences, they serve as cases which “are historically, politically, or culturally 
significant in some way” (Ragin, 1997, p. 29).  Similarly, a “case study is an empirical inquiry 
that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used” (Yin, 1989:23, cited in Verschuren, 2003, p. 123). For this reason, the in-
depth study of particular phenomena within a specific industry is a prevalent method used in 
empirical cluster studies. Examples from the literature include Mano et al. (2011), who examined 
the role of personal networks in the cut-flower industry in Ethiopia; Chari (2000) analyzing the 
agrarian origins of the knitware industrial cluster in Trippur, India; Schmitz’s (1995b) 
assessment of the Sinos valley in Brazil; Mano, Alhassan, Yutaka and Tetsushi’s (2012) study of 
the impact of basic managerial training using experimental training in Suame Magazine, Ghana; 
and Giuliani and Bell (2005) using social network analysis to measure the determinants of 
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learning and innovation in a wine cluster in Chile. Empirical doctoral level dissertations have 
also adopted this single sector, single country method. For example citing from Albu (1997) – 
Khalid Nadvi (1996) on small industrial districts in Pakistan; Meenu Tewari’s (1996) on 
knitware industry in Ludhiana, India; and Henry Sandee’s (1995) on roof-tile manufacturing in 
Java, Indonesia. An exemption is Rabellotti (1995), who compared the footware industry in both 
Italy and Mexico. 
 
Again, while a comparative case study approach could well be relevant for this study, it was 
difficult to find good comparative cases. In SSA, there are no other ICT clusters that share 
similar characteristics with Otigba: with as much prior information; the sheer number of 
clustered firms in one place; assembling and cloning of hardware; minimal state support; and a 
high level of entrepreneurship. For the Otigba cluster (as with some other clusters including and 
in addition to Kamukunji, the Aba micro, small and medium leather and footware cluster and the 
Aba fashion and garments cluster in Nigeria, and the Lake Naivasha cut-flower cluster in Kenya 
which were earlier considered), prior studies provided useful secondary information and thereby 
created awareness of the cluster before an actual site visit was carried out.  
 
Another case study method which was initially considered was to use different sector clusters, or 
maximum variation cases. These cases are used to “obtain information about the significance of 
various circumstances for case process and outcome (e.g., three to four cases that are very 
different on one dimension: one size, form of organization, location, budget)” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p. 230; emphasis added). The challenge with this approach was that the clusters under 
consideration were different in more than one dimension – location, sector, political-economic 
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background and so on. Limitations of time, data, language, and resources further contributed to 
delineating the primary research to one core case.    
 
With Otigba as the selected case study, cluster variability allowed for intra-cluster comparative 
analysis due to the differentiated firm sizes, structure and nature of ownership. The cluster in 
addition displayed variety in types and levels of collaboration; for example unlike clusters in 
advanced industrial environments, Otigba thrives largely on strong kinship and family ties, 
although professional ties exist. Finally, case studies are expensive and successful outcomes 
depend in large part on accessibility to information and key actors. From the pilot study 
experience, this cluster was more accessible for the author financially, and more critically, to key 
actors and knowledge of the sector.  
 
As earlier mentioned, the dissertation is complemented and enriched through secondary 
literature. This is important to address some of the criticisms of a single case study, one of which 
is generalizability. Verschuren (2003, p. 123) writes:  
Some authors are aware of the fact that the use of one single case has several limitations, 
regarding both analytical power and pervasiveness on the one hand, and generalizability 
of the results on the other… Ragin (1987:xiii) too advocates the use of multiple cases, 




Flyvbjerg (2006) highlights that the perception that “[o]ne cannot generalize on the basis of an 
individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development” (p. 221), 
was a misunderstanding of case studies. In correcting this misunderstanding, he wrote,  
“[o]ne can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be 
central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other 
methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as source of scientific development, 
whereas “the force of example” is underestimated” (ibid., p. 225).  
He concludes “with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of 
thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and 
a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one” (ibid., p. 219). 
 
Given the lack of systematic analysis on the nexus of poverty and industrial clusters, I prioritize 
depth of information and analysis over multiple cases. This dissertation does not propose 
generalization as its end goal, but seeks to be an exemplar of a systematic study that can be used 
as a basis for future studies. There are not many thoroughly executed cluster studies at the 
doctoral level in SSA, and none whatsoever considering living standards of workers within a 
multidimensional poverty framework. My aim is that in time, this case study will “assist in 
conducting research [on other industrial clusters] by helping to identify issues to expect, 
questions to ask, …data to look for [and] … can assist in corroborating the veracity of … data 
and information collected, and can suggest ways in framing narrative[s]” Mukhija (2010, p. 417). 
 
Furthermore, an in-depth case study, as opposed to quantitative analysis of existing data, is 
appropriate in this study; the latter being impossible to do given the dearth of data on 
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multidimensional poverty among workers in African clusters. In addition to theoretical 
justifications of a single case approach for cluster studies, the empirical study also validates the 
Otigba cluster as an appropriate and adequate study sample.  
 
Validation of the Otigba case from empirical study. Informants5 corroborated the broad 
narrative that Otigba has been a major source of employment and income for a wide range of 
workers, entrepreneurs and intermediaries, including university graduates. One interviewee was 
categorical that in the unlikely event of closing down the market, unemployment, poverty, and 
insecurity will ensue. The secretary of the CAPDAN stated in response to a newspaper interview 
question: “what significant role would you say the Computer Village is playing in the national 
economy?” that  
The contribution from this cluster has been enormous… Computer [V]illage, I stand to be 
corrected, has done more than any other sector has done for this country… When you talk 
about employment and wealth creation here, it is amazing what impact this [V]illage has 
made on the economy. (National Mirror, 2012). 
 
Thus for policy purposes, this case further represents a good fit for the study as it will provide 
relevant knowledge to an understanding of the socio economic problems of poverty and 
unemployment, both acknowledged challenges of the Nigerian economy. According to the Small 
and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN, 2005), CAPDAN had 
about 3,500 registered enterprises, with about 8,000 to 10,000 employers excluding their 
employers. There are also about 1,500 street operators. By how much has this figure grown in 
                                                        
5 Informants are a group of experts with more than a casual knowledge of the cluster and the subject matter. I had 
several discussions with such individuals prior to and during the study’s fieldwork. 
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the past nine years is to be known. While the cluster has provided employment to a considerable 
number of people, I sought to probe the extent to which these employment opportunities had 
created better living standards for the workers.  
 
Secondly, the structure of the industry in Otigba is highly heterogeneous comprising small, 
medium, and large firms; rendering different services with ownership structures that are highly 
diverse as well. SMEDAN (2005) broke down firm sizes in terms of numbers of employees, into 
micro (1-15), small (16-50) and medium (50-200). This variability further argued for the choice 
of this cluster, as it will contribute towards understanding how different size firms with varying 
types and levels of skills, capabilities and policies resulted in diverse living standards for their 
workers.  
 
Thirdly, findings from the employee pilot survey showed that the cluster had the potential of 
raising living standards, although there seemed to be a contradiction between employees stated 
earnings and their perceptions of how they were faring. In particular in terms of earnings per 
week, out of 18 respondents, 4 earned between 0-1,000 naira;6 7 between 1,001 to 5,000 naira, 3 
between 5,001 to 10,000 naira, 2 between 10,001 and 50,000 and 2 above 50,000 naira. The 
minimum wage in the country, as at March 2011, was N18,000 per month (ILO). The pilot 
survey thus showed that about 61% of employees in the cluster made less than N20,000 per 
month which is more than the Lagos State average of 38%. On the other hand, about 11% made 
more than N200,000 per month compared to the state average of about 2% which made more 
than N100,000 monthly (Lagos Bureau of Statistics, 2011). However, when asked, “Has working 
                                                        
6 Naira = N; N1 = $0.00594; N1,000 = $5.94 ; N5,000 = $29.69; N10,000 = $59.39; N18, 000 = $106.9; N50,000 = 
$296.93 (OANDA, 2014, October 6). Table 1.1 in the appendix provides converted exchange rates for the rest of the 
dissertation.  
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here at Otigba raised your standard of living?”, more than half (57.9%) of the 19 respondents to 
the question answered “yes”.  
 
An attempt to measure the cost of living of workers in the cluster (Table 1.1) and in what way 
their living standard had changed since working in the cluster (Table 1.2) showed that despite a 
high cost of living, the cluster had the propensity to improve the standard of living of workers 
within them. From Table 1.1, we find 41.2% and 31.6% of respondents spent between a quarter 
to half of their income on accommodation and transportation respectively. 
  












On average, what percentage of your income do you 
spend on accommodation? 
17.6 29.4 41.2 11.8 17  
On average, what percentage of your income do you 
spend on transportation? 
21.1 36.8 31.6 10.5 19  
On average, what percentage of your income do you 
spend on drinking water? 
47.4 47.4 5.3 0 19  
On average, what percentage of your income do you 
save? 
42.1 26.3 26.3 5.3 19  
Source: Author’s field survey (2012) 
 
Despite these expenses, 60% of respondents reported rising standards of living and income (see 
Table 1.2 below). This confirmed my hypothesis that industrial clusters could improve standard 
of living, and validated Otigba as a good case study. However, there was still the need to 
understand the mechanisms through which poverty was alleviated and what factors drove the rise 
in living standards in the face of a high cost of living.   
 
In other words, given the empirical evidence showing that the cluster was instrumental in raising 
the living standards of workers, the question remained how was this being done? Was it only 
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through work-place benefits like salaries, wages, and training that the workers received which 
could then be translated directly or indirectly to improving their living standards, or were some 
firms motivated to pass on other work-based or place-based benefits to their workers?  
 
















Que 1. 5% 10% 25% 45% 15% 20  
Que 2. 0 10% 30% 55% 5% 20 
Que 3. 0 10.5% 42.1% 42.1% 5.3% 19  
Que 4. 0 17.6% 29.4% 47.1% 5.9% 17  
Que 5. 5.3% 10.5% 42.1% 31.6% 10.5% 19  
Que 1: Between when you started working here and today, how much has your standard of living changed?  
Que 2: Between when you started working here and today, how much has your income changed? 
Que 3: Since working here, about how much have your personal assets changed over time? 
Que 4: Since working here, how has your support (monetary and non-monetary) to people around? 
Que 5: Since working here, how has your health changed over time? 
Source: Author’s field survey (2012) 
However, while it might be viewed as a productive cluster, productivity is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the improvement of welfare of workers. How then did employees in 
Otigba navigate better living standards for themselves in the face of weak or missing formal 
institutions, or weak enforcement in cases where labor laws were in existence?  
 
Fourthly, while the literature places the state as a central actor in fostering cluster growth, the 
cluster in question has itself experienced poor state support, while formal institutions for social 
protection for informal workers has tended to be weak. It therefore serves as a good case to 
examine how firms pass on benefits to workers in the absence of institutional regulations that 
mandates and enforces the delivery of social protection to workers.  
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Fifth, the cluster is noted for high-level inter-firm cooperation. Abiola (2008, p. 69) writes that a 
significant characteristic of the firms in Otigba, as opposed to traditional clusters in Africa, is 
“the level of inter firm cooperation and joint action, both of which developed in response to poor 
state support and sometimes hostile municipal government policy.” There are also many 
Information Technology (IT) associations in the country, a significant one in the cluster itself 
being CAPDAN. Strong inter-firm collaboration could provide the fulcrum for equally 
significant inter-sectoral integration of industrial activities; a very important basis for supportive 
policy intervention. 
 
The cluster, in spite of major challenges such as “lack of capital, especially long-term financing; 
weak infrastructure support; vulnerability to foreign exchange and import duties” (Zeng, 2008, p. 
3), is still vibrant and in all likelihood will continue to grow. In sum, for the aforementioned 
reasons, Otigba served as a strong case for this study. 
 
Data Collection. For this study, primary data was collected by way of interviews and 
surveys. Surveys were used in the study to enhance a general understanding of the Otigba cluster 
and were administered to both employees and employers. Two types of questionnaires were 
constructed and administered – one targeted to employees and the other to owners/Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and managers of the companies. Table 1.3 shows components of each 
of the questionnaires and selected information from each section. The questionnaires enabled 
respondents and their firms to be anonymous by not requiring their names or the name of their 
firms. Given the sensitivity of some of the questions i.e. on poverty, living conditions and firm 
particular data, anonymity was given to encourage truthfulness in responses. Initial interviews 
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and a pilot survey (mentioned earlier and carried out in March 2012) were designed to feed the 
development of the final survey questionnaire. A total of 40 questionnaires were analyzed from 
the pilot survey. The pilot survey was then improved upon and changed to reflect the more 
specific concentration of the study. Questions that were not properly answered or that were not 
deemed necessary for the study’s analysis in the pilot survey were removed or modified.  
 
Subsequent field research was carried out in July/August 2012, and from January to the 
beginning of March 2013. During these latter visits, data was collected from primary and 
secondary sources using interviews, survey questionnaires, and general observations of the 
cluster. Archival research to collect old, and relevant newspaper articles on the cluster and 
poverty in Nigeria was also carried out. Informants for this study included ICT and non-ICT 
business owners and employees within the cluster; business owners who had ICT businesses, but 
were not within the geographical location of the cluster; government officials; bank employees; 
and others who had information and knowledge on the topic. The cluster was categorized in 
terms of the different types of firms based on products and services rendered. Interviews were 
then sought with firms that fit into these different types, as well as some of the bigger players in 
the cluster and ICT industry.  
 
In all, a total of about sixty formal and informal interviews took place, most of which were face 
to face. The final surveys were randomly distributed, in an attempt to reach different types of 
actors/firms (based on product, size, and location) within the cluster, as well as established firms 
in the industry who were located inside and outside of the cluster. My connection within the 
cluster assisted in soliciting help from people within the cluster to aid in the distribution of some 
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of the questionnaires. In addition, a shortened version of the survey questionnaires was also 
disseminated via email to members of the Computer Society of Nigeria (CSN), as well at the 
Lagos and Ijebu-Ode chapter during the meetings of the Society. Samples of the employee and 
CEO/management survey questionnaires (not the shortened versions) are included in the 
appendix. The retrieval number of 257 questionnaires – 101 CEO/Management and 156 
employees surpassed our expectation of 150-200, which may be due to the interest of the 
respondents in the research.  The questionnaires were analyzed using basic descriptive analysis 
as well as Discriminant Analysis.7 
 
Table 1.3: Components of employee and CEO/management surveys 
Section Employee (select information within each 
section) 
CEO/Management (select information within each 
section) 
1 General information (Position in enterprise; 
level of education) 
General information (Number of employees; initial 
investment; present worth)  
2 Employment information (products & 
services of firm; time spent working in firm) 
Basic information: (Products & services of firm; 
questions on collaboration) 
3 Joint action (social network in employment; 
collaboration with other workers) 
Financial support & physical infrastructure (financial 
sources used; rating of provision of public infrastructure) 
4 Welfare (non-income benefits received from 
employers; perceptions of own standard of 
living) 
Employees (non-income benefits and vacation days given 
to employees) 
5 Cost of living (effect of government policies; 
living arrangements) 
Welfare (perceptions of own standard of living; 
perceptions on standard of living with regards to 
Computer Village) 
6 N/A Cost of living (effect of government policies; living 
arrangements) 
 
Living standards were measured both subjectively and objectively. The former was used to 
assess the perception of workers on their living standards, while the latter was used to compare 
living standards in the cluster with standardized (and internationally recognized) indicators of 
multidimensional poverty and slums indicators. The subjective measurement is akin to the 
                                                        
7 Discriminant function analysis (DA) is a tool that enables the prediction of outcomes. DA, unlike multiple linear 
regression which is used when the dependent variable is an interval variable, can be used when the dependent 
variable is categorical (Author Unknown, Chapter 25, Discriminant Analysis). Furthermore, it does not presuppose 
any causal relationships between the variables in the analysis and is therefore preferred over regression analysis 
where casual relationships among variables is not known or is immaterial.   
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“subjective poverty measure” which is based on the “perception of the citizenry” (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. 11).  In this case, it is based on the perception of the survey 
respondents.  The perceptions of workers were drawn out with such questions as:  
 
 
Box 1.1: Sample questions of subjective living standard measurements 
About how much do you make on average every week (in Naira)?  
a) 0 - 1000 b) 1001 – 5000 c) 5001 to 10,000 d) 10,001-50,000 e) Above 50,000 
 
              Has your working in this company raised your standard of living? 
a) Yes    b) No 
 
 Between when you started working here and today, how much has your standard of living changed?  
              a) Drastically reduced   b) Reduced    c) Remained the same   d) Increased      
              e) Drastically increased 
 
              Between when you started working here and today, about how much has your income changed over time?  
              a) Drastically reduced      b) Reduced   c) Remained the same      d) Increased       
              e) Drastically increased  
 
How will you describe your current standard of living compared to your peers? 
a) Poor    b) Surviving    c) Comfortable      d) Rich      e) Very Rich 
 
 Please tick either True or False to the following statements, based on your opinion of the 
Computer Village (i.e. Otigba):  
Statement 
Workers doing the same work but in different companies in Computer Village get different financial 
rewards.  
Workers in Computer Village are faring better financially than those doing the same work outside of 
Computer Village.  
Job security within Computer Village is good (that is, there is no fear of losing one’s job)  
Most workers working in Computer Village are very satisfied  
Given the opportunity, most workers will go to work outside Computer Village 
For most workers, their standard of living improves when they begin working in Computer Village. 
   Source: Author’s survey (2013) 
 
For the standardized measurements, indicators from the standard of living component of the MPI 
and the definition of a slum household as defined by the United Nations Human Settlements 
Program (UN-Habitat) were used. The MPI (Alkire and Santos, 2010) has ten indicators that are 
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categorized under education, health, and standard of living, just like the HDI. The three 
dimensions with their ten indicators are:  
Health 
Child mortality: If any child has died in the family 
Nutrition: If any adult or child in the family is malnourished 
Education 
Years of schooling: If no household member has completed 5 years of schooling 
Child Enrolment: If any school-aged child is out of school in years 1 to 8 
Standard of Living 
Electricity – If household does not have electricity 
Drinking water – If does not meet the MDG definitions, or is more than 30 mins walk 
Sanitation – If does not meet MDG definitions, or the toilet is shared  
Flooring – If the floor is dirt, sand, or dung 
Cooking Fuel – If they cook with wood, charcoal, or dung 
Assets – If do not own more than one of: radio, tv, telephone, bike, motorbike 
 
Inquiries for this dissertation are however limited only to the standard of living dimension of the 
MPI. It also draws from the UN-Habitat’s (2008, p. 33) characterization of a slum household:  
consists of one or a group of individuals living under the same roof in an urban area, 
lacking one or more of the following five amenities: (1) durable housing (a permanent 
structure providing protection from extreme climate conditions); (2) sufficient living area 
(no more than three people sharing a room); (3) access to improved water (water that is 
sufficient, affordable and can be obtained without extreme effort); (4) access to improved 
sanitation facilities (a private toilet, or a public one shared with a reasonable number of 
people); and (5) secure tenure (de facto or de jure secure tenant status and protection 
against forced eviction).8  
 
                                                        
8 As information for secure tenure is not readily available for many countries, the first four indicators are usually 
used by the UN-Habitat to define and calculate the proportion of slum households in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2008, 
p. 33)  
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Drawing from these two concepts, the study gathered data on respondents’ electricity, cooking 
fuel, drinking water, sanitation, cooking fuel, assets, flooring and housing. Table 1.4 below 
highlights these different indicators.  
 
 
Table 1.4: Overlap in MPI, study, and UN-Habitat indicators  
MPI standard of living 
indicators & deprivation 
criteria 
Study standard of living indicators UN-Habitat slum indicators 
Electricity: If household does 
not have electricity 
Electricity: Source of lighting; 
frequency of public power supply 
 
Cooking Fuel: If they cook with 
wood, charcoal, or dung 
 
Cooking Fuel: Type of cooking fuel  
 
 
Drinking water: If does not 
meet MDG definitions, or is 
more than 30 mins walks 
Drinking water: Amount spent on 
drinking water; source of drinking 
water 
Access to improved water: water that is 
sufficient, affordable and can be 
obtained without extreme effort) 
Sanitation: If does not meet 
MDG definitions, or the toilet is 
shared 
Sanitation: Access to toilet facilities 
at home 
Access to improved sanitation facilities: 
a private toilet, or a public one shared 
with a reasonable number of people 
Assets: If do not own more than 
one of: radio, tv, telephone, 
bike, motorbike 
Assets: Ownership of assets; change 
in personal assets since working in 
firm 
 
Flooring: If the floor is dirt, 
sand, or dung 
Material used to build house: natural, 
rudimentary, finished 
 
 Condition and location of home: in 
need of major repair, in a hazardous 
place, on or near toxic waste 
Durable housing: a permanent structure 
providing protection from extreme 
climate conditions 
 Sufficient living area: More than 3 
people share a bedroom 
Sufficient living area: no more than 
three people sharing a room 
Source: Alkire, S. and Santos, M. E. (2010, p. 7); UN-Habitat (2008, p. 33); Author’s field 
survey (2013) 
 
While this study was influenced by the MPI, it differed in certain ways from it. Firstly, while the 
target population for MPI surveys are households, this study targeted individuals (though some 
questions pertain to their households). Secondly, questions on health and education were 
adjusted to address the individual worker within the cluster as opposed to their household.  
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Thirdly, a single MPI statistic for the cluster was not calculated as is done for MPI for various 
countries. 
 
This study also drew on other resources to inform the data collection. For example, a past 
questionnaire used by SMEDAN (2005) on six SME clusters in Nigeria – the Otigba Information 
and Communications Technology cluster, the Nnewi automotive SME cluster, the Kano leather 
cluster, the Aba micro, small and medium leather and footwear cluster, the Aba fashion and 
garments cluster and the Abeokuta and Oshogbo tie and dye industry – was drawn upon to 
inform the development of this study’s surveys. The SMEDAN survey questionnaire for the 
Otigba cluster was extensive and had ten sections which asked questions soliciting general and 
basic information of the respondent and their firms; sources of input and import constraints; 
source, process and product of technology and innovation, government support; physical 
infrastructure; technical support; financial support; market access; cooperation; and competitive 
factors.  
 
The pilot survey showed that questions which asked for historical numerical information for 
example about profit, income, and number of employees from 5 years back, had a low response 
rate. It therefore proved easier and lent to more accuracy to ask about incremental and current 
standards of living since working at Otigba, than that which existed before the workers began to 
work at Otigba. Additionally, another challenge with obtaining accurate information on living 
standards for the workers and employers was that they had different dates in which they started 
working or established their firms at the Computer Village. Therefore living standards of 
workers and owners at the start of their work or owning a business at the cluster were not asked. 
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Instead, information that measured current, as well as improvements to living standards since 
working or owning a business in the cluster were obtained and considered sufficient for the 
study.  
 
Secondary quantitative data from such sources as the 2010 Nigeria Poverty Profile, the Nigeria 
Millennium Development Goals, the Human Development Report, the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys, the World Bank Doing Business Project, and the Lagos Bureau of Statistics’ (LBS) 
Household Survey Report,9 were also used to complement the primary data. The LBS data set 
breaks down information by Local Government Areas, and includes information for the Ikeja 
Local Government Area where Otigba is located. However, this data, to the best of my 
knowledge was not delineated to such a degree as to be narrowly concerned with the Computer 
Village. Furthermore, the data found on living standards for the Computer Village area, did not 
reflect that of the workers and firm owners themselves, as a good number of the workers 
commute to work, and live outside the Ikeja local government area in places such as Iyana Ipaja, 
Oshodi, Festac, Igado, Egbeda, and Ikotun. For example, survey results show that about 37% of 






                                                        
9 The household survey questionnaire was designed to cover 15 distinct modules: household information, type of 
housing, land and tenure, access to infrastructure – storm water drainage, sanitation, water supply, solid waste 
removal, energy and electricity, communication (telephone), transportation and local roads, education, health, 
emergency and policing services, community preferences, household income and expenditure. (LBS, 2011, p.21).  
 37 
Table 1.5: Average time to work  
Average time it takes from work to where your live No Percentage 
Less than 30 minutes 31 19.9 
Between 30 minutes to one hour 59 37.8 
Between one to two hours 24 15.4 
Between two to three hours  20 12.8 
More than three hours 15 9.6 
No response 7 4.5 
Total 156 100.0 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013) 
 
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two is the literature review which 
locates the dissertation within the existing theoretical literature by further reviewing the 
relationship between manufacturing, growth and employment and the need for and agents of 
social protection. The chapter further explains the focus on the nexus of clusters and poverty, and 
highlights the role of social protection and institutions as pertains to this thesis. In addition, it 
explores why the gaps that currently exist in the industrial cluster and human development 
literature merit scholarly and policy attention. Chapter three gives a descriptive historic portrait 
and evolution of the case study, and its position within the political economy and urban context 
of Nigeria. It reviews and analyzes background information on poverty, unemployment, 
inequality, living standards and planning issues in Nigeria, while also benchmarking it within the 
broader industrial/manufacturing milieu, and the ICT sector in comparative analysis with 
industry in Africa.  
 
Chapter four considers the relationship between work and standard of living. Drawing on 
secondary literature, analysis from surveys and interviews, it uses the case study to explain the 
standard of living of workers in the cluster, using MPI and slum indicators. Chapter five takes a 
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close look at the debate on social protection in Nigeria, and particularly as it pertains to informal 
workers. Finally, it uses the case study to profile the characteristics that cause firms to pass on 
work-place based, work-based and place-based benefits to their workers. Chapter six follows 
from chapter two’s review of the role of the state and institutions in creating an enabling 
environment for clusters. It specifically focuses on the past and current roles of government, its 
agencies, policies, and institutions in poverty eradication in Nigeria, and how these have 
impacted industrial clusters and Otigba in particular. The seventh and final chapter highlights the 
key findings of this dissertation and recounts the main lessons from the previous chapters. It also 

















The Nexus of Industrial Clusters and Poverty 
2.1. Introduction  
As highlighted in chapter one, structural transformation has been seen as a pathway to 
development since the industrial revolution in Britain. Other countries have since boosted their 
economies by following various industrialization pathways. Countries in SSA have also recorded 
noteworthy growth rates in the past decade, however, most of the growth is still largely driven 
and characterized by a heavy dependence on the production and export of commodities, few 
backward and forward linkages, local industries that add little value, and no economic 
diversification (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] & African Union 
[AU], 2013).  
 
Notably, and giving rise to concern is the fact that Africa’s growth rates have not been 
accompanied by complementary improvements in human development indicators such as 
poverty, unemployment and inequality. Furthermore, in many of these countries coverage of 
formal social protection is limited and expansion is constricted by the “lack of formal wage 
employment among the poor” (Giovannetti and Sanfillippo, 2011, para. 4). 
 
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on how productive industrial clusters can impact 
living standards. It begins by demonstrating the links between industrial manufacturing pathway, 
employment and living standards. It provides key stylized facts supporting industrial 
manufacturing as a source of economic growth, followed by manufacturing’s impact on 
employment and poverty. After that, it touches on the nature and pattern of employment, whether 
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formal or informal and its importance to labor’s well-being. Next, based on the caveat that 
productivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improvement in living standards, it 
introduces the concept and place of social protection policies. It further provides insights on 
institutions in cluster development. Finally, it narrows down on clusters as a unique form of 
industrial organization and an entryway to linking industrial dynamism, social protection and 
labor’s welfare outcomes. It highlights actors, mechanisms, and institutions considered in 
impacting productivity and human development in the industrial cluster literature, and the likely 
role this can play from a social protection frame. Importantly, the chapter provides the 
justification for this work, presents the explanation for a focus on the nexus of clusters and 
poverty and why the gaps that currently exist in the cluster and poverty literature merit scholarly 
and policy attention.  
 
2.2. Industrialization, Employment and Living Standards 
This section considers ideas behind the claims made for manufacturing as a positive catalyst for 
economic growth, and as well employment and living standards. It also considers the nature and 
quality of work, including informal and formal employment and skills. 
 
Industrial manufacturing as the source of economic growth. The case for industrial 
manufacturing as “the engine of growth” was made a long time ago through a seminal work 
trying to explain the slow rate of growth in the United Kingdom by Kaldor (1966, 1967) and 
coded in Kaldor’s Laws. They can be summarized as follows:10 
1. The faster the growth rate of manufacturing output, the faster the growth rate of GDP; 
                                                        
10 For more details, see Szirmai 2009; McCombie, 1983; Thirlwall, 1983; Lavopa and Szirmai, 2012 
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2. The faster the growth rate of manufacturing output, the faster the growth rate of 
manufacturing labor productivity (due to increasing returns);  
3. The faster the growth rate of manufacturing output, the faster the growth rate of non-
manufacturing labor productivity (due to reallocation of labor).  
 
Several studies following in the Kaldor tradition have established a clear empirical correlation 
between the degree of industrialization and the level of per capita income in developing countries 
(Rodrik, 2009). Not surprising, almost all developing countries that recorded higher per capital 
incomes concomitantly have relatively high share of manufacturing in GDP and as well rise in 
levels of employment; for the more dynamic emerging countries, this is accompanied by the 
growth of manufacturing output and manufactured exports. Poor countries on the other hand tend 
to record high levels of agricultural labor force and low manufacturing contribution to GDP. 
Second, developing countries that are industrializing are associated with a positive GDP per 
capita and shares of manufacturing correlation. This is because productivity is higher in the 
manufacturing sector than in the agricultural sector (Fei and Ranis, 1964; Syrquin, 1984, 1986; 
Szirmai, 2009). Structural change through an industrialization pathway implies the shift of 
resources from agriculture to manufacturing; and this process continues so far as the share of 
manufacturing continues to rise in overall GDP (Rodrik, 2009).   
 
Third, in contradistinction to agriculture, an industrial manufacturing pathways is a faster road to 
capital accumulation; this is particularly so in spatially concentrated manufacturing (cluster 
agglomeration) compared with spatially dispersed agricultural activities. Capital intensity is 
equally high for sectors linked closely to manufacturing such as mining, utilities, construction 
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and transport and much lower in agriculture and services. Capital accumulation is one of the 
aggregate sources of growth therefore as the share of manufacturing rises aggregate growth 
contribution increases. Fourth, industrial manufacturing pathways make possible large gains in 
economies of scale, which is often not realized in agriculture or services (Cornwall, 1977). As a 
large literature points out, technological change and innovation is largely concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector and diffuses from there to other economic sectors such as the service sector 
(Rosenberg, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
 
Fifth, linkage and spillover effects are far more prominent and widespread in diverse industrial 
manufacturing compared with agriculture or mining. The notion of inter-linkage and their effects 
was made popular by Hirschman (1958) who analyzed the direct backward and forward linkages 
in production and this has come to include other interactive relations between different sectors 
and subsectors in systems of innovation literature (Lundvall, 1992; Von Hippel, 1988). Cluster 
benefits include different kinds of linkage effects that create positive externalities to investments, 
including spillover effects within the cluster and beyond. For example businesses in different 
sectors such as finance, insurance, transportation, and communication can spring up to support 
the cluster. Furthermore, there are disembodied knowledge flows that occur between actors and 
sectors. 
 
Manufacturing pathway impact on employment and poverty (living standards). 
The impact of industrial pathways on employment and job creation is less well understood than 
its broader effect on GDP growth; however there are several effects that can be highlighted. 
First, due to the higher productivity in the manufacturing sector compared with agriculture (a 
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low productivity sector), manufacturing jobs command higher wages and remunerations and as 
such contribute directly to raising living standards. This tends to be even more striking for 
economies growing from a low level and workers previously on very low and precarious wages. 
Conventionally total direct contribution to total employed labor force is between 16 to 20% and 
in the rare case of a country like Taiwan a little under 30% (Lavapo and Szirmai, 2012). 
Second, the far greater contribution of industrial manufacturing is indirect, through backward 
and forward linkages. 
 
The third channel through which industrial activity contributes to employment is through 
induced Keynesian style multiplier effects in both demand and supply sides (Tyler, 1976; 
McMillan and Rodrik, 2011); rise in income stimulates spending thereby creating further 
demands and investments. In addition to these external effects on investment, there arises also 
knowledge spillover effects, which is analyzed subsequently as collaborative learning and 
production relationships in this thesis. According to some estimates, for every job created in 
manufacturing there is a multiplier effect of between five to twenty indirect jobs (United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO], 2012). Clearly, structural shift from agriculture 
to industry is a certain route and pathway out of poverty because it creates diverse avenues for 
wage employment. In the UNIDO study cited above, of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) countries studied, China, which recorded an unprecedented expansion of its 
manufacturing contribution to GDP (from 22% in 1987 to 45% in 2008) achieved an equally 
dramatic reduction in poverty, with an estimated 660 million people taken out of poverty since 
1980 (The Economist, 2012).  
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It is however increasingly recognized that not only is employment important, but its nature and 
quality. Target IB of the MDGs, newly added in 2008, seeks to achieve “full and productive 
employment and decent work for all, including women and young people” (Sparreboom & 
Albee, 2011, p. 2). The International Labor Organization’s (ILO’s) Decent Work Agenda itself 
has “four strategic pillars” that encompass: “full and productive employment, rights at work, 
social protection and the promotion of social dialogue” (ILO, 2012). Indeed, the nature of an 
individual’s work does impact various aspects of life including access to basic amenities, work-
place benefits, social networks, relationship with family, friends, spirituality, health, self-esteem, 
and general life outside the work-place. One’s work is therefore very important, as “[p]eople see 
the world through the optic of their workplace. Success or failure in the labor market determine 
whether family needs and aspirations can be met, whether girls or boys get a decent education, 
[or] whether youths are able to build a career or end up on the street” (World Commission on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004, p. 64).  
 
The urban poor in particular need work that assures a decent wage in order to survive and 
guarantee the basic supply of commoditized necessities (Mitlin and Satterwaite, 2013). For the 
poor, “labour is often the main asset [they] possess. It is their chief source of income; [and] the 
most important asset supporting their wellbeing and survival” (Higgins, 2009, p. 2). Access to 
employment therefore tends to guarantee some level of income stability and work place benefits.   
 
Consequently, the dynamics of the labor market might signal the living conditions of urban 
workers. Without a steady or substantial source of income, a household is clearly forced to 
endure low standards of living, and in poor countries, life in slums. Equally, in the more 
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advanced countries, austerity measures have led to cuts in basic social services like health, which 
has reduced the living standards of many households and limited access of economically 
vulnerable individuals including the unemployed to these services. Consequently, the poor tend 
to spend a higher proportion of their income on basic necessities. In essence, a vicious cycle of 
poverty then emerges where children are born into low-income households having inadequate 
basic social amenities like education and housing, and end up with unequal opportunities as 
opposed to more well-off children; evidently unequal opportunities result in different outcome 
inequalities observed later in life (Barros, Ferreira, Vega & Chanduvi, 2009).11  
 
One might then point to the work-place as an important agency in helping to improve workers’ 
welfare, for it can be argued on the one hand that the more productive firms are better placed to 
employ workers and improve the living standards of their workers than those that are less so. 
That is, firm productivity could also determine the welfare of the workers. This was 
demonstrated during the global financial crisis, which started in 2008, and resulted in the 
widespread closures of firm; making 22 million people unemployed in one year (World Bank, 
2013).  I however join Srinivas (2009) to add the caveat that productivity might be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to alleviate poverty among workers and employers in the cluster. For 
“[a]lthough productivity increases and industrial upgrading potentially lead to robust industrial 
welfare, benefits have not always evolved from upgrading, nor do work-place benefits guarantee 
better industrial performance” (Srinivas, 2010, p. 456).  
 
                                                        
11 Recent studies by UN-Habitat (2010) and Soremekun, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Haughton (2013) trace the root of 
poor labor market prospects of individuals to opportunity inequality. 
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In some cases, national social protection policies and formal institutions exist that protect the 
rights of workers and ensure that they garner certain benefits from the work-place. But, in a large 
number of developing countries, these “social protection systems and institutions are weak and 
under-resourced” (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004, p. 65), 
making income and benefits received from the work-place become even more important 
determinants of living standards. For informal workers in particular, there sometimes fails to 
exist a clear tripartite relation between the government, the organization and the worker 
(Srinivas, 2009), where employees receive benefits from the work-place i.e. are employer 
dependent (Srinivas, 2010), and work-place benefits for labor can be negotiated with employers 
through trade unions. In these cases, the need to recognize existing and evolve social protection 
systems that ensure basic needs of workers become even more crucial.  
 
2.3. Social Protection and Labor Benefits  
Social protection is a major component of social policy, and seeks to prevent, manage and 
overcome situations that have an adverse effect on the well-being of people. Social policy itself 
has a vast domain and entails “what a community collectively does to protect its weakest 
members, [and] also has to meet the social needs of all.” (ILO, 2000, p. 113). When faced with 
such contingencies as “illness, maternity, disability or old age; market risks, such as 
unemployment; as well as economic crises or natural disasters”, social protection measures help 
individuals to maintain their living standard (United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development [UNRISD], 2010, p. 135). It can thus be viewed as a “set of policies and 
programmes designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by diminishing people’s exposure to 
 47 
economic and social risks, enhancing their capacity to protect themselves from these risks, and 
reducing the impact of shocks that occur” (Oxford Policy Management, n.d., para. 1).  
 
The common categorizations under social protection are social security, social insurance, social 
assistance, social safety net (including social funds), and social protection (Lund and Srinivas, 
2000, p.15). Sometimes these categories “represent an ideological position, as well as being 
“technical” terms to describe different types of programmes.” Albeit, “their use changes over 
time, and they are used differently in different parts of the world” (Ibid.). Social protection could 
also be formal or informal. Formal social protection can be defined as “actions taken by the 
public sector (alone or in conjunction with other parties such as non-governmental organizations 
and donors) and private sector arrangements that have legal backing” while informal social 
protection “encompass those arrangements and actions taken by an individual or groups of 
individuals which are not guided by formal legal legislations, but which are not necessarily 
contravening these laws and regulations” (Oduro, 2010, p. 2).   
 
Social Protection, the state and the firm. The state has historically played a leading role 
in establishing the right macroeconomic policies, as well as social protection policies including 
employment and labor market incentives. Traditional industrial policy contains a variety of 
instruments including policies that affect the size and shape (demand characteristics) of the 
domestic market; policies that influence taxation and wages; policies that affect input costs or 
outputs for entrepreneurs, for example, land use and prices; incentives that shape the nature of 
competition, foreign investment, and those that promote local upgrading and linkages between 
foreign and local actors. 
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However, governments have for the most part failed to play the role that includes rectifying 
market imperfections and supporting workers’ welfare at the level of the firm. In addition, as will 
be demonstrated in chapter six, through specific policies and lack of effective infrastructure 
provision, governments in underdevelopment contexts have over time contributed to the 
establishment of institutions that undermine worker’s welfare, thereby creating alternative 
institutions which employers and firms have to respond to. The response of these actors on the 
other hand usually tends to promote self-interests and lead to inefficient outcomes. Poor 
functioning of social protection policies is thus part of a broader coordination failure that is 
pervasive in developing countries manifesting in part as poorly functioning institutions, for 
example those key institutions that are required for dynamic organizational (cluster) 
performance.  
 
How is this situation to be righted in developing countries? Would instituting national social 
policies be the panacea? What combination of formal and informal institutions should be 
encouraged to ensure the optimal benefit for workers? Despite extant or possible inefficiencies of 
formal social protection institutions, Wood and Gough (2006, p. 1698) posit that “formally 
guaranteed rights to welfare and employment security, embodied in legitimated states and 
regulated labor markets, will always be superior to a clientelist, or even reciprocal, system of 
informal rights which deliver dependent rather than autonomous security.” In this case, work-
place, place, and work-based benefits are explicit and formally guaranteed. In highlighting the 
existence of two types of welfare regimes – the informal security regime and the insecurity 
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regime12 – one sees multiple actors and institutions at work in providing benefits to citizenry and 
workers. The authors as well as Srinivas (2010), however, underline the need to look beyond the 
typical state-market dichotomy to understand the multiple alternate institutions in welfare 
provision for late industrializing countries.  
 
The “concept of complementary institutions” which shows how the existence of one institution 
“permits or facilitates the existence of the others” (Amable, 2000, p. 656) is therefore of 
relevance here. Amable (2000, p. 647) thus writes:  
…. Understanding the diversity of institutional structures, and hence the diversity of 
capitalist societies, ‘national models’ … requires the study of how different institutions 
are complementary to each other, in the sense that one institution functions all the better 
because some other particular institutions or forms of organizations are present. 
 
While Amable calls this “complementary institutions”, Evans (1996) raises the idea of synergy. 
He surmises that some theorists think that government involvement “crowds out” the informal 
networks, while others believe it allows for “synergy” which could enable greater efficiency. He 
writes on this idea of synergy whereby “civic engagement strengthens state institutions and 
effective state institutions create an environment in which civic engagement is more likely to 
thrive” (p. 1034). The question for planners and policy makers then becomes how to create good 
synergies and which combination of labor institutions whether formal or informal, for example 
with regards to pay structure, skills and training, health, housing, transportation and other social 
                                                        
12 Informal security regimes “describe institutional arrangements where people rely heavily upon community and 
family relationships to meet their security needs, to greatly varying degrees” while insecurity regimes “describe 
institutional arrangements which generate gross insecurity and block the emergence of stable informal mechanisms 
to mitigate, let alone rectify, these” (Wood and Gough, 2006, p. 1699).  
 50 
security benefits have emerged in developing countries? Furthermore, from industrial cluster and 
welfare scholarship, which institutions prove to be more complementary and can be leveraged to 
allow the integration of economic and spatial plans? For if one probes further into the missing 
theoretical and policy connections between clusters and human development, a broad assumption 
could be that the difficulty of merging economic and spatial policies exists because institutional 
framing is insufficient, and cluster policies are largely executed by either spatial or economic 
ministries but rarely both.  
 
2.4. Institutions and Cluster Development 
According to North, “history matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of society’s 
institutions. Today’s and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the past” (1990, p. vii). The state and 
institutions are crucial lenses to understanding the past, present and future development of any 
society; the state because it plays several critical roles, and institutions because they depict “the 
rules of the game in a society [,] … reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life” 
and guide human interaction (North, 1990, p. 3). Institutions though may not be “necessarily 
efficient”, however they “structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic… Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the 
key to understanding historical change” (North, 1990, p. 3 & 6). This thesis examines how 
institutions in the process of evolution, triggered by policy formally or informally through 
historical processes by the state, firms, and citizens, relate in mitigating risk for labor and 
eventually impacting their living standards. From literature, the analysis of institutions can be re-
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grouped in three different ways – according to their area of analysis, in terms of their degree of 
formality, and on a hierarchical basis (Jütting, 2003).  
 
Institutions and area of analysis. Constraints governing human engagement have 
commonly been classified based on the area of analysis under economic, legal, political, and 
social institutions in the literature (Jütting, 2003). Sometimes these institutions are not so clearly 
demarcated, and these classifications might have many cross-cutting institutions under them. 
Economic institutions could be seen as those which govern the allocation, exchange and 
transaction of goods and services, influencing consumers’ tastes, preferences, values and 
personalities and such contrary behavior as opportunism, cheating, and shirking. They include 
institutions such as finance, insurance, marketing, and credit (North, 1987; Bowles, 1998).  
 
Political institutions could be defined as those institutions which “determine the interaction 
between individuals and the government (and the political elites who control the government)”, 
thus preventing expropriation by these elites and the government. They could also be referred to 
as property right institutions (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2003, p. 1&6). Variables such as electoral 
rules are used to measure political institutions (Torsten, 2002). Legal institutions on the other 
hand embody those that “provide the legal framework that enables private contracts to facilitate 
economic transactions (i.e., “reduce transaction costs”).” They could also be referred to as 
“contracting institutions” (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2003, p. 1). 
 
For social institutions, studies show that these usually reflect rules that generally govern and 
define the relationship between people. They can pertain to issues of social security, health, 
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education, and gender (Jütting, 2003, p. 14). Chaudhuri (1996) for example describes the labor 
market as a social institution in India. In this case, a legal regime evolved whereby employers 
required governmental permission to retrench a worker, permissions which are rarely granted. 
Hechter (1990, p. 14) notes that social institutions are evidenced by “appearance of some 
regularity in collective behavior.” That is, when different individuals behave in a like manner 
when confronted with the same social circumstance, and this behavior endures over a time period 
which can be long but indefinite. Marriage and slavery (Berry, 1989) and health systems can be 
seen as social institutions that govern how economic actors might access certain resources in 
their society.  
 
Formal and informal institutions. Institutions can also be differentiated in terms of 
their levels of formality. Drawing heavily from Helmke and Levitsky (2003), conceptual 
distinctions between formal and informal institutions have been made using a state-societal 
frame – where formal institutions would embody state agencies and enforcement rules, and 
informal institutions fall under the civic, religious, and other non-state bodies and rules, or based 
on the enforcing body. Here, informal institutions are self-reinforcing, while formal institutions 
require a third party influence, which is usually the state. However, they find these two 
conceptualizations to exclude certain institutions. They thus define:  
formal institutions as rules that are openly codified, in the sense that they are established 
and communicated through channels that are widely accepted as official. By contrast, 
informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels [authors emphasis 
not included]. (p. 7-8) 
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Formal institutions therefore include state agencies, bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, 
constitutions, laws (common, by laws), regulations, property rights, statutes, as well as 
enforcement characteristics, social sanctions, and internally enforced standards of conduct. 
Informal institutions which typically underlie and supplement formal rules encompass customs, 
taboos, traditions having such enforcement mechanisms as shunning, boycotting, threats and the 
use of violence (Lambooy and Moulaert, 1996; De Soysa & Jütting, 2006). Informal institutions 
should not be confused with weak institutions. In fact some formal rules, though codified, are 
themselves ignored or not enforced (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003). That the informal constraints 
are important can be observed from the evidence that the same formal rules and constitutions 
imposed on different societies produce different outcomes. Notably, the informal institutions that 
small community-based groups rely on tend to support a less diverse community than do formal 
legal institutions. 
 
Levels of institutional hierarchy. Oliver E. Williamson (2000) offers an alternative 
classification of institutions; one based on four different hierarchical levels. The first level is the 
social embeddedeness level and includes institutions such as social norms, customs, traditions, 
religion and informal institutions. Institutions at this level usually date back many centuries and 
are slow to change. They are particularly relevant for people living in poor countries. Level two 
is the institutional environment and has institutions that relate to the formal rules of the game – 
conventions, laws, property rights, constitutions, judiciary, and bureaucracy. These institutions 
usually define and enforce property rights. Institutions that relate to governance are classified as 
level three institutions. These create structures for the society to govern transactions, provide 
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incentives and ensure that conflict is mitigated and mutual gains realized. It therefore leads to the 
building of organizations, state agencies, non-governmental organizations and so on. This level 
is reflective of transaction costs economies and change occurs more frequently, between one to 
ten years. Level four institutions reflect resource allocation and employment institutions. They 
signal neoclassical economics, and are concerned with making right marginal conditions. These 
institutions define the extent of adjustment that occurs through prices or quantities, and specify 
the resource allocation mechanism.  
 
The institutional framework, enforcement and quality of institutions, determine to a great extent 
the productive performance of the society (Rodrik, 2004). North (1990, p. 54) purports that a 
major source of “historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World” 
is the inability to “develop effective, low-cost enforcements of contracts.” The state, through its 
policies and institutions has also played a role in coordinating business activities and stimulating 
forward and backward linkages, ensuring the availability of credit for both large and small 
businesses by the establishment of development banks and special credit facilities. In providing 
support to industry, the clustering of firms can be an important and efficient means for 
government and its agencies to reach and extend services. Furthermore, agglomerated firms are 
better able through joint action to convey their needs to the government as opposed to firms that 
are located in isolated areas. Success and failure tend to depend in large part on the complexity 
of national and sectoral challenges as much as on policy-bureaucratic competence, and impact on 
the business environment in the country.  
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Institutions are therefore critical to industrialization as they determine the performance of the 
economy. In particular, the institutional framework affects both the costs of transformation (or 
production) and transaction (or exchange), with consequential effects on profitability and 
growth. That is, institutions affect transformational costs by influencing the type of technology 
used and transaction costs which include both measurable costs like lawyers fees or more 
difficult to measure costs like time spent in acquiring information, bribes, queuing (North, 1990). 
North proposes further that in comparing more advanced economies like the United States, New 
Zealand and other developing countries, one finds that in the latter, the cost of exchange is so 
much higher, that sometimes exchange would not take place at all. In short, developing countries 
tend to define a set of pay-offs, affecting individuals and organizations (political, educational, 
economic, and social) alike that ultimately discourage productive activities. These institutions 
through their effect on the transformational and transactions costs can also constrict or enhance 
growth. In many developing countries, where property rights and the rule of law are not well 
defined, it could impede growth and lead to the rise of less formal institutions mediated through 
underground markets. Quite often, poor coordination and information externalities are at the 
heart of what is often referred to as “institutional failures”.  
 
Looking at a concrete example, Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, United States and 
Denmark rank top five respectively in the World Bank’s ease of doing business rankings, while 
Nigeria ranks 131. The rankings are based on the average of the economy’s percentiles in the 10 
topics seen in Table 2.1 below. The rankings show that across many indicators, the institutional 
environment that govern such things as the enforcement of contracts, rules regarding setting up 
infrastructure, business registration, and trade across borders are relatively convoluted. An 
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investor might be deterred from doing business in Nigeria or similar countries when they face 
such arduous formal and informal institutions. These sorts of indicators that reveal the hiatus 
between expectation and performance of economic systems in poor countries may be one reason 
why so much emphasis is put on the regulatory dimensions of institutions.  This regulatory 
dimension points to institutional capacity for rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning and is 
conspicuous by its absence in many developing countries. 
 
Table 2.1: Nigeria’s ease of doing business 
EASE OF DOING BUSINESS 131/185 
Starting a business 119 
Registering property 182 
Trading across borders 154 
Dealing with construction permits 88 
Getting credit 23 
Enforcing contracts 98 
Getting electricity 178 
Protecting investors 70 
Resolving insolvency 105 
Paying taxes 155 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
In this regard, a growing literature calls for getting institutions right, as they determine income 
levels.13 Rodrik (1999, 2000) suggests that successful market-based economies need institutions 
that will fulfill the following requirements: (i) Provide property rights, bestow control rights, 
uphold the rule of law, and rein in corruption; (ii) Provide appropriate regulation of such things 
as products, labor, and financial markets to counteract the sources or consequences of market 
failure; (iii) Support macroeconomic stabilization, including the value of money and ensuring a 
                                                        
13 Two other dominant views apart from an institutional one explaining income levels, and the divergence and 
convergence between countries (Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004) albeit outside the purview of this study are 
geography i.e. the effects of ecological and geographical variables such as climate, disease, distance from coast 
(Bloom & Sachs, 1998; Gallup, Sachs with Mellinger, 1998; Gallup & Sachs, 2000; Sachs, 2003), and international 
trade (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Dollar & Kraay, 2004).  
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sustainable fiscal position, and; (iv) Ensure social insurance including guarding against extremes 
of poverty and (v) Protect social cohesion and stability and reduce social conflicts. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis I recognize the wider range of key functions to be played by the 
institutional environment in promoting human well-being and ensuring equitable and inclusive 
development. Adapted from the World Bank (2003), these include that: (i) institutions must have 
the capability to pick up signals about needs and problems. This involves getting essential 
information from and disseminating it among the required sectors of the economy. For this to be 
accomplished, (ii) institutions should give citizens a voice, respond to their feedback and also 
foster learning. (iii) Institutions should be equipped to balance interests, negotiate changes and 
forge agreements, and also avoid conflict. Therefore, institutions need to develop the capacity to 
encourage the proposal, execution and implementation of agreed upon programs and solutions in 
a credible manner. (iv) Finally, the role of institutions is to plan, implement and monitor various 
key development policies in order to establish market mechanisms, reduce distortions, excesses 
and unintended implications. 
 
Contrary to neo-liberal and “less-state” ideas of the Washington Consensus, the actions and 
policies of the state have influenced and continue to determine the evolution of sectors and 
industries in significant ways (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Rasiah, 2009). The 2008 World Bank 
Enterprise Survey revealed the significant impact of infrastructure, institutions and regulations 
on firm-level activities (Table 2.1 above). Indeed, the state can (and should) play an active role 
in providing an enabling environment, adequate infrastructure and business services, assisting 
with exports, and resolving conflicts as seen in the case of more successful clusters in emerging 
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economies. Meagher (2007) cited the examples of the Pakistani surgical instruments cluster 
(Nadvi, 1999), the Indian (Knorringa, 1999), and Mexican footware clusters (Rabellotti, 1999), 
the Ludhiana textile cluster in India (Tewari, 1999), and small firms in Hong Kong (Castells, 
1998) to show how governments have played an active role in enabling clusters to survive during 
liberalization while providing “extensive infrastructural and social welfare” in the Hong Kong 
case (p. 494).   
 
The state can also determine to a large extent the availability and access to production-enhancing 
infrastructure. Infrastructure encompass public works like roads, canals, dams; other transport 
systems including railways, ports, airfreight, urban transport; and services from utilities such as 
energy supply, telecommunications, water, gas, sanitation and sewerage (World Bank, 1994; 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006b), and are an important component in the productive capacities14 
(UNCTAD, 2006) and industrial processes of a country. Their contribution to GDP can be 
substantial and generally surpasses the costs involved in providing such services (Esfahani & 
Ramírez, 2003).  
 
Although the direction of causality between economic growth and the infrastructure services has 
been a matter of debate (Munnell, 1992), where studies have found different elasticity and rates 
of return, there is a general consensus that infrastructure does have a high rate of return and is 
indispensable for development. Notably, a virtuous circle might be observed in the interplay 
                                                        
14 Productive capacities are those productive resources (natural resources, human resources, financial capital and 
physical capital), entrepreneurial capabilities (core competencies and technological capabilities) and production 
linkages (backward and forward linkages, flows of information and exchange of experience, resource flows – human 
capital, financial capital –, territorial production clusters, global value-chains, links between FDI and domestic 
entrepreneurs, and links between large firms and SMES) “which together determine the capacity of a country to 
produce goods and services and enable it to grow and develop” (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 61&63). 
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between the development of infrastructure services and economic growth, with infrastructure 
development enhancing economic growth and economic growth contributing to infrastructure 
development (Department for International Development [DFID], 2002). Démurger (2001, 
p.115&95) noted that improvements in infrastructure might be “considered a byproduct as well 
as a necessary condition for market development and economic growth” and showed how 
infrastructure such as transport and telecommunications significantly accounted for disparities in 
growth performances across provinces in China, haven taken “differences in terms of reforms 
and openness, geographical location and infrastructure endowment” into consideration. Capital 
investment contributes positively to economic growth in several ways including expanding the 
productive capability of a place, increasing the efficiency of other existing resources, creating 
jobs and employment, improving the standard of living of citizens, accommodating population 
growth, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), and reducing cost of production for the 
private sector (Munnel, 1992; World Bank, 1994; United States Department of State, 2012). In 
particular, investment in infrastructure can lead to sustainable growth through the following 
means:   
Reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade flows within and across borders; 
Enabling economic actors – individuals, firms, governments – to respond to new types of 
demand in different places; 
Lowering the costs of inputs for entrepreneurs, or making existing businesses more 
profitable; 
Creating employment, including in public works (both as social protection and as a 
counter-cyclical policy in times of recession); 
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Enhancing human capital, for example by improving access to schools and health centres; 
and, 
Improving environmental conditions, which link to improved livelihoods, better health 
and reduced vulnerability of the poor (DFID, 2002, p. 6).  
 
For example energy supply is needed to enable the working of various machinery; transport 
systems are crucial for the movement of inputs and final outputs among suppliers, producers, and 
consumers; telecommunication enables people to pass across information among other things. 
The mobile money innovation, M-Pesa15 (Corbett, 2008) in Kenya, is a known example of how 
phones can facilitate the exchange of money between various economic actors.  
 
Indeed infrastructure possesses certain economic and technical characteristics: indivisibility; 
multi-user; and being generic (Smith, 2002), which have effects on industrialization, 
urbanization and living standards. Indivisibility in the sense that infrastructure is usually 
constructed as a whole/complete system, and serves not one market but “the entire industrial 
base of a region, country or even continent” (p. 11). Furthermore, infrastructure is multi-user in 
that there are multiple users for the same system, using it for different ends whether private, 
public, or economic among others. Finally, it is generic in that it is a basic and core requirement 
                                                        
15 M-Pesa (meaning mobile money, pesa is money in Swahili) is a financial initiative by the service provider 
Safaricom in Kenya. It was launched in 2007. Safaricom being a subsidiary of the international company Vodafone. 
M-Pesa is a way to carry out money transactions on the mobile phone, without the use of either a bank account or a 
bank card. With M-Pesa, one can deposit, withdraw and transfer money within Kenya by use of the mobile phones. 
Given the fact that only about 19% of Kenya’s population of 35 million had a bank account in 2006, this innovation 
by Safaricom showed how a player within the telecommunication industry adapted to meet specific socio-economic 
needs such as a large low income population and inadequacies in banking sector for sending money. M-Pesa added 
200,000 new customers within the 1st month, and within one year, it had 1.6 million subscribers. As at November 
2005, M-Pesa had 4.5 million active customers. Now, Vodafone is looking to open mobile-banking enterprises in a 
number of other countries (Corbett, 2008; Alliance for financial inclusion, 2010)  
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for most or all activities. These characteristics of infrastructure reflect the necessary role it plays 
in any economy. Also, it usually needs heavy investment and has traditionally been state-owned 
or by some sort of private-public partnership.  
 
Infrastructure therefore tends to be natural monopolies, as “the combination of size and 
indivisibility often means increasing returns to scale” (Smith, 2002, p. 12). Infrastructure, once 
provided is usually made available for consumers, firms and industrial systems. It is usually not 
limited in usage (unless it is intentionally being restricted for particular usage or by payment). 
That is, multiple roads do not have to be made for the same route. However, given its multi-user 
and generic characteristics, it can be subjected to issues of congestion from various users. We 
thus find various policies e.g. restricted lanes for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and congestion 
pricing in the United Kingdom (UK), which try to regulate the time certain vehicles are allowed 
into an area. Infrastructure also needs to be properly maintained as it is subject to wear and tear.  
 
However, the institutional environment could also impact on the development of new and proper 
maintenance of existing infrastructure. Successful projects according to experts need 
“[s]upportive regulations, strong project management, transparent procurement procedures, and 
careful consideration of environmental and social impacts” (United States Department of State, 
2012, p. 2). Rules need to be in place to ensure that capital appropriated for infrastructural 
projects is used properly and for their intended purpose. Procedures also need to be established 
which guarantee the maintenance of the infrastructure. Not only does the stock of infrastructure 
require continuous extension, the quality of infrastructure services need to be improved in order 
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to raise efficiency and reduce waste and redundancy in capital and human resources that are used 
in providing infrastructural services (The World Bank, 1994). 
 
2.5. Productive Industrial Clusters, Social Protection and Living Standards 
Economic growth has always been a central concern for development and developing countries 
and solutions for growth ranging from open trade to privatization have been prescribed and 
adapted by African countries. In many developing countries, SMEs tend to be the main 
contributors to national productivity and manufacturing. Clusters in developing countries 
attracted the attention of scholars in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when stories of how small-
scale industrial districts in Europe, especially in Italy, were producing competitive products for 
the international markets in the 1970s and 1980s, became widely-known. For developing 
countries, the question thus arose as to whether similar industrial clusters existed, and under what 
conditions they either produce, modify or prevent their growth (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999).  
 
As mentioned earlier, industrial clusters are defined as “sectoral and spatial concentrations of 
firms” (Schimtz and Nadvi, 1999, p. 1503, emphasis added by authors) for the purpose of this 
study. However other definitions for the industrial district exist, for example as “a sizeable and 
spatially delimited area of trade-oriented economic activity which has a distinctive economic 
specialization, be it resource-related, manufacturing, or services” (Park & Markusen, 1994 in 
Markusen, 1996, p. 296) and typologies of the industrial district16 have been put forth, I choose 
                                                        
16 Markusen (1996, p. 296) in addition to (1) the Marshallian New Industrial District (NID), with its recent Italian 
variety, considers an additional three types of industrial districts. These include “(2) the hub-and-spoke district, 
where regional structure revolves around one or several major corporations in one or a few industries; (3) the 
satellite industrial platform, comprised chiefly of branch plants of absent multinational corporations – this type of 
district may either comprise of high-tech branch plants or consist chiefly of low-wage, low-tax, publicly subsidized 
establishments; and (4) the state-centered district, a more eclectic category, where a major government tenant 
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the Marshallian industrial district as a starting point (Box 2.1 highlights the characteristics of this 
district) as it best represents most clusters in SSA, and the case study cluster in particular.  
 
Box 2.1: Hypothesized features of the Marshallian industrial district 
Business structure dominated by small, locally owned firms 
Scale economies relatively low 
Substantial intradistrict trade among buyers and suppliers 
Key investment decisions made locally 
Long-term contracts and commitments between local buyers and suppliers 
Low degrees of cooperation or linkage with firms external to the district 
Labor market internal to the district, highly flexible 
Workers committed to district, rather than to firms 
High rates of labor in-migration, lower levels of out-migration 
Evolution of unique local cultural identity, bonds 
Specialized sources of finance, technical expertise, business services available in district outside of firms 
Existence of “patient capital” within district 
Turmoil, but good long-term prospects for growth and employment 
Source: Markusen, 1996, p. 298 
 
The idea of industrial districts is not novel, and was put forward by Marshall (1890) using “the 
concept of external economies” (cited in Schmitz 1999, p. 468). This idea of agglomeration can 
be understood by two key economic concepts: division of labor and economies of scale. The 
former, introduced by Smith (1869, p. 7) and illustrated by the workings in a pin-making factory, 
show how the separation of tasks would lead to an increase in the “productive powers of labor”. 
Economies of scale on the other hand can be internal and external. Oughton and Whittam (1996, 
p. 64-65) surmised the distinction Marshall made between the two in Principles of Economics:  
external economies of scale – … he defined as those economies that were dependent on 
the overall development of the industrial environment in which firms operate and internal 
economies, … depend on the internal resources of the firm and the manner in which they 
are organized and managed. Internal economies are associated primarily with the scale of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
anchors the regional economy (a capital city, key military or research facility, public corporation).” See Markusen 
(1996) for more information.  
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production and arise as a result of the spreading of fixed costs over a large number of 
units of output.  
In essence, Marshall used the concept of external economies of scale to explain “(a) why and 
how the location of industry matters; and (b) why and how small enterprises can be efficient and 
competitive” (Schmitz, 1999, p. 468). According to Marshall, firms may concentrate in an area 
for reasons such as: “physical conditions”, court patronage, and the “presence of a town” 
(Belussi and Caldari, 2009, p. 336). After a while, firms begin to enjoy such advantages as 
“hereditary skills,” “the growth of subsidiary trades,” “the use of highly specialized machinery,” 
“[l]ocal market for special skill”, “industrial leadership” and the “introduction of novelties” 
(Ibid, p. 337).  
 
Porter (1998) highlights the ubiquitous nature and critical role of the locality in maintaining 
comparative competitive advantage, in spite of an increasingly globalizing world. He articulates, 
“[w]hat happens inside companies is important, but clusters reveal that the immediate business 
environment outside companies plays a vital role as well” (p. 78, emphasis by author). Within a 
cluster, firms are able to enjoy access to “a pool of specialized workers, easy access to suppliers 
of specialized inputs and services and the quick dissemination of new knowledge” (Schmitz and 
Nadvi, 1999, p. 1504). This is the external economies that Marshall conceptualized. In sum, 
regional agglomeration garners specific benefits to firms: improved market access, which allows 
firms to increase production; improved potential for technological upgrading; joint action which 
allows firms to deal with external shocks particularly from the global economy; easy flow of and 
access to information; and finally, it enables firms “to make good use of relatively small amounts 
of resources” (McCormick, 1999, p. 1545). Clustering also helps firms to reduce transaction 
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costs between actors including manufacturers, suppliers, traders and consumers in a business 
exchange (Otsuka and Sonobe, 2011).    
 
Moving from Marshall’s conceptualization on clustering, Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) assert that 
incidental external economies alone is not sufficient to explain cluster dynamism. They thus 
introduce the collective efficiency framework – a concept that brings together the incidental 
(external economies) and deliberate (joint action) efforts of the clusters. According to Schmitz 
(1999, p. 469):  
Incidental external economies are of importance in explaining the growth of 
contemporary industrial clusters, but there is also a deliberate force at work, namely 
consciously pursued joint action … [Joint action] can be of two types: individual 
enterprises cooperating (for example, sharing equipment or developing a new product), 
and groups of firms joining forces in business associations, producer consortia and the 
like. Cutting across this distinction, one can distinguish between horizontal cooperation 
(between competitors) and vertical cooperation (between producer and user of inputs or 
between producer and seller of outputs).  
 
In developing countries, there is a significant amount of industrial clustering, characterized by a 
wide variation in their growth experiences and pronounced internal heterogeneity (Otsuka and 
Sonobe, 2011 & Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). However, these clusters differ somewhat from the 
aforementioned Marshallian and Italian models. Schmitz and Nadvi (1999, p. 1504)17 elaborating 
on these points note that: 
                                                        
17 Their analysis comes from the introductory article on a special issue on clusters in developing countries in World 
Development, Vol. 27, No. 9.  
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At one end of the spectrum are artisanal clusters which show little dynamism and seem 
unable to expand or innovate (e.g. McCormick, 1998). At the other end are clusters which 
have been able to deepen the inter-firm division of labor, raise their competitiveness and 
break into international markets (Cawthorne, 1995; Nadvi, 1999b; Schmitz, 1995). Along 
the spectrum there are many intermediate cases (Knorringa, 1996; Rabolletti, 1997; 
Sandee, 1995; Visser, 1996). Even the successful cases differ in several respects from the 
Italian model… Except in the rudimentary clusters, medium and large firms have 
emerged and play an important role in the governance of these clusters. In this respect the 
developing country experiences are substantially different from the Italian model (based 
on the 1970s and 1980s experience) but not different from the Italian reality of the 1990s 
(Brusco et al., 1996; Rabolletti, 1997).  
The reasons behind why certain clusters are hindered in their productivity, dynamism and ability 
to expand is beyond the purview of this work, and we take off as our start point that given the 
cluster is productive, under what conditions would the firms pass on benefits to their workers 
that improve their living standards. Given the centrality of the concept of multidimensional 
poverty and living standards to this thesis, it is important to consider recent discussions around it.  
 
Multidimensional poverty and standard of living. In both the academic and policy 
discourse, the idea of poverty has received considerable theoretical and empirical treatment. This 
is due in part to the rising phenomenon of poverty despite unprecedented growth in wealth in all 
regions. In fact, the literature on poverty and the attendant inequality has grown relatively rapidly 
over time particularly since after the Second World War. One of the early conceptions of poverty 
was by Rowntree (1901), who defined primary poverty as a situation where the total earnings are 
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insufficient to obtain the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency. 
However poverty and the way it is measured – the complicated debate of which I will not get 
into in this thesis – remains an elusive concept and much of the contemporary definitions are still 
subjects of considerable academic argument. However the central concept on which most 
scholars agree is that the poor is someone who lives in a condition of deprivation; that is, a 
condition in which the standard of living of the individual poor falls below minimum acceptable 
standards. 
 
The measurement and analytical definition has revolved on how well poverty is represented by 
the level of income, reflected in macro-economic indicators such as Gross National Product 
(GNP) per head. Several leaders have commented on the inadequacy of the current measurement: 
"[w]e need to move beyond gross domestic product as our main measure of progress, and fashion 
a sustainable development index that puts people first" (Ki-moon, 2012, para. 18). The Report by 
the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2010), 
which was created at the beginning of 2008 on the initiative of the French government suggested 
alternative measures to the GDP similar to the MPI adopted by the UNDP and used in this 
dissertation. This earlier emphasis on growth was underlined by notable studies such as the work 
of the Pearson Commission – Partners in Development (1969). A decade later in the 1970s, 
sustained focus on poverty found expression in the work of Robert McNamara’s celebrated 
speech to the World Bank Board of Governors in Nairobi in 1973 on basic needs, and the 
subsequent publication of “Strategies for Equitable Growth” (Adelman, 1974).  
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According to the World Bank (2001), “poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being”, where 
well-being can be measured by an individual’s possession of income, health, nutrition, education, 
assets, housing, and certain rights in a society, such as freedom of speech. Poverty is also viewed 
as a lack of opportunities, powerlessness, and vulnerability. This broadens the definition of 
poverty to include hunger, lack of shelter, being sick and not being able to see a doctor, not being 
able to go to school and not knowing how to read, not having a job, fear for the future, living one 
day at a time and losing a child to illness brought by unclean water. Poverty further entails lack 
of representation and freedom. The most notable global expression of the concern with the 
poverty issue was the formulation of the MDGs by heads of states, which succeeded to put 
intense global focus on poverty reduction. The international target proposed by the MDGs has 
been widely adopted, notably that to reduce by half, the proportion of people living in extreme 
poverty by 2015. However, and despite concerted efforts at the highest level, the goal while it 
has been met in some countries has remained a difficult challenge for many countries, especially 
in Africa, and a new 2030 date has now been set arising from the Post-2015 agenda debate 
(United Nations, 2013). 
 
As with all phenomena of this significance, the causes of poverty are numerous and varied over 
time including historical, institutional and generational. They range from national – exploitative 
fiefdoms, to transnational – slavery, to global – imperialism, and tied with these have been the 
resulting growth of inequality. These historical as well as contemporary institutions are sustained 
by economic structures that tend to perpetuate not just absolute poverty but inequality over the 
long term. This happens in part because while mankind has created avenues to efficiently 
maximize and utilize the resources available to create wealth, it is still lacking proper 
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arrangements to ensure the equitable distribution of this wealth. In other words, those with 
resources often possess greater capital to make more, and those born into poverty are born with 
disadvantages that are inter-generational.  
 
Broadly, poverty is seen not as an event but a phenomenon that arises and perpetuates itself over 
long periods of time and is the outcome of one or several or combined processes. It is argued that 
if an individual is born into poverty and the condition of deprivation is not corrected, it is likely 
to be passed on to generations while others, given the right institutions and circumstances, are 
able to escape it (Sen, 1999). It is for this reason that most governments and the global 
community have made poverty eradication a priority policy objective.  
 
In sum, poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and incidences of poverty take on context 
specific forms defined by geography, history and institutions. Also a wide array of factors 
converges to give poverty multi-dimensional characteristics; for instance, the World Bank (2001) 
highlighted three broad dimensions of poverty namely: lack of income, insecurity and lack of 
political voice, that are common to societies with large inequalities.   
 
Contemporary definitions and measures of poverty therefore take account of the many 
dimensions of this phenomenon, contrary to the traditional approaches that tended to focus on 
one variable such as income or consumption. For example Sen’s (1999) capability theory 
promoted the multi-dimensional notion of poverty and did much to extend the number of 
dimensions along which poverty is measured. Sabina Alkire and James Foster at the Oxford 
Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) further articulated an innovative, new 
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“multidimensional” measure of people living in poverty, known as the Multidimensional Poverty 
Index (MPI). The MPI features three deprivation dimensions – health, education and standard of 
living. Using the Alkire Foster method, outcomes of individuals or households are measured 
against multiple criteria (ten in all) from each of the three dimensions, thus providing a detailed 
picture of not just who is poor, but in what way they are poor. The MPI was featured in the 20th-
anniversary edition of the UNDP Human Development Report (2010). The United Nations 
Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat, 2013) also developed the City Prosperity Index (CPI). 
There is thus a move away from conceptualizing poverty mainly in terms of the income or an 
individual’s employment to viewing the phenomenon in a multidimensional form.  
 
Understanding the gap in literature: Industrial clusters and poverty. Reflecting more 
broadly on the literature on industrial clusters, from its introduction by Marshall to more recent 
works, most have focused largely on the sectoral and geographic characteristics, and how these 
determine economic and dynamic advantages. Less systematic attention has been devoted to the 
role of industrial clusters in poverty alleviation (Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004; Fowler and Kleit, 
2013). 
  
There could be several plausible reasons put forward to explain why industrial clusters have not 
necessarily been considered as pathways for poverty alleviation and human development. For 
one, the shift in focus to argue for human development through a multidimensional formulation 
of poverty is fairly recent; human development having gained significant support through the 
work of scholars like Sen and through organizations like the UNDP reporting the HDI for 
countries. This process continued to command global attention and culminated in the MDGs by 
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heads of government in 2000. The MPI is even more recent, and is built on the very successful 
advocacy gains of the UNDP-HDI (Alkire and Santos, 2010).  
 
Again, in light of historical time frames, the study of clusters in developing countries is still 
comparatively new, having emerged in less than two decades. Although it has gained 
considerable following, it is still tilted in scope, being guided by categories and frameworks of 
studying industrial clusters from advanced countries e.g. new mainstream economics, business 
economics, regional science and innovation policy. For the most part, these categories do not 
fully capture the historical and institutional realities of relatively low-income environments, the 
most challenging domain for both policy and scholars being the need to eradicate mass as well as 
relative poverty that manifest as multi-dimensional deprivations.  
 
Furthermore, studies tend to be sensitive to the global economy within which they are embedded. 
The benefit of agglomeration as a tool to penetrate global markets was one of the reasons for the 
popularity of industrial clusters in developing countries. As earlier mentioned, the focus on 
clusters in developing countries began when in the late 1980s and early 1990s, stories of how 
small-scale industrial districts in Europe, especially in Italy producing competitive products for 
the international markets in the 1970s and 1980s, became widely-known. As Navas-Alemán 
(2011) introduces:  
Advice to developing countries regarding industrial upgrading has swung from 
emphasizing domestic markets to focusing all energies on export markets. From the 
1950s through to the 1970s, import substitution and protection of infant industries were 
part of orthodox industrialization policies. By contrast, advice to governments and firms 
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in developing countries over the last three decades has been characterized by a clear 
message: export your products to developed markets and your industries will upgrade to 
global standards. 
In other words, academic scholarship has tended to focus at this incipient phase on the broad 
“mapping” of clusters and on policy advocacy targeted at policy makers on the shifting 
landscape of the debates largely driven by scholars from the developed world.  
 
A systematic search through journals illustrates more vividly the gap between poverty alleviation 
and industrial clusters. For example, in the World Development,18 the search for articles that had 
“industrial cluster” within its “abstract, keyword, and title” for the period 2005 till October 2011 
produced only 25 articles. Within these results, a search for “labor” came up with the same 25 
articles, while a search for “poverty” within these same 25 articles produced only 12 articles. 
Though these 12 articles while not explicitly considering multidimensional poverty, they are 
instrumental in merging the productivity and human development potentials of the industrial 
cluster as they implicitly highlight arguments for, and institutions, agents and mechanisms that 
help to improve labor’s welfare in industrial clusters. These lessons will be drawn upon in the 
next section. 
 
2.6. Bridging the Gap in Literature: Industrial Clusters, Poverty and Labor Welfare 
Several points can be raised in analyzing the role and possibilities for industrial clusters to 
improve labor welfare. Firstly, following the arguments expatiated on earlier in this chapter for 
manufacturing leading to growth and employment, industrial clusters as a unique form of 
                                                        
18 Other journals analyzed were Research Policy, and Industrial and Corporate Change 
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industrial organization do have the potential of eradicating poverty by reducing the industrial 
isolation that SMEs face in developing countries, and providing employment for workers (Mano 
et al., 2011; Weijland, 1999). The more efficient and dynamic firms have the propensity to be 
more productive, and therefore hold greater possibilities for workers to increase their income and 
well-being. However it is worth mentioning again that productivity might be a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition to alleviate poverty (Srinivas, 2009). In reality, clusters are different and 
their individual features, processes and dynamics would determine their impact on poverty 
(Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004), to whom, and how sustainable it would be. For example, incipient, 
survival, rural based and informal urban clusters which employ low-skills and technology might 
help to generate employment, have low barriers to entry, but they might not survive in the face of 
intense external competition. In Africa, for instance, one finds that there are not a lot of 
successful clusters (McCormick, 1999, p. 1547). Many of the extant clusters are groundwork19 
and industrializing clusters that have not attained the status of industrialized clusters. The 
clusters that fall in the complex cluster category tended “to be smaller and less well developed 
than their counterparts in other parts of the world.” McCormick further noted, “collective 
efficiency, with its emphasis on the internal dynamics of clusters, cannot fully explain Africa’s 
lack of complex clusters” as there was need to look at the “social and economic environment for 
clustering,” and other barriers which reduce “the power of the clustering dynamic” (Ibid.).   
 
Second, improvements in a cluster through technology upgrading, can make it more productive 
and dynamic, and since technologically superior firms tend to be more profitable, they have a 
                                                        
19 McCormick (1999) offers three categories of African clusters – “groundwork” clusters, which lay the foundation 
for industrialization, prepare the way for the emergence of collective efficiency, and exemplify most of the clusters 
in Africa. Some are “industrializing” clusters, which “begin the process of specialization, differentiation, and 
technological development,” while fewer are “complex” industrial clusters, which “produce competitively for wider 
markets” (p. 1531).  
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better chance of eradicating poverty by providing employment and higher wages for workers.  
Kimura (2011, p. 2105, emphasis by author) narrates how a “traditional handicraft village” in 
northern Vietnam was transformed into a:  
modern industrial cluster, through the diffusion of mechanized production over the last 
20 years... During the modernization process, annual per capita income of the village 
increased from 400 USD in 1995 to around 2000 USD in 2005. The process also created 
employment opportunities for the surrounding agricultural villages: the paper factories in 
the village employed around 5000 workers from the village and its surrounding districts. 
It is notable that kinship networks were instrumental in helping to disseminate the knowledge of 
the new technology and sometimes providing the initial investment needed to adopt it.  
 
Thirdly, governments can and do play a critical supportive role in encouraging the formation of a 
cluster, promoting upgrading, supply of dedicated public goods (power, roads, water, skills 
training and so on) and providing an enabling environment for the cluster by policy and 
establishing institutions where they are weak or absent (Chari, 2000; Cammett, 2007; van 
Diermen, 1997; Mano et al., 2011; McCormick 1999; Mehrotra and Biggeri, 2005; Weijland, 
1999). In particular, drawing from Mehrotra & Biggeri (2002), Mehrotra & Biggeri (2005) claim 
that “without external intervention (collective and/or public action), a poor household may 
remain at best in a status quo of human capabilities, and there will be an intergenerational 
transfer of a poverty trap” (p.1737). Mano et al. (2011, p. 1762), also speak of the Ethiopian 
government’s policies support to the country’s cut flower industry:  
The strong initiative of the Ethiopian government has also contributed to the development 
of the cut flower industry. The government exempted taxes for inputs, revised the 
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investment law for foreign investors, leased land with basic utilities at low prices, and 
provided special loans through the Development Bank of Ethiopia. As a result, the 
investment climate in Ethiopia has drastically improved over the past few years, which 
has led to a huge capital inflow into the Ethiopian cut flower industry. 
 
In Indonesia, Weijland (1999, p. 1524) stated that the “government of Indonesia has stimulated 
rural CI [cottage industry] clustering to encourage industrial development and at the same time 
alleviate poverty” while Diermen (1997, p. 2129, 2133) found that “policies to promote small 
enterprises will continue to remain a high priority for the government…. [and one policy 
particularly] “encouraged and provided incentives for similar small enterprises to cluster 
together.” He further noted that “wages paid in Jabotabek’s large garment and wood furniture 
industries, however, are influenced significantly by the government’s minimum wage 
regulations.” Chari (2000) describes government intervention in providing loans to entrepreneurs 
through the State Bank of India. Cammett (2007, p. 1889) expounded on business-government 
relations in upgrading reporting that “state initiative and support is critical for promoting 
upgrading and industrial clusters – especially in the initial stages of cluster promotion, when the 
primary goal is to achieve economies of scale particularly among small firms.” Finally, 
McCormick (1999, p. 1548) in summing up the reality in Africa, proposes that governments can:  
encourage clustering by offering improved infrastructure and other incentives to 
producers and related service providers to locate in designated areas… create a policy 
environment that favors business activity. Policies designed to stabilize markets and to 
allow borrowing by businesses of all sizes are key. Also important are policies that 
facilitate associational activity, not by creating associations “from above,” but by 
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providing an institutional framework that allows them to form, grow, and dissolve in 
response to their members' needs. 
 
While government support is necessary for the growth of SMEs and clusters, this dissertation 
questions what the impact might be on worker’s living standards in the presence or absence of 
government’s institutions and policies in clusters. Specifically, how do the institutions of the 
state, firms, and society relate in mitigating risk for labor and eventually impacting their living 
standards?  Indeed, non-state and informal institutions such as trust, collaboration and social 
networks are important to upgrading, dynamism and improving labor’s welfare in industrial 
clusters. Individuals and firms collaborate through horizontal and vertical linkages, and various 
personal, business and social networks. These collaborations improve individual, firm, and 
cluster productivity, reduce transaction costs, and enhance trust. In turn collaboration and 
learning, even when competitive, leads to monetary and non-monetary benefits for workers 
leading to improved living standards and poverty eradication. Collaboration could take various 
forms, including inter-firm learning, sub-contracting, apprenticeship, technical support, inter-
firm credit, forward linkages to domestic and foreign buyers, backward linkages to buyers and 
suppliers, association membership, and other joint action to drive down cost of production. 
 
As previously discussed, an important hallmark that guides the concept of industrial clusters is 
collective efficiency. Collective efficiency is the concept that brings together the incidental 
(external economies) and deliberate (joint action) efforts of the clusters (Schmitz and Nadvi, 
1999). Workers within clusters are likely to acquire superior skills through constant interactions 
with competent peers and these skills and competencies, can lead to improvement in 
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performance and productivity in firms (Chari, 2000; Mano et. al., 2012). Personal, kinship and 
social networks can be beneficial in gaining useful employment, much in the same way it helps 
in the diffusion of knowledge, and provision of capital for the adoption of a technology (Mano 
et. al, 2011; Kimura 2011). In addition, learning and upgrading can also be attained through 
social networks, and from multiple and domestic and regional value chains as opposed to single, 
and global value chains (Navas-Alemán, 2011), while trade and professional associations can 
also be useful in helping to overcome poverty traps in their advocacy role for better wage and 
working conditions (Mehrotra and Biggeri, 2005). 
 
Richman (2005, abstract) gives an example of Jewish dominance of the diamond industry in 
New York writing that “[r]elying on a reputation mechanism that is supported by a distinctive set 
of industry, family, and community institutions, Jewish diamond merchants have been able to 
enforce such contracts and have thus maintained industry leadership for several centuries.” He 
further presents the cases of “Chinese family businesses in Southeast Asia;” and the Jains and 
Angadias of India and their involvement in the diamond industry, as successful instances of 
“other ethnically homogeneous communities who have built prosperous networks of commerce” 
(Richman, 2005, p. 45).  
 
Thus through various mechanisms and institutions including the state, the firm’s productivity and 
dynamism, and social networks, firms in productive industrial clusters have the potential to 




2.7. Summing Up 
In this chapter, the rationale for this study has been laid out by establishing the linkages that exist 
between industrial manufacturing pathway, employment and living standards. This was 
important given the question at the heart of the study being how do firms in productive industrial 
clusters impact on the welfare of their workers. The importance of considering not just 
employment in and of itself, but the nature and form of employment was also set out. Next, it 
highlighted the essence of and various actors and institutions as agents of social protection in 
playing a mediating role between productivity and welfare outcomes. It further explicated on 
institutions as having a role in cluster development and also elucidated on multidimensional 
poverty. Finally, it narrowed down on industrial clusters as an entryway to linking industrial 
dynamism, social protection and labor’s welfare outcomes, concluding from the literature that 














Living Standards and Industrial Clusters in Nigeria 
3.1. Introduction   
A prominent and currently widely discussed issue shaping the development agenda is the rapid 
growth of African and other emerging economies. However, this growth has not only been 
accompanied by rising poverty and widening inequality but by low employment levels and in 
fact growing rates of unemployment. While the attainment of full productive employment has 
been the objective of national macroeconomic policies and the broader goals of global 
declarations, we have on the contrary witnessed widespread “jobless growth”.20 Conventional 
wisdom had always been that rapid economic growth will automatically lead to job growth; an 
assumption which may have derived from the earlier growth narrative following the end of the 
Second World War (World Bank, 1978).21 The example of rapid economic growth and attendant 
structural change was in some way an inspiration for the massive investment of the oil money to 
drive Nigeria’s public sector industrialization pathway of the 1970s.  
 
However, this broad growth narrative did not paint a full picture and there were considerable 
differences among developing nations deriving in large part from their stages of development, 
the available skills to plan and execute large-scale industrial projects and as well their levels of 
                                                        
20 The Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development in 1995 held out the prospects of the link between full 
productive employment and poverty reduction; also target 1B of Goal 1 – to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger –  
of the 2000 Millennium Development Goals states: “Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for 
all, including women and young people”. Both the 1995 World Summit as well as the revised 2008 MDGs restated 
the nexus of poverty and employment (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/text-version/; United Nations, 2012, p. 
6&8). 
 
21 This Report was a review of twenty five years (1950-1975) of growth in developing countries accompanied by 
evident rise of per capita income in the range of 3 percent points per year doing so above population growth rates at 
the time. 
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institutional sophistications.  While as the Report says virtually all developing countries recorded 
rise in per capita income through industry-driven growth, not all countries uniformly benefitted 
from growth with structural change. Nigeria, as will be detailed in this chapter recorded 
significant failures in its industrialization efforts, and with it, a worsening quality of life and slow 
employment growth.   
 
In this chapter a history of Nigeria’s industrialization pathways is provided with the objective of 
justifying clustering as an alternative pathway to development. The next section provides a 
narrative of Africa’s and Nigeria’s past and contemporary industrial conditions. In section 3.3, I 
provide an analysis on the status and structure of Otigba ending it with a typology of the core 
actors and summing up with a perspective of types of institutions to foster a socially cohesive 
cluster manufacturing development. 
 
3.2. Africa’s Industrial Efforts in Comparative Regional Perspective 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2013), 
the economies of developing countries have been growing at rates that supersede that of the 
OECD countries since the mid-1990s. “[S]ince 2003 more than half of the world’s economic 
growth has derived from non-OECD countries; by 2011, non-OECD economies accounted for 
more than 45% of world GDP (in purchasing power parity [PPP] terms)” (p. 6). African 
economies in particular have collectively been experiencing good growth, marked with a few 
lows. For example, growth rate on the continent from 2002 to 2008 averaged 5.6%, fell to 2.2% 
in 2000 due to a rise in food and fuel prices, and as well the global financial crisis. However, 
average growth rate rose to 4.6% in 2010, and was at 5% in 2012. This remarkable economic 
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growth can be attributed to such things as improved domestic demand as income and 
urbanization levels rise, increase in public spending particularly on infrastructure, favorable 
weather leading to bumper harvests, economic recovery after conflict in several countries, and 
trade and investment with emerging economies investing in the natural resource and extractive 
industries (Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] & African Union [AU], 2013).  
 
Unfortunately, this growth is still largely driven and characterized by a heavy dependence on the 
production and export of commodities, few backward and forward linkages, local industries that 
add little value, and no economic diversification (UNECA & AU, 2013). The manufacturing 
value added (MVA),22 measured as a percentage of GDP in SSA was last reported at 10.5% in 
2013. This has dropped from 13% in 2000. These figures are however still below the rule of 
thumb that specifies 25% level for meeting the condition of industrialization (UNIDO, 1975).23 
For the East Asia and Pacific region, the MVA for 2000 and 2011 were 24% and 20% 
respectively, and considering the developing countries24 only in this region, the figures are even 
higher at 31% for 2000 and 29% for 2010 (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2013). 
 
While much of East Asia has become fully engaged in global trade in manufacturing and value 
adding services, Africa remains connected largely through the supply of raw materials. In fact, a 
new trade dynamic has emerged between Africa and Asia that has tremendous implications for 
                                                        
22 “Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector 
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs” (World Bank website, 2013). 
23 This point was reiterated that "Only when a minimum of 25 percent of GDP emanates from the industrial sector, 
will Africa be able to achieve the desired economic growth rate, jobs creation and economic transformation that is 
needed to eliminate poverty" (News24Kenya, 11 June 2013).  
24 The 23 countries in this category of “developing only” include American Samao, Cambodia, China, Fiji, 
Indonesia, Kiribati, Korea (Dem. Rep.), Lao DPR, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Fed. Sts), Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu 
and Vietnam (World Bank).  
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trade and development in Africa. The terms and volume of trade as well as the destination of raw 
material exports are experiencing geographical shifts, with Africa progressively exporting more 
to Asia and feeding the world’s new factories and workshops located on the continent, and in the 
process fueling its growth. Albeit, this trade dynamic might happen at the expense of Africa’s 
own nascent local manufacturing capacity. For instance, much of East Asia including China has 
tremendous strength in low-tech production such as in consumer electronics, computer 
peripherals, footwear and apparels. However, Africa as well has a fairly long history in textile 
and garment manufacturing, and there is some promise of electronics manufacturing in South 
Africa, Nigeria (Otigba Industrial cluster) and Mauritius. 
 
Still, the proper enabling environment to encourage industrialization on the continent has to be 
put in place. Physical infrastructure necessary for modern and mass production is very weak in 
most African countries, although in the last decade there has been a significant improvement in 
telecommunication. In 2003, telephone mainlines and fixed and mobile phones per 1000 people 
were 11% of the level in developing countries and 3% of the level in OECD countries; this has 
risen in more recent years. However, investment in electric power has not been as robust. In 
2002, electricity consumption per capita in the Least Developing Countries (LDCs – most of 
which are in Africa) was 7% of the level in other developing countries and 1.6 per cent of the 
level in OECD countries. Only 16% of the LDC population are estimated to have had access to 
electricity in that year, compared with 53% in other developing countries and 99% in OECD 
countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2006). Firm-level 
surveys (various Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank) indicate that new machinery 
and equipment is identified as the most important channel of technology acquisition by African 
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firms. However, in real per capita terms, machinery and equipment imports into the region 
during the early 2000 were at almost the same level as in 1980; a revealing signal of near 
structural stagnation.  
 
Another feature of the African economy relates to the size distribution of enterprises; most 
African countries are widely perceived to have a ‘missing middle’. At one end of the spectrum, 
there are a multitude of informal micro-enterprises, most of which are characterized by their use 
of basic and traditional technologies and cater to the main consumption needs of relatively small 
local markets. At the other end of the spectrum there are a few large firms, which are mainly 
capital intensive, resource-based, import-dependent or export assembly-oriented. These firms are 
often wholly or minority-owned foreign affiliates, or state-owned enterprises (World Bank 
Enterprise Survey, 2008, 2010). Although they are not large by international standards, they 
dominate the business landscape in most LDCs. Between these extremes there are very few 
formal sector SMEs. Also credit and financial institutions are still evolving; the domestic 
financial systems are characterized by dualistic and segmented structures. The formal financial 
system is not working properly to support long-term productive investment in most countries 
(UNCTAD, 2006).25 
 
The fact that economic development in Africa is not being driven by structural changes and 
deepening manufacturing means it has been lacking in driving employment growth and overall 
improvement in human and social development. The impressive economic performance on the 
continent has not resulted in generating the much-needed jobs and income to curb high 
                                                        
25 Between 1980 and 2003, a period in which most LDCs undertook financial liberalization, domestic credit to the 
private sector stagnated at around 14-15 percent of GDP. In contrast in other developing countries, domestic credit 
as share of GDP almost doubled from 30 percent to 60 percent over the same period.  
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unemployment levels (including rising youth unemployment) and poverty (ECA & AU, 2012, p. 
3; Martins, 2013). Furthermore, while there have been achievements in certain areas including 
education, child and maternal mortality rates, and gender equality, the pace of change is still too 
slow, making it unlikely for African countries to attain social development goals, such as some 
set by the Millennium Development Goals before the 2015 end date. The continent continues to 
lag behind the East Asian countries that have been able to lift a significant number of its citizens 
out of poverty through labor-intensive industries. African countries therefore need policies that 
would stimulate economic transformation and industrialization (ECA & AU, 2013, p. 6); albeit 
paying great attention to the quality, sustainability and spread of the growth to ensure that it is 
pro-poor (UNIDO, n.d.). 
 
This chapter provides a background of the political economic governing system and reviews 
industrial performance and policy, as well as human development in Nigeria from its 
independence in 1960. However, chapter 4 will nuance the living standard indicators in a 
national comparative perspective, showing living standards within the cluster under study and 
setting it against the backdrop of the country. In what follows, this chapter provides a historical 
evolution and detailed information of Nigeria’s industrialization and on the case study.  
 
3.3. Background on Nigeria  
This section provides a background on the political-economic set-up in Nigeria in order to enable 
a proper understanding of the governing structure in the country. 
Political-economic situation. Nigeria gained its independence from the British on the 1st 
of October, 1960. Since then, it has had a mix of both military and civilian rule, the former 
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usually gaining power by means of a coup. Currently, it is under a civilian/democratic 
government. Nigeria is endowed with numerous natural resources.26 It is a federal state with 
power and revenue being shared among its three tiers of government - the federal, the state and 
the local governments. It is divided into 6 geopolitical regions: North-Central, North-East, 
North-West, South-East, South-West, South-South – and has a total of 36 states and one Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT) – Abuja. The federal government oversees dealings with the 
international community, interstate and international roads, heavy industries and the like. The 
state government’s responsibilities include health, secondary schools and higher education, town 
and country planning, while the local government oversees sewage disposal, primary education 
among others. Appendix table 3.1 shows the division of responsibilities among Nigeria’s three 
levels of government.  
 
In terms of revenue, the state governments can raise money from their own sources. Lagos state 
for example, receives tax revenue from individuals and organizations. However, the federal 
government allocates revenue from oil, import, export and excise duties and agricultural 
commodities, deposited by the states into a federated account in the ratio seventy-five to twenty-
two to three, for the federal, state and local governments respectively. Allocations that previously 
remitted fifty percent of revenues to the regions where they were generated were discontinued 
(World Bank, 2002 in R.N.I. Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). The persistent strong reliance of the 
state governments on the federal government purportedly has its roots in the period of this highly 
                                                        
26 Nigeria has “about 34 different minerals across the country (including gold, iron ore, coal, tin, uranium, 
phosphates, and limestone), 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 187 trillion cubic feet of proven natural 
gas. Also, there are opportunities for fertiliser and liquefied gas production. With average production of about 2.3 
million barrels of crude oil per day, Nigeria is the largest exporter of crude oil in Africa and tenth largest in the 
world. It has a vast land of 923 768km^2, of which about 70 million hectares are farmland” (African Economic 
Outlook, nd.).  
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centralized, near unitary system practiced by previous military governments. In particular, after 
the unsuccessful attempt of the Eastern Region to break away and create the State of Biafra 
induced the response of the then Military government to break up the 3 regions into 12 states, 
under the belief that "by creating a larger number of relatively weak states under a strong central 
government it could overcome the instability of the past” (Barkan, Gboyega & Stevens, 2001, 
Federalism after independence, para. 4).  
 
However, there are challenges with the sharing of power, revenue and responsibilities in this 
manner. For one, the states have lost significant financial autonomy while responsibilities about 
who should carry out certain public works are often blurred. Lack of coordination among the 
different tiers and between the state and local governments also leads to certain infrastructural 
works and repairs being left undone. In large part, the states and local governments become 
heavily dependent on the federal government in order for them to effectively carry out their 
social service functions due to their relatively narrow tax base, except for Lagos and a handful of 
oil producing states. 
 
3.4. Industrialization, Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria 
Nigeria is one of the African countries that has enjoyed significant economic growth over the 
past years, which has not been translated to reduction in poverty and improvement in living 
standards. Instead, poverty, inequality and unemployment have become worse over the years as 
highlighted in chapter one. Furthermore, while industrialization has been recognized as a key 
development strategy by various administrations, the level of industrialization has remained very 
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low since independence (Amakom, 2008). The Vision 2020 Manufacturing Sector National 
Technical Working Group (2009, p. 17) describes that the: 
Nigerian manufacturing sector has failed to undergo the critical structural transformation 
necessary for it to play a leading role in economic growth and development. The sector is 
structurally weak and basic industries such as iron, steel and petrochemicals are not fully 
in place. The technological base for manufacturing is lacking, largely due to the near 
absence or inadequacy of research and development efforts and light manufactures, 
which depend entirely on imports for machinery, equipment and spare parts…. These 
factors have led previous development plans to describe the Nigerian manufacturing 
sector as one of “mere assembly plants” … [T]he skilled manpower necessary to 
guarantee competitiveness in the … globalised world is lacking. In recent years, the 
sector’s share of GDP has remained less than 5 percent of the annual average, 
contributions to foreign exchange earnings have been minimal, and share of employment 
and government revenue generated have been low. In short, the manufacturing sector has 
failed to be recognized as a mover of the nation’s economy. 
 
The manufacturing sector which is key to generating different linkages in the economy is weak 
and has been unable to contribute significantly to the GDP and employment. The future prospect 
of the sector is not bright, given the extant growth rates and challenges confronting the sector. 
Results of a recent study of the country’s Index of Industrial Production (IIP), which measures 
the productivity of an economy, indicate that the real sector is need of help. The three sectors 
examined, namely manufacturing, mining and electricity have failed to record appreciable 
growth between 2008 and 2012 (Osae-Brown, 2013), and seen in Table 3.1 below. The 
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implication of this finding is lower productivity, and higher level of unemployment which will 
be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
Table 3.1: Sectoral contribution to real GDP: 2006-2010 (%) 
Contribution to GDP in (%) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
Agriculture 
Solid Mineral 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
Manufacturing  
Telecommunication & Post 
Finance & Insurance 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Building and Construction 
Hotel and Restaurants 
Real Estate 






























































Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010); * Provisional estimates 
 
Despite these challenges, FDI inflows to Nigeria have been considerable. In 2011 for example, 
Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa together accounted for about half of the FDI inflows to the 
continent (Okubadejo, 2013). In Nigeria in particular, total investment as a percentage of GDP 
has averaged 23.8% between 2004 and 2013, and was 22.1% and 22.6% in 2012 and 2013 
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012). In addition, in mid-2013, major international rating 
agencies, Fitch Group, Moody’s and Standard & Poors (S&P) have all praised the country’s 
economic performance, and raised Nigeria credit ratings. For instance, S & P increased the 
country’s long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit rating from B+ in the last quarter 
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of 2012 to BB-27 in January 2013, thereby enhancing the future FDI potential and credit 
worthiness of the country (Guardian, 2014).  
 
In spite of the external inflows and high economic growth rate (Table 3.2), the economy still 
faces structural weakness which has made it impossible for Nigerian workers to benefit from the 
growth in GDP. A real transformation should be broad-based and improve social conditions 
especially job creation, inclusion and poverty reduction.   
 
Table 3.2: Trends in some of Nigeria’s socio-economic indicators (2000-2012) 
 Indicator/Year 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
GDP $million 46,386 67,656 145,430 169,481 459,616 
Gross National Income per Capita, PPP 
(Current international $) 
1,970 2,360 3,900 4,350 5,270 
Population (millions) 122.8 132.5 143 143 168.8 
Percentage of Urban 42 44 46 48 50 
Source: (World Bank, 2014) 
 
The question then is how did the country arrive at this low level of industrialization given its 
relatively significant material and human resource base? In this section I present a political-
economic development narrative that shows three to four decades of Nigeria’s industrialization 
as an outcome of state-led development that in large part failed, and then highlight the 
substantive themes that can be drawn out from this narrative.  
  
                                                        
27 Ratings are AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D and NR, with AAA signifying being the best and 
signifying that the “obligator’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong” 
(Standard & Poors, 2012, p.5).  
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Historical evolution of Nigeria’s political economy and industrial landscape 
Pre-independence: extractive mercantilist pathway. The British colonial government in 
Nigeria pursued a mercantilist and extractive policy, not developing any major industries, and 
not enacting any real industrial policy to promote industrialization in the country (Duru, 2012). 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) named this institution building of the colonial period an extractive 
political institution. Although infrastructure like railroads and waterways were developed before 
1950s, there was no modern manufacturing of worth in Nigeria. Instead, Nigeria became a 
supplier of raw materials to industrial Britain, who de-industrialized “the indigenous economy by 
killing or at best stunting existing industries and the skills associated with them”, making 
Nigerians to become slowly incapable of producing “handicraft items in which they had 
developed acknowledged expertise, and which could have provided the basis for real industrial 
growth and development” Njoku (2001, p. 167).  
 
The nature of these extractive institutions essentially turned the colonies into sources of primary 
products, while discouraging the growth of potentially competitive manufacturing industries. 
Unfortunately, the Nigerian political elite has pursued this same strategy. As the colonial 
administration came to an end, the mercantilist policy “gradually tilted towards the introduction 
of basic processing methods. This was the era of the pioneer oil mills for palm oil processing, 
palm kernel and groundnut crushing, cotton ginning, leather tanning, power driven saw mills, 
beer brewing and oil seed milling” (Iwuagwu, 2011, p. 6). At independence, the Nigerian 
economy was thus “predominantly agrarian, both in the production for domestic consumption 
and exports” (Duru, 2012, p. 15), and with “nearly no industrial sector” (Afodunrinbin, 2000, p. 
51-52). The agricultural sector employed over 80% of the population, and contributed 85% of the 
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entire country’s foreign exchange earnings, mainly in primary goods. Notwithstanding, while the 
Federal Bureau of Statistics expressed that 15% of the population lived in poverty in 1960 
(Adeleke, 2012), living standards were comparably better than that of most African countries 
(Afodunrinbin, 2000).  
 
1960s: Import substitution pathway. The newly appointed government set about to 
transform the country, seeking to make Nigeria into a “modern industrial economy” (Duru, 2012, 
p. 15). Under the First National Development Plan, it implemented an Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) policy that sought to reduce dependence on foreign trade, and conserve 
foreign exchange by substituting previously imported goods with local production. To this end, 
several protectionism measures were implemented, making tariffs on imported intermediate 
inputs cheap and those on final products expensive. This however made it difficult for domestic 
manufacturing companies to compete, and many became assembly plants that put the final 
touches on inputs that were imported. Linkages were also not formed within the economy (Duru, 
2012; Famade, 2009; Ikpeze, Soludo, & Elekwa, 2004; Iwuagwu, 2011).   
 
In 1966, the country experienced its first military coup. This was to become a somewhat regular 
occurrence in Nigeria, with each successive military leader, invariably justifying “its take-over 
by condemning its predecessor” (Njoku, 2001, p. 245). The result was that from 1960 till 1986, 
Nigeria had two civilian governments and six military regimes; coming into power through 
coups. The corruption, extravagance, and indifference of the politicians towards the populace, 
coupled with the wealth inequality between the wage-workers and the growing middle class, 
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made the coup generally welcome (Crowder, 1978). In 1967 however, the Biafran civil war,28 
which lasted till 1970 ensued. In spite of the political instabilities, manufacturing as a percent of 
GDP, grew by 1 percent to 6 percent by 1965, from the 5 percent rate at independence (Ikpeze, 
Soludo, & Elekwa, 2004). However, poverty had already been on the increase since 
independence (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), 2003), and as at 
1965, 28% of the population lived in poverty (Adeleke, 2012). The ordinary worker was also 
faced with increasing rent and food prices (Crowder, 1978).  
 
1970s-1980s: Post-war efforts. As the war ended in 1970, the government sought a 
policy of “Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction” aimed at reconciling the people 
and rehabilitating and reconstructing “existing infrastructures and businesses” (Iwuagwu, 2011, 
p. 9). Thus under the Second National Development Plan 1970 – 1974, industrial development 
was targeted to:  
promote even development and fair distribution of industries in all parts of the country; 
ensure rapid expansion and diversification of the industrial sector of the economy; 
increase incomes realized from manufacturing activities; create more employment 
opportunities; promote the establishment of industries, which cater for overseas markets 
in order to earn foreign exchange; continue the programme of import-substitution and 
raise the level of intermediate and capital goods production; initiate schemes designed to 
promote indigenous manpower development in the industrial sector; and, raise the 
proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial investments (Federal Ministry of 
Information, 1970). (Iwuagwu, 2011, p. 9) 
 
                                                        
28 A political and ethnic war where the South Eastern states attempted to secede and become independent. 
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In 1972, Nigeria adopted the indigenization policy, which was later amended in 1977, which 
aimed to transfer the ownership and control of foreign owned firms to Nigerians, foster 
widespread ownership of enterprises among Nigerian citizens, create “opportunities for Nigerian 
indigenous businessmen”, and encourage foreign investments to areas of the economy where 
they were more needed (Famade, 2009, p. 3). However, while leadership of the companies were 
given to Nigerians, strategic positions were still held by foreign owners (Iwuagwu, 2011). 
 
Petroleum, which was produced as early as 1958 in Nigeria, became a dominant factor in the 
economy in the 1970s, although it was produced as early as 1958 (Lubeck, 1977). As one of the 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it benefited greatly 
from the oil boom. Lubeck (1977, p. 6) wrote, “oil now accounts for nearly 93% of Nigeria's 
export earnings, 75% of foreign exchange earnings, 87% of total government revenues, and 45% 
of the Gross Domestic Product.” Oil therefore displaced agriculture in terms of foreign exchange 
earnings. In fact, as the economy grew from about 6 percent annually in the 60s, to more than 8 
percent after 1973, agricultural production lagged behind both economic and population growth 
rates (Essien, 1990).  
 
While the Federal Government acknowledged the decline in food production and causes such as 
decreased soil fertility due to “limited use of fertilizer, unimproved crop varieties and breeds of 
livestock, lack of credit, inadequate extension services, and the use of very simple manually 
operated tools” in its Third Development Plan (1975-1980), (Federal Republic of Nigeria, p.13), 
identification of the problem did not necessarily lead to action. Indeed, the farmer was not 
adequately recognized, and “relative prices shifted against the rural farmers; income per head in 
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the rural areas was comparatively lower than what obtained in the cities; public sector investment 
in physical and social infrastructures continued to increase while agriculture was ignored” 
(Essien, 1990, p. 24). Nigeria went from being self-sufficient to being a major food importer. 
The fixed exchange rate policy followed after independence, which led to an overvaluation of the 
currency, contributed to the ease at which imports which were then cheaper than domestic goods, 
could be brought in. This was however to the detriment of the domestic agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors (Sanusi, 2004). 
 
Revenue from oil exports continued to flow in. Government began to spend on big projects, and 
Nigeria was “lured not only into the courts of the credit agencies of Europe but also into the net 
of the International Capital Market (ICM)” (Essien, 1990, p. 28). By 1975, “the oil boom became 
less of a blessing.” Government was “not concentrating on other parts of the economy,” and 
“millionaires had arisen from illegal monetary sources” (Falola, 1999, p. 14). Indeed, the country 
continued to depend on and develop its economy around petroleum export, reflecting a very high 
level of mineral dependency, to the detriment of other sectors even in the years to come. In 2010 
and 2011 for example, 87.1% and 89.1% of Nigeria’s exports comprised of petroleum oils, 
gases, and other related petrochemical materials, according to the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC).  
 
The causes of industrial failure in Nigeria were therefore both institutional and structural. Not 
only was the economy heavily dependent on oil, at the same time, the funds being received were 
seriously misappropriated. But one cannot point to the military alone, as opposed to a civilian 
government as the sole usurper of public funds. For example, Obasanjo’s military regime, from 
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1976 to 1979, reportedly left in the foreign reserve N2.6 billion (Afodunrinbi, 2000, p. 54). 
However, the civilian administration, the country’s second since independence, under the 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN) with Shehu Shagari as president, squandered the wealth left by 
the previous regime. According to Falola (1999, p. 14-15): 
when the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) came to power, the economy was still doing 
well. The foreign debt was small and oil revenues increased substantially for a year. 
However, the regime squandered this opportunity. The concern of the NPN was to reward 
party members with contracts and import licenses. Grandiose projects, such as the rapid 
building of the new federal capital at Abuja, made this possible. Local production was 
severely damaged. The country had to import rice, vegetable oil, and other items to meet 
the local demand for food. Non-oil exports declined, the peasantry suffered, city dwellers 
found it hard to obtain cheap food, and smuggling of all sorts of commodities increased 
as the country banned some imports. The middle class, pampered in the mid 1970s, was 
now complaining loudly. Rural-urban migration intensified… The country had to take on 
more foreign loans as reserves declined. 
By 1978 when the oil crisis hit, earnings from oil were low and the country had contracted a 
series of loans. As at 1985, “over 33 percent of export earnings was meant for debt service” 
(Essien, 1990, p. 65).  
 
1980s – 1990s: Structural adjustment program. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
are conditions or performance clauses, in the form of policies or structural change requirements, 
which serve as prerequisites for eligibility to receive loans from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The primary aim of SAPs, in official policy discourse, was 
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to restore financial equilibrium for countries that were facing financial difficulties and balance-
of-payment problems. SAPs represent a direct intervention in the macro-economic policies of 
sovereign states, thought necessary by international organizations to which they turned for loans, 
particularly after the oil shock in 1979. It was essentially a neo-liberal framework demanding 
less of government’s intervention and more of the use of free market instruments in the 
allocation of resources in the economy. From the 1970s to early 1980s, ISI and its associated 
ideas were being heavily attacked by neoclassical development economists who trusted the 
workings of the market and distrusted that of the government (Chang, 2004).  
 
In 1986, Nigeria implemented SAP (Famade, 2009) under the leadership of General Ibrahim-
Babangida, albeit without a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The core policies 
of the program involved policies to correct for the overvaluation of the naira through the setting 
up of a viable Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), coupled with adjustments to the 
official rate, and aimed at a convergence of the two rates as soon as possible; overcome the 
observed public sector inefficiencies through improved public expenditure control programs and 
the rationalization of parastatals; and relieve the debt burden and attract a net inflow of foreign 
capital while keeping a lid on foreign loans (Essien, 1990).  
 
The emphasis on the exchange rate was because Nigeria had operated a fixed exchange rate 
regime following independence (Sanusi, 2004). The fixed exchange rate resulted in the 
overvaluation of the Naira, making imports cheaper than domestic goods. Both the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors were affected, as the “real appreciation of the exchange 
rate encouraged imports and capital flight, discouraged non-oil exports and helped to sustain the 
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manufacturing sectors over dependence on imported inputs. The agricultural sector was seriously 
undermined” (Obadan, 2006, p. 3).  
 
The major objectives of SAP included reducing the dependence on the oil sector and imports by 
restructuring and diversifying the productive base of the economy; developing and encouraging 
the use of local raw materials, intermediate inputs and technology; promoting a value-adding 
manufacturing sector, export oriented industries, and small and medium private sector 
enterprises which could help generate employment; eliminating hindrances to industrial 
development including deficiencies in infrastructure, man power and administration; facilitating 
domestic and foreign investments by liberalizing control; achieving fiscal and balance of 
payments viability over the period; laying the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary or minimal 
inflationary growth; lessening the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, 
improve the sector’s efficiency and intensifying the growth potential of the private sector 
(Essien, 1990; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1986 cited in Iwuagwu, 2011).  
 
SAP however arguably made the industrial sector worse off. The change to a flexible exchange 
rate and high interest rates led to inflation and a reduction in consumers’ purchasing power. 
Trade liberalization removed the protection that firms previously enjoyed and brought about an 
influx of imports – finished, second-hand and substandard goods. Many shops and factories 
closed down and workers were laid off (Iwuagwu, 2011).  
 
In 1989, the trade and financial liberalization policy was enacted (Famade, 2009). The policy’s 
aims and objectives included:  
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To foster competition among the domestic firms and between the domestic import 
competing firms and foreign firms with view to promote efficiency; [r]eduction of levels 
of both tariff and non tariff barriers; [s]craping of commodity marketing boards; [market] 
determination of [the] exchang[e] rate as well as deregulation of interest rates … meant to 
foster efficiency and productivity” (Famade, 2009, p. 6). 
 
2000s: Beyond structural adjustment. In the past decade, the government continued to 
enact policies to help spur growth in the economy. The efforts included considerable institutional 
changes such as the merging of previously disparate but complementary development 
organizations. For instance, the Bank of Industry (BOI) was constituted in 2000 to serve as the 
primary lending financial institution for industries in Nigeria. It was created from the merging of 
the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND), the Nigerian Industrial Development 
Bank (NIDB), and Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI). In the agricultural sector, 
the Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB) was set up 
from the Family Economic Advancement Program (FEAP), the Nigerian Agricultural and 
Cooperative Bank, and the People’s Bank, with the mandate to provide funds for industrial 
inputs (Famade, 2009). 
 
The government also took steps to promote small and medium enterprises (SMEs), recognizing 
them as the “nucleus of industrialization,” noting that “given the structure of the industrial sector, 
the SMEs hold the greatest prospect for growth” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & Abiola, 2007, 
p. 1).  Commercial banks were also directed to “set aside 10% of their annual profit as equity 
funds for the promotion of SMEs under the Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment 
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Scheme (SMEEIS)” (Iwuagwu, 2011, p. 13). At the macroeconomic level, a broader long term 
plan – the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was put in 
place in 2004 (Aigbokhan, 2008). NEEDS aimed to provide 7 million new jobs (Agu and Evoh, 
2011). More recently, the country embarked on the Vision 2020 project, with the hope of putting 
Nigeria among the top 20 economic countries in the world.  
 
There is also a renewed interest in clustering as an industrial policy in Nigeria, with the 
government introducing “a new industrial development policy anchored on the Cluster Concept” 
in 2007 (Iwuagwu, 2011, p. 2). Then again, industrial clusters and districts including free trade 
zones (FTZs) and EPZs are not new to Nigeria, and have had “some measure of success in the 
western part of Nigeria” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & Abiola, 2007, p. 1). The first industrial 
estates were set up in 1957 in Apapa and Mushin, and then in Ikeja in 1959 – all in Lagos state. 
The state has over twenty-two of such estates now. The southern parts of Nigeria, including 
Delta and Ogun states also has large manufacturing concentrations, and Lagos has the largest of 
all (Vision 2020 Manufacturing Sector National Technical Working Group, 2009). While there 
are government supported industrial districts and zones, as the Lekki and Nigeria Ogun-
Guandong Free Trade Zones (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2011), there are those like the Otigba 
Computer Village, Aba small and medium leather and footware cluster, Aba fashion and 
garments cluster and the Nnewi automotive cluster that are agglomerations of firms that have 
grown over time with minimal government support (Meagher, 2010; SMEDAN, 2005). 
 
Current socio-economic conditions and standard of living. In the past decade, Nigeria 
has experienced increased growth, with an average of 6.68% growth in GDP from 2005 to 2010 
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and an estimated real growth rate for 2011 of 7.36%. In 2011, agriculture (40.24%), wholesale & 
retail trade (19.38%) and crude oil and natural gas (14.71%) made up over 70% of Nigeria’s 
GDP (NBS, 2012, p.7-8). The recent rebasing of the country’s GDP has made Nigeria the 26th 
largest economy in the world and the biggest in Africa, with a GDP of US$510 billion. More 
significant is the diminished contribution of agriculture and the emergence of the service 
industries including information technology, telecommunications, airlines, music, the film 
industry (“Nollywood”), and online retail outlets in the new valuation, which bears clear 
evidence to a structural shift in the Nigerian economy (Faul, 2014). While economic growth 
indicators have been good, human development indicators have been poor, and current 
unemployment, poverty and inequality levels are high (see chapter one - Table 3.2 in the 
appendix also gives a summary of key indicators).  
 
Graduate unemployment is also unacceptably high for a country with so much room for 
economic growth. Agu and Evoh (2011), cite a report by the British Council and Harvard School 
of Public Health (2010, p. 25), which states a “highly educated Nigerian is not significantly more 
likely to find work than one with no education at all… and an average Nigerian does not 
generate more labor income than her or his individual consumption until 32 years of age, when 
she, or he becomes a net contributor to society.”  
 
High levels of graduate unemployment can on the one hand be attributed to the increase in 
universities from one before independence in 1960, to 39 universities between 1960 and 1999, to 
89 universities as at 2008, “comprising 27 federal, 30 state and 32 private universities. The 
concomitant effect of this is that an average of about one hundred and sixty thousand graduates 
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are turned out into [the] labor market annually.” (Ajayi, Adeniji and Adu, 2008, p. 78). On the 
other hand, there is the general impression of a mismatch between what employers are looking 
for and what employees have to offer (The Economist, 2011, 2012). In Nigeria however, 
potential employers express the view that graduates are indeed “half-baked” and in a survey of 
55 private firms, professional associations, public enterprises, and non-governmental institutions, 
the message being conveyed was that: 
University graduates are poorly trained and unproductive on the job. 
Human [c]apital [g]raduate skills have steadily deteriorated over the past decade. 
Shortcomings are particularly severe in oral and written communication, and in applied 
technical skills. (Dabalen, Oni, with Adekola, 2000, executive summary) 
National poverty levels have increased over the years, with rural poverty (63.3%) being higher 
than urban ones (43.2%). Table 3.3 below shows the relative poverty head count from 1980 to 
2010. One finds that as at 2010, the poverty incidence is 69.0% from 27.2% in 1980, with the 
estimated population living in poverty being 112.47 million.  
 
Table 3.3: Relative poverty headcount (1980-2010) 
Year Poverty Incidence (%) Estimated Population  
(Million) 
Population in  
poverty (Million) 
1980 27.2 65 17.1 
1985 46.3 75 34.7 
1992 42.7 91.5 39.2 
1996 65.6 102.3 67.1 
2004 54.4 126.3 68.7 
2010 69.0 163 112.47 
Source: NBS, 2012b 
Figure 3.1 shows the delineation between non-poor, moderately poor and extremely poor and 
how the proportions have merged over time.  
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Figure 3.1: Relative poverty: non-poor, moderately poor & extremely poor  
 
Source: NBS, Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey, 2010, as cited in  
NBS, 2012b 
 
To conclude this section, I highlight the major points that characterize Nigeria’s industrial 
landscape that underpin what has been discussed from the historical narrative. I also make a 
connection between the present state and the living standards of people. 
 
Understanding the industrial landscape of Nigeria: Core drivers29 
Public sector decisions for and manufacturing path to industrialization. Nigeria’s path 
of development is principally defined by choices made within a framework of state investment 
planning processes. This was common in many developing countries before the wave of 
privatization swept through in the 1980s. While state investment in public utilities such as power 
and water remain common to industrialized and developing countries alike, intervention in 
directly productive sectors is more a feature of developing countries. Justification for this is wide 
and varied ranging from economic, political to historical. To start, large-scale investment require 
heavy financial outlays but is characterized by low returns (at least in the short run); a feature of 
capital-intensive manufacturing and service sectors. Once investment is made in these natural 
                                                        















monopolies in the service sector and in oligopolies that produce tradable goods such as 
fertilizers, steel, petrochemicals and others, the tendency is to hold on and to control the 
enterprises. Other economic reasons relate to market failures, imperfection in factor market, lack 
of information, low level entrepreneurship and high-risk aversion of private capital to key and 
service sector investments (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B., Laditan, Kajogbola & Akinbinu, 1997). 
 
In Nigeria, some of the aforementioned reasons were given for the widespread investment in 
public enterprises. Large-scale technology projects for several reasons were the choice 
undertakings. One reason was to generate domestic technological capacity (increase in physical 
capital); second was to develop endogenous technological capabilities (human knowledge and 
resources) in design, production and innovation; and third was to generate employment. The 
overall aim might have well been to deepen the industrialization process and to hasten 
development. By the end of 1990s, total federal government investments were worth over 36 
billion Naira at their historical book values. Nigeria’s Bureau of Public Enterprises’ (BPE) 
survey (1991), shows the magnitude of state intervention in Nigeria, in that there were more than 
600 public enterprises at the federal level alone and several smaller ones at the state level that 
accounted for between 10-40% of fixed capital and formal employment. However, over time, the 
huge investment and continued state participation in industrial production came under intense 
questioning.30  
 
Public ownership of industry in Nigeria achieved minimal success and many of the projects 
failed; failure in the context of this narrative being when a project encounters severe cost and 
                                                        
30 This led to the setting up of several study groups that reviewed the activities of public enterprises. In 1988, the 
government established the Technical Committee on Commercialization and Privatization (TCPC) to carry out 
deep-going restructuring of the public ownership by privatizing and commercializing the enterprises.  
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time overruns, operates persistently below design or nominal capacity and due to the above 
factors, cannot build up technological capabilities, operates at a financial loss and in the end falls 
short of meeting social and economic objectives. This was in large part the fate of many Nigerian 
projects which despite huge investments by the government failed. For example, the Federal 
Superphosphate Fertilizer Company in Kaduna, completed in 1973 to produce superphosphate 
fertilizer and sulphuric acid for the Nigerian market, collapsed within ten years of 
commissioning. The Delta Steel Company in Warri did not fare much different. The company 
was operating at about four percent capacity after fourteen years in operation. The same can be 
said of the Machine Tools Company in Oshogbo which suffered several years of delay and cost 
overruns. The Iwopin Paper Mill was uncompleted, while Oku-Iboku paper mill closed down.31 
These were all companies that were of strategic importance to the Nigerian economy. The 
fertilizer companies were expected to contribute to increased agricultural productivity and supply 
of food. The machine tools company was expected to service the informal sector as well as the 
large and small-scale industries whose contributions to the economy were enormous while the 
paper mill was expected to facilitate literacy in the country. There are many more examples of 
large technological projects that failed in Nigeria. Clearly, the failure of these strategic projects 
contributed significantly to the poor state of the Nigerian economy today.  
 
Policy and technical challenges leading to public industrial pathway failure. The 
parastatal industries, which were largely import-substituting, were grossly inefficient. They were 
generally plagued by excess capacity because of the inability to maintain plants locally, to 
substitute local for foreign materials, and to provide basic technical management skills. Most of 
                                                        
31 For a full account of the history of the projects cited and the broader industrialization in Nigeria see Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka, B. et al. (1997).  
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the spare parts and components needed for repairs and maintenance in the plants had to be 
imported mainly from Europe. They were therefore faced with perpetual shortages of these parts, 
which were commonplace items within the industrial system of advanced economies.  
 
Again, large-scale projects are often very capital and technology intensive requiring multiple 
technology mastery efforts in implementation, and the management requirements of such 
projects are usually far beyond what most developing countries like Nigeria possess. For the 
Nigerian government though, domestic participation in technological acquisition was a key 
objective. This constituted a significant drag on the speedy completion of projects, although the 
general reasoning was that it was a worthwhile price to pay. Public servants, with the advice of 
young engineers relying on no more than theoretical knowledge of how industry works, assumed 
the enormous responsibilities of planning and managing large-scale process plants, roles for 
which they were ill-prepared. Furthermore, in order to encourage local participation in the 
project, the civil and construction works were reserved for Nigerian contractors, which also 
caused a lot of problems in implementation. For many of the projects, the commissioning dates 
kept being postponed. This caused a lot of unnecessary delays and internal wrangling between 
foreign contractors and national bureaucrats.  
 
Lack of institutional infrastructure leading to public industrial pathway failure. 
Nigeria’s institutional infrastructure was and remains to a large extent structurally weak. 
Technology infrastructure including research and development institutions, quality assurance and 
testing, and technology information is evidently ineffective. A vibrant system of innovation, 
which would guarantee a minimum interdependent relation among economic agents, is 
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completely absent. While some technology institutions certainly exist in Nigeria, there appears to 
be limited interaction between them and the industrial sector. They thus operate in isolation from 
the productive sectors. In addition, many are not only poorly funded and given conflicting 
objectives, but also have inadequate equipment and unmotivated staff. Further, poor coordination 
among agencies competing for relevance, the limited skills of policy-makers, together with the 
paucity of scientific and technical personnel with the requisite understanding of the science and 
technology system, jeopardized development objectives. Moreover, there seems to be a paucity 
of institutions that are critical to the development initiative. In addition, the ubiquitous lack of 
efficient physical infrastructure like electricity for industrial purposes has been and continues to 
be a bane to the economy. During the initial stages of operation for many of the plants, there 
were frequent interruptions of power supply by the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA).  
 
Structure of the Nigerian manufacturing industry. Nigerian industry is presently made 
up largely of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and clusters. MSMEs contributed 
about 46.54% to the country’s GDP in 2010. In the ‘other manufacturing’ sub-sector which 
excludes oil refining and cement, and includes “food, beverages & tobacco, textile, apparel & 
footwear, wood & wood products: pulp, paper & publishing, non-metallic products, 
domestic/industrial plastic & rubber, electrical & electronics, basic metal, iron & steel and motor 
vehicle & miscellaneous assembly,” MSMEs contributed 63.74% to that ‘other manufacturing’ 
sector’s GDP (NBS & SMEDAN, 2012). This group of enterprises produces largely for the low-
income group and employs low-level techniques. The medium and large enterprises on the other 
hand, particularly the enterprises in the engineering and related sectors, depend largely on 
imported technologies. Their presence and distribution in countries vary considerably and 
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depend on a number of factors such as resource endowment and availability of human capital. 
Relatively resource-rich countries like Nigeria, using its oil wealth, invested quite heavily in 
chemicals, extractive, and metallic core sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. From these core sectors 
were expected spin-off firms emerging from the development of Hirschman-type backward and 
forward linkages. A generation of enterprises, in response to the ISI strategy, including small 
firms was established. However, the shallow nature of endogenous technological capacity led to 
the failure to move beyond the elementary phase of industrialization.  
  
3.5. Status and Structure of Otigba Computer Village  
In the midst of relatively high poverty, inequality and unemployment levels in Nigeria, and failed 
large-scale public enterpises, the Otigba information and communication technologies cluster, “is 
an example of self-starting and self-sustaining small enterprises that are in some cases family 
owned” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006, p. 20), providing employment for many, including 
graduates. It originated in the early 1990s on two streets that were designated as residential by 
the local government, but now occupies eights streets, with Otigba being the largest (Ibid, 2006). 
It is spread over an area of about 6 square kilometers in Ikeja, “bordering Ikeja’s Government 
Reservation Area (GRA), Anifowose, Awolowo Way and Agege Motor Road (Badejo, 2011). It 
is bounded in particular by Obafemi Awolowo Road, Kodesho Street, Mobolaji Johnson Way, 
and Simbiat Abiola Road. Ikeja is the capital of Lagos state. The Map below (Map 3.1) gives a 





Map 3.1: Map of Computer Village, Ikeja 
 
 
Source: Google maps, 2014 
 
Evolution of the Otigba cluster. As noted earlier, the cluster evolved in an area that was 
initially zoned residential. The area is now more commercial than residential, with many of the 
buildings turned into plazas - buildings that have been partitioned into lockable spaces which 
firms can rent. Each of these plazas usually have their own management, overseeing the 
collection of rent, waste management, and security. According to an informant, Computer 
Village was initially at Bode Thomas in Surulere, also in Lagos. However, the high cost of 
building and properties in Bode Thomas motivated firms to move and remain in the present 
location in Ikeja. One of the first movers was Current Technology. Some of these first movers 
trained others in engineering. Afterwards the trainees started their own organizations in the 
Computer Village instead of going to Surulere, where they would have been faced with 
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discouraging rents. Unlike Bode Thomas, Ikeja was more accessible as a market and the area 
was already being used for mixed purposed that is residential and commercial purposes. It was 
not uncommon for residents to use their garages for stores or to build additional structures to 
their buildings.  
 
Initially, most of the buildings in Otigba were residential, and some were used for offices, 
including those of lawyers and clearing agents. The presence of the late Fela Kuti, a musician, 
political activist and satirist’s shrine in the now Computer Village area made it hard for people to 
come and buy there. Bamiro (2004, p. 7) wrote:  
[t]he cluster started about a decade ago on a low key with less than eight shops along one 
of the streets selling imported branded computers and accessories. As at the time, rent 
was low while there were several empty buildings. This was particularly so along Pepple 
Street which had as its prominent occupant Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, the legendary Afro beat 
musician cum-social crusader. His music attracted many followers coming to the “shrine” 
to enjoy music and partake in the musician’s celebrated smoking habits. Some of the 
unruly die-hard fans of his music and unusual habits rendered the Pepple street and its 
environs a no-go area for people.  But this is no more as the area has given way to the 
ICT cluster. “The metamorphosis from an entertainment street to one of business was 
made easier by the low rents charged on properties during the initial period. For many 
years, this area was not attractive to business, but since the ‘shrine’ ceased to exist here, 
the rush started", remarked a shop owner interviewed in this study.  However, the cluster 
still has to grapple with the remnants of the past era still lurking around the area and 
sometimes causing security problem[s]. 
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Prior research highlight two identifiable phases in the history of the cluster: the phase of 
stationary and office equipment, and the computer assembly phase. I purport that a third phase - 
laptop and Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) phase – has also emerged in the 
past 10 years or so. The phase of stationary and office equipment corroborates with the origins of 
the cluster in the early 1990’s. Then, the cluster consisted of a “few sales and repair outlets 
specializing in stationery, printers, photocopiers, branded computers and office equipment” 
(Abiola, 2006, p. 67).   
 
In the phase of computer assembly, as the cluster began to grow, new actors began to come in. 
These included  
retailers, importers of computers and notably, builders of computer clones, many of them 
SMEs…. The retail market changed to include more activities such as the direct 
importation of computer parts (which previously had been limited to a few privileged 
firms). Emerging business activities included the direct sale, repair, and servicing of 
computers and all kinds of office equipment and accessories. (Ibid, 2006, p. 67) 
 
In this new third ‘GSM’ phase that has evolved in Otigba, the cluster, in responding to the global 
ICT market, has seen an expansion in the market for, and trade of laptops, mobile phones, smart 
phones and accessories. Other ICT products that were in low demand or not in existence before 
like iPads and tablets are also now available. Many city-based Nigerians are more up-to-date 
with the names, types and brands of the different phones than their western counterparts. As 
noted by one of the interviewees, changes came into the Computer Village about 10 years ago, 
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when GSM came and changed the tide, bringing with it a dramatic change and more people into 
the cluster. With GSM, the need for specialized skill training as was needed for computer 
assembling was not as great. He however noted that even if the GSM revolution is on-going, 
computers would still stay because banks, the oil sector, and a lot of business is done through 
networking, and computers and laptops are needed to drive the network (paraphrased) 
 
Survey results from about 8 years back, compared with this one confirm these observations (see 
Table 3.4 below). From Abiola (2006), Abiola (2008) reported results from 392 SMEs and 3092 
workers in the cluster, showing that the proportion of firms involved in production and 
installation (2 SMEs, 16 workers) was least in the cluster while those involved in 
computer/accessories were the greatest (269 SMEs, 2,014 workers). Firms that cloned and 
assembled computers fall into this latter category. At the time, only 33 firms were involved in the 
sale of branded computers that could have been foreign like Compaq, Dell, IBM, and Toshiba, or 
Nigerian owned branded computers from Omatek or Zinox which were then new in the market 
(Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & Abiola, 2006, p. 54). Mobile phones had not yet boomed in the 
market as only 26 firms were involved in GSM, and that alongside typewriters, cameras and 
other parts.  
 
Survey results from this study show that about 41.7% of firms are now involved in the sale of 
new GSM, and 34.6% in the sale of used ones. Another notable change is the ‘other ICT 
products’ category, where about 45.5% of firms are now involved in the sale of such products as 
Ipads and tablets.  More than 50% (53.2%) of firms are however still in the business of cloning 
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computers. A sizeable percentage (46.2%) of firms are also wholesalers, and they might sell in 
bulk to others within the cluster or for re-sale in other parts of the country and beyond.  
 
Table 3.4: Comparative percentage of firms involved in various products and services 
Author’s Survey (2013)  From Abiola (2006)   
Product/Service % Firms SMEs (%) Workers (%) 
Laptop-new 64.1 Computer/accessories 68.62 66.49 
Retailing 61.5 Branded computer/Equipment 8.42 10.33 
Laptop accessories 57.1 Typewriter/GSM/Cameras and parts 6.63 6.31 
Installation 56.4 Services/Marketing 4.34 4.66 
Cloning of computers 53.2 Sales 4.08 4.26 
Desktop-new 52.6 Peripherals/Others 1.79 12.51 
Desktop accessories 47.4 Networking 1.53 1.82 
Desktop – used 46.2 Maintenance and repairs 0.77 0.73 
Wholesale 46.2 Production/Installation 0.51 0.53 
Laptop – used 45.5    
Other ICT products (Ipad, tablets) 45.5    
Phone accessories 42.3    
Phones (GSM) – new 41.7    
Repairs and servicing of desktop 41    
Repairs and servicing of laptop 40.4    
Downloading 39.1    
Marketing 39.1    
ICT solutions/Applications 37.2    
Phones (GSM) – used 34.6    
Cyber café services 32.5    
Non-ICT products – Shoes 25    
Non-ICT products – Clothes 23.1    
Non-ICT products - Food  17.9    
Other 8.3    
     
Source: Author’s field survey (2013); Abiola (2008) 
 
The cluster enjoys great demand from within the country. Lagos, where is it located, has “the 
nation’s highest percentage of educated people and educational institutions” (Abiola, 2008, p. 
67). There is thus a significant demand for the cluster’s products and services from the huge 
population of Lagos and Nigeria more generally. In fact, it “has been variously described as the 
information and communication technology (ICT) hub of West Africa, potentially the biggest 
ICT market in Africa, and the Silicon Valley of West Africa” (Ibid, 2008, p. 66).  The cluster is 
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therefore a dynamic and rapidly evolving locus of trade and manufacturing. One of the IT 
hardware executives who was relocating to the cluster from the highbrow part of Lagos remarked 
that Otigba is “the place to be now or you go under” (Ibid, 2008, p.68).  
 
General profile. The Computer Village has a large population of young people with 
68.7% of employees reportedly between 21 to 30 years of age. 7.8% are less than 20 while under 
a quarter (23.5%) are above 31. Survey results show a comparable mix of female (48.1%) and 
male (51.9%) employees. The cluster has a large population of graduates, with close to 50% 
being university graduates and almost 30% with technical degrees. 19.1% reported having high 
school degrees while only 3% had attained only elementary school education. This is 
corroborated by previous studies that found a significant number of skilled workers in the cluster 
who were trained in computer engineering, computer science, electronics, business 
administration and other related disciplines (SMEDAN, 2005; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2007). In 
particular, SMEDAN (2005, p. 85) found “55% of respondents are university graduates, 15% are 
graduates of the polytechnic, 20% are technicians, while the rest 10% are the unskilled ordinary 
traders.”  
 
The cluster in its own way is quite profitable. The cluster between 1999 and 2004, saw an 
increase in profitability and output exported. In particular, profitability was recorded as 39.48, 
34.75, 36.63, 39.24, 41.85, and 44.37 between 1999 and 2004 (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2007). In 
surveying the present worth of the firms, 11.6% of respondents each fell into the N0 – N50,000 
and N50,000 – N100,000 categories. The largest number of respondents (27.4%) indicated that 
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their businesses were worth between N1,000,001 – N5,000,000, while 10.5% had businesses 
worth over a N100,000,000. Table 3.5 below shows these results.  
 
Table 3.5: Worth of firms in Naira 
Worth of Firm No. Percentage 
N0-N50,000 11 11.6 
N50,001-N100,000 11 11.6 
N100,001-N500,000 6 6.3 
N500,001-N1,000,000 7 7.4 
N1,000,001-N5,000,000 26 27.4 
N5,000,001-N10,000,000 16 16.8 
N10,000,001-N50,000,000 7 7.4 
N50,000,001-N100,000,000 1 1.1 
Above N100,000,000 10 10.5 
Total 95 100.0 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
Given the capital intensive nature of the business, the results are not surprising. One can assume 
that the companies that have lower worth are less capital intensive than the others, and may be 
engaged in the sale of less expensive products. Firms’ profitability might also give a better 
insight into the profitability of the cluster as a whole. From Figure 3.2 below, about 14.9% of 
firms made between N0-1,000 per week. 31% made between N10,001 and N50,000 while 20.7% 
made above N50,000.  
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Figure 3.2: Firms’ average profit per week 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
The cluster however has a wide range of actors: 
1. ICT-related business owners. The first set of actors that make up the core of the 
cluster are the business owners, and they range from being single owner/employee to enterprises 
with more than 50 employees. The enterprises have grown over time in numbers, matured over 
time in the way they conduct business particularly in the accumulation of experiences and 
knowledge in the core technical activities of the cluster, which is computer assembling, cloning 
and the like detailed in table 3.4. The firms have mostly emerged in fairly similar ways: starting 
with limited capital, learning the businesses for the most part through apprenticeship and the 
inter-personal exchanges and networks of informal and formal associations. There is a strong set 
of knowledge and skills in trading in computers, servicing, and repairs of computers and intricate 
allied products. Collective action and joint action is transacted through what is most scarce 
namely, provision of credit, technical support, collective purchases and warehousing of goods. 















The poor and surviving Category  
Street hawkers/vendors: These are vendors who do not have a shop or permanent 
structure but instead stand or walk around to sell their wares. The products they sell are mainly 
computer and phone accessories such as SIM cards, flash drives, and phone cases. Most of these 
vendors are young people who might have attained some level of education. These hawkers 
sometimes act as middle-men between shop owners and potential customers, linking customers 
who might find it hard to navigate their way in the unfamiliar cluster to a particular shop. They 
might receive some money from the customer as a token of appreciation. On the other hand, the 
vendor might take advantage of information asymmetry and tell a hiked price to the customer, 
thus receiving the difference between the store’s selling price and the customer’s purchase price, 
when the exchange is made. In addition, they might receive goods on credit from more 
established shop owners for them to sell, usually at their own prices, and they return the cost 
price and unsold ware to the shop owners. For example one interviewee noted, BB [blackberry] 
soft cover, say someone on the street sells it for 400 Naira, but you go” upstairs” it sells for 300 
Naira. These vendors benefit from being able to switch from one product to another due to the 
diverse and fragmented nature of their kind of market depending on what is in demand at the 
time in the market. They have the flexibility of stocking a small range of different products and 
are able to decide on timing, when to bring in their wares to the cluster in order to enhance their 
livelihood while doing other businesses as is common with this category of actors.  
 
Street vendors and hawkers are highly vulnerable to work-related risks and disabling effects of 
being in the cluster. First, their sales and profit are likely to be volatile. Hard-working and honest 
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vendors might be viewed as dubious “hustlers” due to the general perception that might have 
been caused by other hawkers who deal dishonestly in the cluster. Furthermore, customers might 
be more willing to patronize established stores, where they can get a receipt as opposed to a 
trader whom they may be unable to find if there is a defect with the product that was purchased.  
Their business is often subject to the vagaries of the weather and gravely affected, for instance, 
when the rain falls. Also, according to the CEO of another established business, the work of 
“hustling” is not sustainable, as they have to stay in the hot sun and stand or walk around which 
could be quite tasking; it is a life of sweat and toil but the expectation of profit is enough 
motivation to endure and persist. Picture 3.1 below gives a glimpse into the range of actors that 
frequent the cluster as well as the busyness of it. 
 





Source: Review Naija, 2014 
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The presence of the cluster provides some income for the workers; however their work is tiring 
and not sustainable. Although they might benefit indirectly through access to credit from the 
firms, as well as their customers, unless officially recognized and employed by a firm, these 
individuals do not have access to the direct income and non-income benefits that the firms give 
to their workers. More generally, the cluster can and does improve their living standards in the 
long-run as they move from street hawking to possible employment in a firm, and to being the 
owner of a stable business. This is a natural progression that individuals have made within the 
cluster. A worker in a marketing firm who was engaged in Computer Village noted when asked 
if the cluster was helping living standard saying: 
Go to the beginning of GSM. SLOT32 used to hustle33 on the street, he repackaged his 
business, and now has stores. Here you see some have their own laptops, they download 
songs, software … Some make like 2, 3, 4 k34 each day … go home, eat, save, make 
something reasonable. If he is sharp and owns a vision he will own a shop.  
Another employee who worked for a large firm said in comparing his own employment and 
those of the hustlers selling on the street that ‘can’t tell, its like 50-50. Sometimes they (the 
hustlers) can make two/three times his salary and other times not.’ There is thus the perception 
that one can be successful within the cluster, particularly if one works hard, is wise and has a 
vision, he will eventually move out of street trading and hustling.  
 
                                                        
32 Slot systems limited is a company, incorporated in 1998, which specializes in the sale of mobile phones and 
laptops, and the provision of sales and repair services. With the headquarters in computer village, it has about 28 
other branches within Lagos and other states in Nigeria. SLOT is usually pointed to as one of the success stories in 
the cluster (Slot Limited).  
33 Hustle (hustling, hustled) is a slang used in Nigeria to depict struggling usually to earn money, make a living. 
34 k = thousand; two, three, four thousand naira.  
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The “Comfortable” Business Category 
Stall/temporary structure vendors: This category of vendors conduct their business in a 
hired or own space usually in front of buildings or by the sides of the street.  In cases where these 
business own the space, the structures used to delineate the space and display their wares is 
usually temporary and can take various forms: a box with a chair; a table and chair; a bookshelf; 
car tyres, sometimes with some shade like a big umbrella. Products sold include computer and 
phone accessories like sim cards, phone cases, laptop bags, software installation compact discs 
(Cds) and books. These sellers are slightly more established and better advantaged than the street 
vendors in that they have an identifiable location where customers can find them. They have the 
luxury of sitting down and do enjoy some degree of protection from the forces of nature. They 
could get their products from within the cluster or outside the cluster, usually within the Lagos 
area. Some are educated with high school degrees or some form of diploma.  
However, similar to the street hawkers and vendors they are highly vulnerable to the weather and 
can be considered a nuisance by government agents who want to sanitize the cluster.  
Again these entrepreneurs often start as a small family-based business with funds from own 
savings or from friends and relatives; they might also be “graduates” (previous category) of 
street vending who had accumulated sufficient capital to rent shop space because institutional 
lending is hardly considered a possibility. Their progress is delimited by two sets of institutional 
biases that are perennially against micro enterprises and which the actors are very much 
acquainted with in this cluster. First, there is a historical state bias that favors large state-owned 
enterprises and large private firms as was detailed in section 3.2; a fixation that has been 
unsuccessful particularly for the former. Also, state policy on industrial development stresses 
MSME, however, very little in practical terms have ever been done to support microenterprises. 
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This is because of poor state capacity to implement targeted policies to pursue explicit 
differentiating mechanism across size and product groups.  
 
Moveable/immoveable kiosks: These kiosks are more permanent than the temporary 
stalls. They can be made from metallic materials. The shop owners are less vulnerable than the 
street hawkers and stall owners and therefore, their customers are able to locate them. This is a 
big advantage in a competitive environment. The stalls are usually small and might be shared by 
two or more business owners. The shop owner might have an employee or sales assistant who 
works in the kiosk, and have storage facilities elsewhere. In other words, they are a cut above the 
“survival” category but remain vulnerable without social protection and could easily slip back 
when market conditions change quickly. 
 
The stable “rich” core enterprise category  
Stores/shops: Store and shop owners in the Computer Village are the most established 
companies in Computer Village. They comprise small, medium or large firms as measured by 
number of employees. Most of the businesses are personal and owned by Nigerians, however 
there are a few foreign companies in the cluster including Zed Mobile (Indian) and Techno 
(Chinese). The firms are usually registered with the association, and they also pay taxes. They 
have access to the Hygeia health insurance scheme in the cluster, and are more likely to qualify 
for bank loans. Some of these firms provide the input resources for the street vendors and 
temporary structure vendors. However, they also sell through other established companies in the 
market. Many of these firms have additional branch or branches either in the Computer Village 
or elsewhere. Shop owners are sometimes those who were previously employed in other firms 
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and have saved enough capital, and confidence to start their own businesses. Other entrepreneurs 
might have become familiar with the cluster through people who work there or dealings there, 
and have enough the resources set up a business there.  
 
In Computer Village, the physical size of the firms might not be reflective of how productive 
they are, as some of the firms have small shops with warehouses. Apart from the general risk of 
completely leaving the market if the proposed move of the Computer Village takes place, these 
firms are not exposed to the occasional risk of being asked by the State task force to move 
because they want to sanitize the market.  
 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs): Within the ICT industry in Nigeria, there 
are the OEMs. These have their own brand of computers just as Dell, Hewlett Packard, and 
Apple are name brands. They include Zinox, Omatek, Brian, and Speedstar. Omatek is not 
located within the cluster, Brian and Speedstar are located in very close proximity to it, while 
Zinox has a branch there. These actors constantly push for the promotion of their brands in 
Nigeria and have been beneficiaries of such policies where government agencies are required to 
be furnished by them. There was also the ‘Computer for All Nigerians Initiative’ (CANi) under 
former president Obasanjo that aimed to put a computer in the hand of every Nigerian by making 
it more affordable. The project was a partnership between “the Federal Ministry of Science and 
Technology and Intel, Microsoft, and Omatek, Zinox, Brian and Beta among other technology 
companies” (Balancing Act, nd., para. 2). Table 3.6 below summarizes the ICT-related actors 
and their vulnerabilities. 
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Table 3.6: Typology ICT-related businesses and vulnerabilities 
Actors Description and Vulnerabilities 
Street hawkers and 
vendors 
No shop or permanent structure. Highly vulnerable to work-related risks 
and disabling effects of cluster. Sales and profits likely to be volatile.  
Susceptible to the vagaries of the weather, and state government’s efforts to 
sanitize the cluster.  
Stall/temporary 
structure vendors 
Use of hired space usually in front of buildings or by the sides of streets. 
Space delineated with temporary things like a box with a chair; a table and 
chair; a bookshelf; car tyres, sometimes with some shade like a big 
umbrella. Slightly more advantaged than street hawkers and vendors as 
they have an identifiable location where customers can find them. Highly 
vulnerable to the weather and can be considered a nuisance by government 




More permanent than temporary stalls. Kiosks can be made from metallic 
materials. Less vulnerable than street hawkers and stall owners, and are 
easily located by customers.  
Stores/shops Most established companies in the cluster. Comprise small, medium or 
large firms as measured by number of employees. Firms are usually fully 
registered with the association and pay tax. They have access to the Hygeia 
health insurance scheme in the cluster and are more likely to qualify for 
bank loans. Some have additional branch(es) either in the cluster or 





ICT firms with own brands. Include Zinox, Omatek, Brian, and Speedstar. 
These actors constantly push for the promotion of their brands in Nigeria 
and have been beneficiaries of such policies where government agencies 
are required to use Nigerian made labels. 
Source: Author’s Field Research (2012-2013) 
 
Branded company distributing centers: Most of the foreign branded ICT companies 
including Blackberry, Hewlett Packard, LG, Nokia, Samsung, Sony, and Techno have 
distributing centers in Nigeria where other firms can purchase their products for re-sale. 
According to an interviewee, some of the products have been developed for the Nigerian market. 
For example, for a number of the major players – Nokia, Samsung, Sony, and LG, information in 
one of the major languages – Hausa, Ibo or Yoruba – can be retrieved from the phone. Some 




Suppliers: While some firms obtain their input products and purchases from within the 
cluster and distributing centers, others establish contacts with firms in countries of origin like 
China, Malaysia, Dubai, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Hungary, Mexico to 
purchase their goods. One implication of this is that the price of the goods are influenced by the 
exchange rate.  
 
Consumers: The cluster has a large variety of customers including individual end-users, 
companies, and other retailers, nationals and foreigners for example Congo and South Africa, but 
most customers come from West Africa – Abidjan, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo.   
 
2. Supporting systems for business enterprises. As characteristic of business districts, 
the clusters activities have created certain positive spill-over effects by spurring economic 
activities in other sectors, thus providing employment both directly and indirectly. Some of these 
businesses include: 
 
Financial institutions like banks and insurance providers. Credit facilities from banks are 
available in the cluster, as well as other SMEs. The loan rates are however still very high. For 
example, a bank that gives loans to established businesses in the cluster, that is those who have 
shops, had an interest rate between 27% to 30%, depending on the loan plan the applicant asked 
for. This figure was increased from 25%. There was also an additional one-off 2.5% 
management fee. The ICT business can be very capital intensive and insurance against fire and 
theft are useful for owners. 
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Training institutions: Although many learn the tools of the trade from within the cluster, 
there are companies and institutions that provide training in computer and various IT 
certifications. 
 
Cargo companies: Some of the cargo companies supporting the cluster are DHL, FedEx 
Corporation, TNT, AS, Global express, IMS, and Tranex. These companies enable goods to be 
transported to other parts of the country and beyond and as well to bring in the goods of the 
firms. Some of the firms pay the agent fee to the cargo companies and do not have to be involved 
in the clearing of the goods at the port of entry. 
 
Transportation: Entrepreneurs in the cluster often travel out of the country to purchase 
goods for their firms, and as well for personal reasons. Human and goods are constantly being 
transported to and from the cluster. There are therefore a lot of traveling agencies within the 
cluster. 
 
Communication: Firms within the cluster are supported by printing, publishing and 
communication services who advertise their goods by printing and publishing flyers that show 
what they have.  
 
Other non-ICT businesses: The cluster has attracted those who seek to profit from the 
potential customers in the cluster. These include fruits, food, clothes, shoes, belts, and drinks 
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sellers. Some of these vendors are street traders who move around while others have kiosks or 
shops. There is a lotto shed as well. There are also those who come to beg for alms.  
  
3. Social and Professional Associations 
The Computer and Allied Products Dealers Association of Nigeria (CAPDAN): 
CAPDAN is the umbrella association in the cluster and was inaugurated in the cluster in 2004.  
CAPDAN was the response to the threat of being shut down in the face of insecurity and 
dishonest businesses which were occurring in the cluster, giving it a bad reputation and causing 
some patrons to stay away. CAPDAN was thus formed to “sanitize the system and clean up the 
bad image of the cluster as a haven for hoodlums” (Bamiro, 2004, p. 18). This was reflected by 
one of its officials who mentioned that CAPDAN was set up to ensure that sellers conform to the 
best business practices. Companies are registered with the association, and it acts as a go-
between the firms and the different levels of government. Although the government should 
provide security in the cluster, CAPDAN also has its own taskforce. The association also helps 
to mediate between employers, employees and employers, and customers and firms. For example 
in cases where two members of the association are fighting over the same shop or location; 
buying and selling ethics where the customer is not being treated well; cases of substandard 
goods or duplicated products.  
 
Hygeia (financed by the World Bank): In terms of communal benefits, a health 
insurance scheme by Hygeia, which began in August 2009, and is funded by the World Bank, is 
available in the cluster.  The scheme is for firms who have a store in Computer Village and their 
employees. However, not all members of the cluster are enrolled in the scheme. Hygeia usually 
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takes three steps to verify the eligibility of their applications. Step 1: The provision of identity 
cards which are usually issued by the company; Step 2: Spot check where an Hygeia worker goes 
physically to the firm to assess if you work there; Step 3: A sign off by the employer who is the 
principal on the scheme. Street hawkers who are attached to firms can get identity cards and 
apply for health insurance through the firms. As at January 2013, they had about 25,000 who had 
enrolled for the scheme, albeit the active population, which constituted those who had renewed 
their subscription, was about 10,000. It was explained that the drop in enrollment could be 
because the scheme had become restricted to only the nuclear family, as opposed to everyone 
who lived under the applicant’s roof such as the drivers, gardeners and the house helps. Another 
interviewee revealed that the firm he worked with was not using the scheme at the moment 
“because some people abuse it … some of the drugs/services.”  
 
ICT associations in the country: Nigeria also has the Computer Society of Nigeria 
(CSN). CSN has four organizations under them: The Information Technology Association of 
Nigeria (ITAN); Institute of Software Practitioners in Nigeria (ISCOM); Internet Service 
Providers of Nigeria (ISPAN); and National Association of Computer Science Students 
(NACCOS). All these have representation in the cluster.   
 
Other associations which are present are the Ogunbiyi Community Development Association, and 






Awon Omo onile:35 This is translated as the original owners of the land. They are known 
in the popular press as area boys. According to one interviewee, they are people who think their 
father owns the land. These are a group of people who live by collecting rent in the cluster. For 
example when temporary stall owners set up their small stalls on the roadside and/or seek the 
permission of storeowners to put up showcases to display their wares in front of their stores, they 
still pay some sort of rent. One such trader who had been there for 2 years, and sells software and 
flash drives, said he pays N500 on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, N800 on Thursday, N600 
on Friday, and N700 on Saturday, to these awon omo onile. A fruit seller, who sold from a 
wheelbarrow, and had been at the Computer Village for 5 years, said he paid N150 as rent to area 
boys; although, when he first started, it was N10. He made about N3,500 to N5,000 in income 
per day. In essence, the area boys seem to have formed a sort of self-government in the market; 
the awon omo onile is a spontaneous emergence of a self-regulating institution that exists to fill 
missing an institutional vacuum; the lack of formal rules.     
 
Other actors who are in the cluster include residents and homeowners who continue to live there, 
despite the changes that have occurred in the geographical space over time. One such resident I 
spoke to owned a restaurant which ostensibly transformed from a residential to business. The 
home however belonged to her mother-in-law. Again, there are also the plaza owners, who rent 
out shop to others. They might have been former residents or individuals who bought and 
converted the buildings from the former residents. Agents that help to broker sales, construction 
companies and workers, security providers, and as well religious service members are also 
                                                        
35 Area boys, jobless youth whose livehood depends on intimidation and harassment of traders, customers and 
motorists. Their “right” comes from their claim to being “sons of the soil” – the original natives of Lagos.  
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visible in the cluster. For this latter group, on Thursday mornings, businesses do not open until 
10am, as traders in Lagos State have to observe “environmental,” a time when the surroundings 
are cleaned up.36 Visiting the Computer Village on one such Thursday morning, I noticed the 
businesses were closed, and the usual hustle and bustle of the cluster was absent, and there were 
different Christian fellowships going on. There are also those who help to park cars and collect 
money for it, and might be working for the local government. 
 
Different Levels of Government 
Although many at the Computer Village consider state support to be minimal, the government 
and its agencies are present in the cluster in various ways. The state government is the most 
active of all three levels, albeit, all three levels of government receive some form of tax from the 
cluster. The Federal government receives the company tax, the Lagos state government is paid 
the personal income tax while the Local government is the recipient of the shop permit tax. For 
the payment of the personal income tax, there is an agreement between the Lagos State 
Government and CAPDAN. Through this, the firms pay a flat rate of N2,500 or N5,000 yearly to 
the government through the bank, as at 2012. However, the tax officials can also evaluate a 
company to see if they should pay more than this amount. There are however other taxes like a 
tax on radios and televisions.  
 
To ensure order, there are the traffic control police officers who manage the flow of vehicles on 
the roads around the cluster. However, many of them are corrupt, arresting drivers for the least 
offense, if any, and demanding a large amount of money to be paid. There are also police officers 
to maintain order within the cluster. These officers have a mobile steel (pangolo) office with a 
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small cell and two office areas. Also present within the cluster are the task force who come on 
occasion to sanitize the cluster by clearing away the roadside sellers and temporary stalls. The 
Lagos State Waste Management Association (LAWMA) also come to pick up the refuse, and 
electricity from the public grid also comes to the cluster.  
 
The Lagos State Ministry of Commerce and Industry acknowledges the cluster, albeit does not 
carry out any function there, neither does the Lagos State Ministry of Women Affairs and 
Poverty Alleviation (WAPA). According to an official at the Department of Regional Master 
Plan, within the Lagos State Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development, the 
Computer Village is an illegal market, having illegally converted buildings. He expressed the 
view that there was a time that the state government wanted to accommodate the businesses 
there, and gave them a change of use. However, the present governor of Lagos State put a stop to 
it, his rationale being – you have planned a place, why change the use? In fact, the government 
has expressed the desire to move the cluster to a new location in “Kotangowa Market in 
Agbado/Oke-Odo Local Council Development Area, Lagos” (Awoyinfa, 2013). According to an 
official of an association at Computer Village, the move is beneficial, as the Computer Village 
was crowded.  Badejo (2011) reports that: 
As the market is unplanned, it has experienced growing pains. Some local residents are 
upset at the expanding market. Traffic around the area has become congested, and it is 
almost impossible to find a place to park… The new Computer Village will seat on a 21-
hectares of land.  
A department within the Lagos State Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development is in 
charge of this move. This current site is however not vacant, but is also occupied by some 
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traders, who are themselves to be relocated. In a local newspaper, the Commissioner for Physical 
Planning and Urban Development, Mr. Toyin Ayinde speaking on the relocation says 
As soon as people heard that government intends to move traders at Computer Village to 
Kotangowa and those at Kotangowa to Amikanle, all in Agbado-Oke Odo Local Council 
Development Area, those who have land at Amikanle went and started erecting buildings. 
All these buildings were built without approval…. Officials of the ministry have gone to 
visit the site (Amikanle), and we discovered that it is no longer possible to move the 
traders at Kotangowa to Amikanle anymore. We cannot carry out any development there. 
As a government that is sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people, we decided 
to allow those who went to build houses there be… So, both Computer Village and 
Kotangowa will co-exist in the current site where Kotangowa is, but with modern 
buildings. It will accommodate residential houses for those who want to live and do 
business there. We are working with CAPDAN. (Awoyinfa, 2013).  
It is yet to be seen if the move will actually take place.  
 
Relationship between actors 
Collaboration: The cluster exhibits a high level of inter-firm cooperation and 
collaboration. There are horizontal linkages between firms, vertical linkages between firms and 
suppliers, firms and customers, firms and subcontractors, and as well between the street 




Competition: While firms within the cluster collaborate, there is also a high level of 
competition particularly based on price. According to one interviewee who commented on the 
benefits of being located within the cluster as opposed to outside –  
Being located within the market has many advantages. The village is a concentrated area 
where many people come to buy, and they do not necessarily have to know you before 
buying from you… The Computer Village advertises you, and at the same time the place 
is well secured. Although, there [is] a lot of competition which could be a disadvantage 
because we are all selling similar products. However, if ones’ store is located outside the 
Computer Village the profit margin maybe bigger; you know, ‘a one eyed man in the land 
of the blind is a king.’ But remember before people patronize a store located outside of 
Computer Village, there are a lot of adverts that may have gone into it. They spend to 
[get] it.  
Competition also intensified with the importation of goods from Asia. “Leading the pack is 
China, Malaysia and Dubai in the Middle East. This has greatly encouraged informal exportation 
and importation (Trans-border trade) with price be[ing] the major factor of the competition” 
(SMEDAN, 2005, p. 86).  
 
Conflict: Conflict at different levels of intensity and between various actors (street 
traders and shop owners; area boys bringing contention; government and street vendors and 
customers) is observable within the cluster.  
 
Street traders and shop owners: While there is some collaboration between the street 
traders and shop owners, there is still some “serious disaffection” between them, as the shop 
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owners believe that customers approach the vendors first, and the vendors sell the goods at a 
cheaper rate to the customers in order to attract them. Defending their actions, the vendors said 
they have to make a living and pay rent for the spaces they use which are usually high. No space 
is free in the cluster. One vendor said “I pay as much as N15,000 a month if you add all what I 
pay on a daily basis. Apart from that, while they are in their shop, I am on the street, under the 
sun and rain. We must devise a means of surviving the pressure” (Balogun, 2011).  
 
Awon Omo onile as a source of contention: Awon Omo onile is translated as the original 
owners of the land. They are known in the popular press as area boys. Area boys have formed a 
sort of self-government in the market. For example they exact rent from some of the roadside 
traders. One such trader who had been there for 2 years, and sells software and flash drives, said 
he pays N500 on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, N800 on Thursday, N600 on Friday, and 
N700 on Saturday, to “those who feel their father owns the land;” that is these area boys. 
Another fruit seller, who sells from a wheelbarrow, and had been at the Computer Village for 5 
years, said he paid N150 for rent to area boys. Albeit, when he first started, it was N10 ($0.06). 
He made about N3,500 to N5,000 as income per day (Author interviews).  
 
Government and street traders/temporary structure vendors: For street hawkers and 
temporary structure vendors, there is the occasional clash with the Lagos State task force who 
come to clear them away from street trading, in a bid to sanitize the market. The Director, 
Special Duties, Internal Revenue Services of the Lagos State Board of Internal Revenue is 
reported to have said in 2008 that there was no going back in banning street trading, saying “[n]o 
more street trading. No more illegal structures in Computer Village. If a structure is illegal, it 
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would have been marked. We will continue to restore sanity in this market for the interest of all.” 
However, for some in Computer Village, street trading is a means of livelihood. Many of the 
street traders are young people who are seeking to start a program in the university or just trying 
to make ends meet in the current economic situation (Aginam, 2010).  
One street trader who sold used GSM phones told newspaper personnel  
[b]ut what do you expect us to do? Do you want us to go into prostitution or armed 
robbery? We do not have enough money to rent shops here. Our bail out option is to trade 
in the street and survive in the current global economic crisis which [has] messed up 
everything. The government should please give us time to survive.” (Aginam, 2010) 
Another who sold used cell phones reflected the same thoughts, saying “[w]here do you want us 
to go? Where do you want us to start? Times are hard and we have to survive. Trading or 
hawking in the street is better than doing 41937 or prostitution” (Ibid.).  
 
Police officers, and traders/customers: Some police officers are charged with conducting 
illegal searches and extorting money from customers and traders, even in face of evidence 
proving the ownership of the items that they have (Elebeke, 2010).  
 
Constraints to SMEs clusters performance and development.  
  Fake goods/bad reputation: Computer Village is an open market and anyone can come 
there to trade. Of course, limitations based on the amount of capital one has would determine the 
                                                        
37 419 is a situation whereby a person or people try to cheat or con others. The numbers 419 come from the Nigerian 
criminal code act which legislates against this practice, saying “[a]ny person who by any false pretence, and with 
intent to defraud, obtains from any other person anything capable of being stolen, or induces any other person to 
deliver to any person anything capable of being stolen, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three 
years. If the thing is of the value of one thousand naira or upwards, he is liable to imprisonment for seven years.” 
(Nigerian Government, Criminal Code Act, para. 419). 
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level at which one enters the market and what substance one could trade in. Personal and familial 
ties however play a role in many cases about informing potential entrants of the benefits of 
trading in the cluster. The openness of the cluster has attracted both respectable entrepreneurs 
and doubtful characters who deal dubiously with customers, for instance by selling fake products 
to them. Computer Village thus has the dual reputation of being a place where you can purchase 
or repair ICT products, and a place to be careful of being sold fake goods.  
 
Congestion: Visible in and around the cluster is a constant flow of human and vehicle 
traffic. Presently, space is scarce and rent is high. From interviews with informants, the rent for 
office space can be as high as N500,000 per year, which you pay for 5 years. There is also a 10% 
agency fee and 10% legal fees, which can be negotiated to 5%. Another interviewee mentioned 
that rent for a small office per annum if you are lucky is N500,000 for 3 years, but some of the 
plazas take N350,000 times 5 years, stating “government has not been able to put its foot down.”   
 
Institutions promoting consistency of markets and social cohesion. This section looks 
at the socio-economic universe of the Otigba Computer Cluster to better understand the 
structural vectors and the levels of actor differentiation that allows us to probe both the 
functioning and the effectiveness of the extant institutions that foster the proper workings of the 
market in ways consistent with social cohesion. Following from Ocampo (2007), I consider a 
four-stage classification (in line with the review of institutions in chapter six) that will foster 
inclusive growth to make this cluster evolve to higher levels of productivity and production. 
These are: institutions that guarantee provision of goods of social value; redistributive 
institutions; conflict-management institutions; and institutions that foster participation.  
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 (i) The first set of institutions are those which guarantee adequate provision of “goods of social 
value.” These are “goods and services that a particular society considers should be provided for 
all of its members, either because of the influence they exercise on their capacities or on their 
welfare” (Ocampo, 2007, p. 10).  From this and previous surveys, government sources are the 
main channels of finance to execute policies and programs designed to address equity issues, 
although they always seem to fall short of the promised performance. In cities of the developing 
countries experts point out that equity is primarily the responsibility of the government and 
authorities.38 Its absence or deficiency is most commonly a failure of political will or 
indifference. Of all tiers of governance considered in the survey cited above, central 
governments have been most responsible for bearing the burden of creating the proper 
environment to foster equity in cities of the world. Regional distribution based on the survey data 
shows that in Africa, the central government contributed the largest effort to make more equal 
social and economic environment for living in the cities where clusters are located. 
 
In this light, strong governance and effective political institutions seem to be a fundamental 
requirement for cluster performance. For this reason significant financial allocation for assisting 
and promoting the less capable and the more vulnerable actors within the cluster milieu will be 
needed. Apart from the government, donors and NGO funding display some degree of 
                                                        
38 See UN-Habitat State of World Cities Report 2012/2013. Of the cities surveyed, experts from Nairobi and 
Luanda, Kuwait City and Lahore, Lima and Forte-de-France Erbil and Saida (in the four regions) felt their 
governments were most indifferent to inequity at the country level. At a city level, experts from Alexandria and 
Algiers, Hyderabad and Kuwait City, Guadalajara and Panama City, Beirut and Doha, identified their cities as 




importance across the cluster. While associations are present, the social and financial capacities 
to ensure cohesion and influence the direction of equitable growth remains weak.  
 
(ii) Redistributive institutions: these “aim at raising the structure of wealth ownership and 
income distribution to levels considered desirable or at least tolerable by society and at 
establishing rules for the functioning of markets, especially markets of factors of production, 
which could guarantee such outcome” (Ocampo, 2007, p. 10). A growing body of research 
connects city competitiveness and prosperity to social cohesion within cities. A recent study by 
the OECD reached similar conclusions: the term social cohesion includes issues around social 
relationships, social inclusiveness and social equity, which are key components of a wider 
prosperity “[t]he key idea that has emerged to link these concerns is that social cohesion 
improves economic performance. This is a more positive way of saying that social division and 
fragmentation undermine long-term economic success” (Turok, 2007, p. 355, emphasis by 
author). But the absence of social cohesion, and particularly equity, does not just undermine 
economic development but in large part, jeopardizes prosperity. While clustering has usually 
been examined under the trajectories of sector and geographical agglomeration, examining a 
cluster through a social cohesion frame might reveal various economic, social, spatial, and 
political inequities, which result in varying levels of vulnerabilities for actors within the same 
geographic space.  
  
(iii) Conflict management institutions: these are “related to conflict management generated by 
the functioning of markets and to the framing of agreements for their management and eventual 
elimination” (Ocampo, 2007, p. 10). Research has shown an inverse link between income 
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inequality and social cohesion. In more equal societies, people are much more likely to trust each 
other, measures of social capital suggest greater community involvement, and homicide rates are 
consistently lower (UN-Habitat, 2007). In this survey, it was demonstrated that there is a high 
correlation between the amount of trust in society and the level of income equality; the poor do 
not trust rich and powerful government people to look out for their wellbeing as evident in the 
fuel subsidy conundrum which played out in the course of this research. Evidence from the 
fieldwork and secondary sources corroborate the links between inequalities and different forms 
of undesirable behavior such as “the owners of the land” who perpetually make business life 
difficult for citizens. Clearly, an excessive polarization of income, wealth and opportunities 
threatens the social fabric of cities and puts the harmony and stability of clusters such as Otigba 
at risk.39 The perception of inequality has been found to be as important as the actual 
manifestations of inequalities, and in some cases even more important, particularly when these 
inequalities are entrenched into social groups and ethnic strata. 
 
(iv) Institutions that relate to participation in decision-making processes there relate not only to 
“distributive outcomes but also to the very functioning of markets” such as their collaborative 
and complementary relationships (Ocampo, 2007, p. 10).  The latter is essential because of the 
need for social cohesion in ways that promote varieties of positive distributive outcomes, a 
situation that is not achievable without simultaneously fostering the productive functioning of 
markets. Evidently, the factors affecting cluster productivity apart from collaborative 
participation, are multiple, diverse and complex in nature both across sectors and time, and the 
                                                        
39 This is evidenced by the conflict generated by the Bakassi boys, who were an informal vigilante group who were 
convened by the traders within the footware and leather clusters in Aba in South-East Nigeria to maintain order and 
property rights and guard against increased “insecurity and an inefficient and corrupt police force. However, in the 
face of ethnic riots, the group started a riot against the Northern immigrants in Aba (Meagher, 2010, p. 2).  
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impact seemingly difficult to clearly isolate. According to Weiss (2005), urban regions are the 
only places where two very important elements, specialization and diversity, effectively generate 
productivity and innovation to create value and compete in the global marketplace. While city 
size is undoubtedly an important factor in generating productivity, clusters provide an additional 
agglomerative advantage for supply of and demand for a large number of different people with a 
wide range of diverse specialized skills to become employed, productive, and innovative in order 
to be able to develop and market new products and production processes. This is seen in the 
different agglomeration and productive capabilities of the different actors in this Computer 
Village, and their socio-economic contributions to the country as a whole.  
 
 From the social vector dimension, according to Sen (1999), the exercise of political citizenship 
and the specific channels available in democratic societies are not only rights which contribute to 
the well-being of people, but they are also the most effective means by which to guarantee that 
the social objectives of development are adequately represented in public decisions. Therefore 
institutions of participation to resolve and manage conflicts to prevent the breaking down of the 
law are critical for advancing cluster and city growth. The various actors and their rules which 
make up the collaborative include technical support/ research centres, professional and 
vocational training, export promotion outfits, and organizations for the general dissemination of 
information, ideas, and benchmarking standards. Some examples of these are chambers of 
commerce, industry associations, professional associations’ and trade unions.  
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3.6. Summing up: Understanding the Socio-Economic and Institutional Universe of the 
Otigba Cluster 
This chapter has provided a historical narrative of industrialization pathways and then reviewed 
the core actors and institutions that are necessary for dynamic socially inclusive growth of this 
cluster. From the foregoing analysis, the impact of this cluster – clearly evident in the complex 
stream of individuals and enterprises populating the place – may not be easily quantified but 
clearly the employment generation (direct and indirect) and income-generating impact is clear; it 
measures in millions. The informal apprenticeship system and accumulative experiences of street 
vendors that breeds diverse ICT enterprises – software sales, minor repairs, and market 
information are impressive. This category of indirect employment creation is also to be estimated 
in thousands. New graduates and longer time unemployed graduates who will have been left out 
of formal jobs find a refuge in their hundreds in this cluster through apprenticeship with most 
setting up within and outside of the cluster. The cluster arguably accounts for the highest 
employment level of any ICT agglomeration in the sub-region and in the country. The cluster is a 
beehive of young computer entrepreneurs who will potentially transform the enterprises given 
the right institutional support but at the moment formal social protection is clearly weak in 
Nigeria and particularly among informal workers. The lack of social protection and insurance 
means that these largely informal workers and micro enterprises are subject to intense 
vulnerabilities because they clearly lack access to social employment protection and insurance 
systems, which can mitigate the everyday impact of negative shocks and the fear of old age 
income security in old age (Perry et al., 2007). For the hypothesis therefore, this chapter is 
important in establishing the case study as a productive and dynamic cluster, which is 
functioning in a labor market which does not have or enforce formal social protection policies. In 
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the next chapter, I take a close look at the living standards of the workers in the cluster analyzing 























CHAPTER FOUR:  
Industrial Cluster Impact on Employment and Poverty: 
Analysis of Living Standards 
4.1. Introduction 
As seen in the last chapter, while virtually all developing countries recorded a rise in per capita 
income through industry-driven growth from 1950 to 1975, not all countries, including Nigeria, 
uniformly benefitted from growth with structural change (World Bank, 1978). Contrariwise, the 
country has recorded significant failures in its industrialization efforts, and with it, a worsening 
in residents’ quality of life and slow employment growth even till date.  Literature (Cleary, 1989; 
Lall, 1995; Zimbabwe Institute, 2007; Nwagbara, 2011) shows that this so-called jobless growth 
is due in large part to a lack of structural change foisted on poor countries by market-oriented 
policies and guided by the much acclaimed but largely unsuccessful Washington Consensus. The 
Consensus advocates “flexibility” in national labor market policies namely, minimum wage and 
employment protection, which it was claimed will be obstacles to formal sector employment 
growth.  
 
According to this proposal, which is part of the Washington Consensus, “[l]abour-market 
policies – minimum wages, job security regulations, and social security – are usually intended to 
raise welfare or reduce exploitation but they actually reduce labour demand… increase the 
supply of labour to the rural and urban informal sectors, and thus depress labour incomes where 
most of the poor are found” (World Bank Report 1990, p. 63). However, several studies 
including cross-country analysis subsequently found no strong relationship between employment 
and labor market policies. For example an influential study by Card and Krueger (1995) showed 
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that the introduction of the minimum wage had no effect on unemployment levels in the United 
States; Baker et al, (2002) found no robust connections between labor market institutions and 
unemployment. These include social and collective protection for workers such as 
unemployment insurance, minimum wage and employment rights in case of dismissal. In a 
review of what has been learnt in studies in developing country, these institutions were found to 
raise the total income of low-paid workers (Freeman, 2009). Significantly, increasing flexibility 
has in large measure been the root of insecure work status, fragility of income and employment 
standing, and deepening informalization of work. A downside of this is that “…[t]he majority of 
poor and extremely poor workers are found in the informal economy. ...the vast majority of these 
workers are not covered by social security schemes, occupational safety and health measures, 
working conditions regulations and have limited access to health services” (ILO website). 
 
This chapter examines systematically the interrelationships between the workers’ employment 
and their living standards. This dissertation probes how firms in productive industrial clusters 
pass on benefits to workers such that their living standards are improved. In chapter two, key 
academic and empirical arguments justifying the industrial manufacturing pathway as the main 
engine of economic growth and development was put forward while manufacturing’s impact on 
employment and poverty was also highlighted. The next section turns the readers’ attention to 
the importance of the nature and quality of employment including informal vs. formal work, and 
skill sets in improving living standards. This relationship is important because employment is 
instrumental to reducing poverty at the broader community level and as such a strong 
determinant of living standards particularly in developing countries (Chen, 2008, p. 6; Fox & 
Sekkel, 2008; World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004, p. 64; World 
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Bank, 2013b). Second, the Otigba Industrial cluster sits on an informal to formal continuum. 
Furthermore, survey results of the living standards of the workers in the cluster measured within 
a multidimensional frame are reported. This pertinent section gives empirical evidence of the 
cluster’s impact on living standards, and sets the analysis against similar indicators within 
Nigeria and Lagos in particular.  
 
4.2. The Employment Spectrum: Formal and Informal Work 
An important aspect of the nature of work relevant in developing country settings and to this 
thesis is informal versus formal employment. The ILO (2011, p. 2) makes a distinction between 
employment in the informal sector and informal employment:  
Employment in the informal sector is an enterprise-based concept which is defined as 
jobs in unregistered and/or small unincorporated private enterprises; such enterprises are 
not constituted as separate legal entities (and are thus not officially registered) and do not 
maintain a complete set of accounts. Informal employment is a job-based concept and 
encompasses those jobs that generally lack basic social or legal protections or 
employment benefits and may be found in the formal sector, informal sector or 
households. 
The ILO study showed that employment in informal sector enterprises exceeds informal 
employment work in almost all developing countries. This means that informal economy 
employment is mainly concentrated in the informal economy. Furthermore, it reported a negative 
correlation between informal employment and GDP per capita, and a positive correlation 
between informal employment and poverty across countries. In essence, they elucidate that 
“[T]his suggests that as GDP increases and/or poverty declines across countries, workers are 
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more likely to be aware of their rights to certain legal and social protections and worker benefits 
and successfully achieve such protections and benefits” (p. 2). Besides, informal employment in 
developing countries tend to be low technology and low skilled activities that fall outside 
organized enterprise structures with little contribution to overall GDP. While some choose to 
work in the informal economy (Maloney, 2004), informal economy employment is associated 
more readily with low-income work, and non-enforcement of formal rules that could protect the 
rights of workers. Historically, many who work in the informal economy tend to be less well-off 
compared to those who work and live in more formal settings.  
 
Similarly, if the income of an individual or of households is considered as the main indicator of 
their economic conditions then the uncertainty and small margin of returns that characterize 
work puts informal workers in a vulnerable situation to accept jobs that pay less – in monetary 
terms, and accept conditions that disqualify them for eligibility to financial loans, health benefits, 
holidays - than those working in more formal settings. As the working place, or conditions of an 
individual goes beyond the income they receive, informal work environment conditions therefore 
compels the acceptance of low quality and quantity of goods and services. Furthermore, as 
informal economy workers tend to work and live in informal settings and slums, they tend to pay 
disproportionately high costs for goods and services, which are themselves usually of poor 
quality (Sheehan, 2005). 
 
However, it will be erroneous to assume that all within the informal sector face the same levels 
and types of deprivations. On the contrary, there are some that are better-off than others, and 
those who earn even more than low-income formal wage workers. As Chen (2008, p. 6) put it  
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In terms of the linkages between informality and poverty, average earnings are lower in 
the informal economy than in the formal economy. But there is not a complete overlap 
between informality and poverty as some informal operators – notably, informal 
employers – are non-poor and some formal wage workers are poor. Further, there are 
significant gaps in earnings within the informal economy: informal employers have the 
highest earnings on average; followed by their employees and informal employees of 
formal firms; then own account operators; casual wage workers; and industrial 
outworkers. Around the world, men tend to be over-represented in the top segment; 
women tend to be over-represented in the bottom segment; and the shares of men and 
women in the intermediate segments tend to vary across sectors and countries. 
 
In addition, workers in the informal economy are not necessarily a “residual comprised of 
disadvantaged workers rationed out of good jobs” (Maloney, 2004, p.1159). On the contrary, in 
both developed and developing countries, individuals might opt to become self-employed or 
choose informal economy work for a number of reasons. For one, it may be a safety-net for those 
in-between jobs, while given the range of options that they have, or other responsibilities (e.g. a 
newly married woman, or one with a baby), or the stock of human capital they might possess, 
workers might find themselves better suited to work in the informal economy. Again, it might 
give them more flexibility. Furthermore, work in the informal economy might not necessarily be 
more precarious and there might be other less formal modes of protection that the workers are 
privy to. However, as economies become more developed, demand for workers in the formal 
sector might increase, and “[i]ncreasing the size and productivity of the formal sector probably 
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offers the largest hope for raising the standard of living of workers throughout the economy over 
the longer term” (ibid, p. 1173). 
 
What tends to define informal jobs however is relative instability. Yet, the urban poor often do 
not have the luxury to choose because “[r]egardless of whether their income comes from formal 
or informal employment, what matters to households is the scale of income and benefits, security 
of this income and benefits, and working conditions. Low, insecure incomes are a casual factor 
in urban poverty” (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2013, p. 164). Again, much of informal employment 
work is within the SME category, and SMEs find it difficult to access formal credit (OECD, 
2013b), and might be unable to provide their employees certain benefits such as health, long 
vacations, and pensions among others. They are also more vulnerable to economic crisis and are 
the first to shut down when a crisis occurs. They might also be within certain low-demand, low 
productivity and profitability sectors, which in turn translates to lower income and benefits for 
their workers.  
 
Another type of employment/unemployment conundrum that has taken on the form of a special 
challenge in cities around the world relates to the increasing youth population (“urban youth 
bulge”), and rising youth unemployment (ECA & AU, 2012; UN-Habitat, 2012, vii). The global 
economic crisis has exposed the particular vulnerability of young people in the labour market. 
Due to several interrelated reasons large swathes of the youth do not get integrated into the world 
of work after leaving school and tend to risk long-term exclusion. This population represents a 
wasted asset for nations and cities and in the long run, a burden on the state to provide social 
assistance. Young people are also more likely than adults to be among the working poor in 
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informal jobs. Being forced into precarious livelihoods by intense poverty and lack of social 
protection is a lost opportunity since they might otherwise attend school or college and acquire 
skills and competences that could raise their future productivity and earnings.  
 
Worldwide, apart from inadequate growth, there seems to be a skills gap, a difference between 
what education, whether in schools or training facilities, that graduates receive and what 
employers are looking for. A country like Germany has been able to overcome this through 
vocational skills training system while other countries are taking steps to address this global 
challenge (Economist, 2013). Although, a counter argument is that there is indeed nothing like a 
skills gap for example in America (Krugman, 2014), but in Nigeria, a skills mis-match seems to 
be the case (mentioned in Chapter 3), evidenced by firms’ selective recruiting from expatriates 
and top-tier national universities for jobs. While appropriate policies holds the prospects of 
bridging the skills gap, demand for labor is still seen as the major constraint to youth 
unemployment in Africa (AFDB [African Development Bank], OECD, UNDP & UNECA, 
2012); there is therefore the need for a concerted effort to solve the challenge of youth 
unemployment.  
 
4.3. Cluster Employment and Skills 
Economic gains from spatial concentration include employment benefits, which enable firms to 
match their distinctive requirements for labor, have access to a pool of specialized skills – given 
the existence of “thick labour markets” within the agglomeration (Krugman, 1998, p. 8) –, 
premises and suppliers better than firms outside clusters. Agglomerations enable firms to ‘mix 
and match’ their various inputs, access scarce resources and alter their workforce more easily in 
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response to changing business needs. This lowers transaction costs, assists reorganization and 
restructuring, and helps ease staff recruitment and replacement, an especially important factor in 
activities with a high labour turnover, such as business process outsourcing that characterize 
ICTs. Big cities benefit workers too in offering a wider selection of potential employers and 
lower risks of failure. 
 
The role of skills in the performance of urban labor markets has been an issue of longstanding 
debate in academic and policy circles (World Bank, 2013b). One view holds that workforce 
skills and the quality of labor supply are fundamental determinants of the level of employment. 
Weak or obsolete skills, sometimes in combination with poor motivation to work, are deemed 
responsible for people’s inability to secure employment and employers’ reluctance to hire extra 
staff. There may be particular problems for individuals who lack the range of competences and 
personal contacts required to compete for formal employment in cities. There is also sometimes 
the problem of inflexibility in urban labor markets, as a result of government regulations, trade 
unions or individual attitudes preventing downward wage adjustment and discouraging 
employers from recruiting additional workers.  
 
These supply-side arguments imply that a policy priority is to improve education and training in 
order to equip people to be more employable and productive. Providing labor market information 
may also help to increase employment levels where people are not aware of available job 
vacancies, perhaps because they are new entrants to the job market, or have been out of touch 




The opposite view is that the demand for labor is more important than attributes of labor supply 
in determining the level of employment. Urban unemployment is mainly a function of the lack of 
labor demand in the city, in turn a reflection of localized industrial decline or the fact that 
population growth is outpacing local jobs growth. It may also reflect deficient aggregate demand 
for goods and services resulting from a national economic recession or restrictive macro-
economic policies. The policy priority is to expand economic activity and increase the job 
opportunities available by stimulating demand and boosting private investment, since this is the 
only way to absorb the growing number of people seeking work. Attributing urban 
unemployment to low skills and motivation alone implies a focus on the symptoms of economic 
weakness and a diversion from the underlying problem.   
 
Structural unemployment is a more specific form of the problem of lack of demand. It focuses on 
deep-seated obstacles or inefficiencies in urban labour markets, such as a mismatch between the 
characteristics of labour demand and supply in terms of necessary skill-sets. It may result from 
shifts in the composition of urban economies from industry to services, or from low-skilled to 
highly skilled occupations, and may require a combination of demand and supply side policy 
responses. 
 
Finally, two other skill-sets associated with urban labour markets are worth mentioning. In 
developing countries such as Nigeria, migrants to cities from rural areas and other towns outside 
Lagos will typically require special personal attributes to survive and succeed, given the intense 
competition for scarce resources and jobs that often exists. Migrants need to be not just educated 
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and conversant with the demands of the sector to cope with pressurised urban environments; they 
may be required to be part of a social or professional network in order to overcome the obstacles 
of access to the credit markets. Constraints on land, business premises and housing mean that 
considerable energy may be expended in personal negotiation that may be made less 
cumbersome through the use of personal, professional and sometimes ethnic networks that 
intermediate entry.40  
 
Secondly, it is important to have the entrepreneurial and managerial abilities to start and sustain a 
business in a competitive environment (Otsuka & Sonobe, 2011). In a study done at the Suame 
Magazine cluster, a “survival” cluster in Ghana, it was found that entrepreneurs were unfamiliar 
with business practices that would be considered standard in developed countries, but that 
“participation in a rudimentary management training program improve[d] the business practices 
and results of the participants with considerably varying degrees of success.” (Mano, Iddrisu, 
Yoshino & Sonobe, 2012, p. 467). The Computer Village is made up of employers who in the 
beginning could not obtain conventional employment and who went ahead to ‘create their own 
jobs’ or livelihoods by becoming self-employed or forming a new company. Weak labour 
markets and the lack of a welfare safety net tend to encourage this kind of ‘necessity-driven’ 
entrepreneurship – a last resort for people who would prefer a normal job. Other people may 
make a positive choice to start up in business because of personal ambition, an original idea or a 
desire to make a difference, as demonstrated by the cases of Chams and Omatek in the box 
below.  
                                                        
40 Discussion with informants and workers during fieldwork. 
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Box 4.1: Chams Plc and Omatek41 
 
Chams Plc is a leading provider of enterprise technology solutions with competencies in identity management, 
transactional card-based services, e-commerce and mobile payment system. It started in 1985 as a privately 
owned firm providing computer hardware and maintenance services. It has now become a leading provider of 
information technology solutions in Nigeria. Chams started researching into Card technology in 1992 with card 
personalization, identity cards, enrolment logistics and access control. This was a huge success whose 
achievement encouraged the company to further go into smartcards, prepaid cards and the deployment of 
several card based solution and infrastructures – ATM, digital malls, interactive kiosks and so on.  
 
Chams is the first home-grown company to be listed in the Guinness Book of World Record, for setting up the 
ChamsCity mega Digital Mall and also the owner of the largest card plant in the world which it has ceded to its 
subsidiary – CardCenter. The vision of the company is to be the leading provider of innovative technologies 
that improve the quality of lives, and its mission is to design and deploy innovative and beneficial technologies, 
while creating values for its stakeholders.  
 
The origins of Omatek began at least three decades ago with the owner opting to be a one-on-one trainer for 
bank executives on how to use computers at a time when institutionalized training was a rarity. In 1988, the 
founder who is a graduate of chemical engineering, was entrusted with corporate staff training as well as 
sourcing personal computers for the executives. She then proceeded to become a premium partner for the 
foremost foreign brands including Compaq, HP, IBM, Apple and Datamini. In 1990, Omatak Ventures Limited 
became known as the vendor for some world-class computers. In 1993, Omatek commenced the assembly of 
Omatek’s own brand of computers from Semi Knocked Down (SKD) parts purchased from key brand 
manufacturers in Asia. Omatak and its founder have received several recognitions and awards both nationally 
and internationally.   
   Source: Companies’ websites & Omatek profile publication 
 
Successful entrepreneurs in the cluster recognize commercial opportunities where others do not, 
and position themselves to take advantage of them by using whatever resources they have at their 
disposal to full effect. Innovative entrepreneurs solve problems and react to changing situations 
by doing new things and finding new ways of doing old things. They are willing to improvise 
constantly and to take risks, and they can serve as important catalysts for wider change in 
business norms and practices.42  
 
In sum, this review coupled with that of the preceding two chapters shows a clear if not 
straightforward connection between employment, economic growth, and living standards 
                                                        
41 I had a fruitful interview with the founder and chief executive of CHAMS and got very useful insights on the 
sector and its status. I also spoke with Omatek’s founder in the course of my fieldwork and was given a tour of their 
factory.  
42 See the appendix for chapter three for an elaboration of the typology of actors in the Otigba cluster. 
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although the growth-employment nexus vary considerably with economic structures and levels 
of development. For instance while informal employment is strikingly extensive and widespread 
in low-income Asian and African cities, formal employment is more prevalent in advanced 
industrial economies. It has also been found that considerable entrepreneurial initiatives are 
emerging such as is seen in the case of Otigba; this chapter questions if and how all these lead to 
a higher standard of living. 
 
4.4. Cluster-Level Analysis of Living Standards  
The nature and quality of employment impacts, albeit differently, the income and non-income 
benefits received from a firm. Certainly, other factors besides income affect one’s quality of life, 
standard of living, and wealth/poverty level, however, employment remains an important 
determinant (World Bank, 2013); with the worker’s income determining to a large extent the 
living standard including expenditures on both luxury items and basic necessities such as 
housing, sanitation, water, transportation and household assets. In this section therefore, 
statistical analysis based on data from the survey questionnaires is reported. It probes the living 
standards of employees in the cluster using both the subjective and objective measurements. As 
highlighted in chapter one, living standards were measured both subjectively and objectively.  
 
In order to situate analysis on the cluster within the broader national context, multidimensional 
poverty indicators at the national level, showing results for both the urban (within which the 
cluster is located) and the rural areas is presented and compared to select indicators from the 
survey of the cluster. As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show, there are clearly significant differences 
between intensities of rural and urban poverty, with a greater percentage of households located in 
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rural areas being far more severely deprived than those located in urban areas on almost all the 
indicators. Over-crowding is the only exception where more households (43.7 percent) were 
deprived in occupancy rate (persons living per room) in households located in urban areas than 
rural areas (42.4 percent). The results reflect the reality that poverty in rural areas is more 
prevalent than urban areas, while urban poverty is exacerbated by high intensity slum formation; 
the rural areas are less populated and have low population densities but lack the most basic 
amenities such as water, electricity and health care system.  
 
“Years of schooling of women members” shows the highest level of deprivation in both urban 
(97.5%) and rural (98.5%), while minimum deprivation (urban - 8 percent, rural – 9.9 percent) 
was found in female nutrition. Deprivation in water and sanitation facilities is however very 
high, greater than 80% and 90% in urban and rural areas respectively.   
 
Comparing the national urban figures to available indicators for the cluster, we see that 
employees in the Computer Village are less deprived in sanitation, drinking water and assets. 
This could be because access to adequate sanitation and water, though deficient in Lagos, might 
be better than other urban areas. Furthermore, employees in the cluster might be able to afford 
and access certain assets like radio and television, at a cheaper rate to urban households where 
supply of these goods or the taste for it is not as high. However, compared to urban areas in 
Nigeria, Otigba employees tend to live in more crowded rooms, use more of kerosene or 
firewood as cooking fuel, and other means of lightening except electricity.     
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Figure 4.1: Levels of deprivation in households in Nigeria  
 




Figure 4.2: Levels of deprivation in households in the Otigba Cluster 
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Analysis of employees’ living standards in the cluster. In reporting the cluster findings, 
descriptive, as well as bi-variate analysis of both the subjective and standardized measures are 
reported. Survey results showed that 70% of employees indicated that working in their firms had 
increased their standard of living. Furthermore, and of great significance for this study, firms 
located in the cluster tended to have employees who reflected higher standard of living than 
those not located within the cluster. About 55.1% of employees who responded agreed that 
workers in Computer Village are faring better financially than those doing the same work outside 
of Computer Village (see Table 4.1 below). Although less than half (46.8%) admitted that 
workers in Computer Village are very satisfied, only 35.9% of respondents to the question 
indicated that most workers will go to work outside of Computer Village, given the opportunity. 
Again, more than half (57.7%) indicated that for most workers, their standard of living increases 
when they begin to work in the cluster. Thus subjective measures of living standards show that 
most employees perceive that they are doing better since working in the cluster. 
 
Table 4.1: Opinion of employees on working in firms located in the Otigba Cluster  
Opinion on Respondents with TRUE response 
No. Percentage 
Workers doing the same work but in different companies in Computer 
Village get different financial rewards.  
119 76.3 
Workers in Computer Village are faring better financially than those 
doing the same work outside of Computer Village.  
86 55.1 
Job security within Computer Village is good (that is, there is no fear of 
losing one’s job)  
82 52.6 
Most workers working in Computer Village are very satisfied  73 46.8 
Given the opportunity, most workers will go to work outside Computer 
Village 
56 35.9 
For most workers, their standard of living improves when they begin 
working in Computer Village. 
90 57.7 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013) 
Next, descriptive analysis show standardized measures of living standards among Otigba 
employees, using the standard of living indicators of the multidimensional indicators, and as well 
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UN-Habitat’s slum household indicators. In addition, these standardized or objective 
measurements are further broken and measured against the self-reported standard of living 
indicators. The self-reported standard of living indicator used is based on the response of 
employees’ in comparison to their colleagues. In particular, the question, “How will you describe 
your current standard of living compared to your peers?” was asked. Five possible answers were 
given – poor, surviving, comfortable, rich and very rich. For ease of analysis, the five categories 
were contracted to three: poor = poor and surviving; comfortable; rich = rich and very rich. 
Analysis of the different indicators is made in this order: housing; water; sanitation (access to 
toilet facilities); energy use, and personal assets.   
 
Living Standard and Housing. Living arrangements reflect the standard of living of an 
individual. The most poignant indication of this relationship is that the poorest people in the city 
live in slums separated from their affluent neighbors in gated communities.43 Article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing …” 
(UN website). Housing is therefore included in the right to a standard of living. The 1999 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) also declares that the “State shall direct its 
policy towards ensuring: ... that suitable and adequate shelter … are provided for all citizens” 
(FRN, 1999).   
 
While there are legislative provisions for housing for citizens, in practice, there is widespread 
unequal access to accommodation in cities proxied by the way people build their houses with 
                                                        
43 See UN-Habitat (2010) for a rich documentation of empirical evidence across all regions and cities. Clearly 





different materials, a manifestation of the glaring inequality in types of housing. In addition, the 
property rights regime exposes the large number of citizens who lack security of tenure. Legal 
and political bias that stand against the housing interests of individuals, also disrupt the lives and 
livelihoods of people. In Nigeria, spatial expansion and rising urban population has also brought 
about increased pressure on the existing infrastructure such as transportation, communication, 
medical, water, sanitation, and housing. As at the 1970s, there was already an acute housing 
shortage in Nigerian towns. Slums began to emerge as sub-standard and unplanned housing 
districts degenerated (Abiodun, 1976). While there were efforts made to provide low-income 
housing, there was “no coherent policy or any unified national approach among the different 
States” to address housing (Ibid, 1976, p. 341).44 The historical deterioration of the housing 
problem can be attributed to a number of factors including the dilapidated condition of the 
existing houses in the urban areas, overcrowding, high rate of rural-urban migration, high cost of 
labor, inferior construction materials and scarce land, natural increasing population, absence of 
planning and implementation of made plans, lack of efficient and sustainable financial credit for 
the housing sector, people’s inability to afford housing at existing market prices, inadequate data 
showing the extent of the problem, ineffective coordination among housing agencies, and the 
politicization of housing issues (Abiodun, 1976; Olayiwola, Adeleye & Ogunsakin, 2005; 
Ademiluyi, 2010).  
 
Currently, Nigeria’s housing problem is still not solved, and there remains a significant dearth of 
affordable, decent, and safe dwellings (Ademiluyi, 2010). This continued housing shortage, 
impact on the urban labor market and therefore indirectly affects the living conditions in the 
                                                        
44 For more information on the housing problems in Nigerian cities and government response to the problems, see 
Abiodun (1976).  
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urban areas (Jiboye, 2011). Citing the Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Ademiluyi 
(2010, p. 155) notes that as at 2006, Nigeria needed about “ten million housing units before all 
Nigerians could be sheltered.” As at 2013, the figure had risen to a deficit of 16 million housing 
units, with Lagos having 5 million, or 30% of the country’s shortage according to the state’s 
commissioner for housing (Uroko, 2013). Survey results from the Lagos Bureau of Statistics 
(2011) show that about 73% of households live in an average of 1 to 2 rooms, 21% occupy 3 to 4 
rooms while 1 percent occupy an average of 5 to 6 rooms. Evidently the supply constraints in the 
housing sector will equally impact the workers of Otigba given that the cluster is located in 
Lagos, a state with a significantly high housing shortage.  
 
While different variables such as security of tenure, sufficient living area can be used to analyze 
the quality of shelter, the source of living arrangement, type of housing material, and amount 
spent on accommodation are used. The results presented in Table 4.2 show that the association of 
standard of living and the source of living arrangement is highly significant statistically at a 1 
percent level of significance. Out of the four categories of accommodation – owned, rented, 
staying with relatives, and provided by workplace, the highest percentage of respondents 
(40.46%) report that they were staying in accommodation provided by the workplace. 48.89% of 
the poor, and 67.86% of the rich respectively report staying in workplace accommodations.  
 












No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Poor 1 2.22 14 31.11 8 17.78 22 48.89 45 100.00 
Comfortable 10 17.24 27 46.55 9 15.52 12 20.69 58 100.00 
Rich    1 3.57 8 28.57 19 67.86 28 100.00 
Total 11 8.40 42 32.06 25 19.08 53 40.46 131 100.00 




The reasons and types of “official” accommodation vary and are different. For the poor workers, 
“official” implies staying with relatives or kinsmen which was provided for them because rented 
accommodation may be very costly for them. In the cluster, this might be reflective of the strong 
kinsmanship (onye aghala nwanne ya which means “never abandon a brother or sister” value, or 
literally “be your brother’s keeper”, Ikpenwa, 2009, p. 316-317) social networks evident among 
the Igbos. This is further discussed in chapter 6. In this sense, accommodation comes as a 
package and might be some sort of compensation for apprenticeship service, because these firms 
have no formal remunerative structure. When employees were asked about the form of income 
they received, the responses were as follows: 31.3% - fixed; 10.9 percent - based on commission; 
30.6% - some fixed, some on commission; 12.9% - no monetary benefit received; and other – 
14.3%.  
 
Not surprising, the poor benefit directly from the housing support system otherwise many cannot 
afford the rent in cities. In Lagos for example, survey results show that about 50% pay between 
N25,00045 and N79,000 per annum for rent, while 28% pay less than N25,000. About 13% pay 
between N80,000 and N149,000, while 4 percent each pay between N150,000 and N199,000, 
and N200,000 – N500,000. Only 1 percent report paying more than N500,000 per year. In the 
Ikeja local government area where the cluster is located (though some commute to the cluster, 
see table 1.4), all respondents claim to pay between N150,000 and N199,000 for rent (Lagos 
Bureau of Statistics [LBS], 2011).  
 
Again, given the high level of unemployment in the country, people with jobs go to great lengths 
to keep their jobs, even if it means squatting and living away from their own home. For example, 
                                                        
45 See table 1.1 in the appendix for currency conversions 
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an employee interviewed, though married, mentioned that he lives with his parents during the 
week, and returned home to his family during the weekends since the banning of okadas.46 This 
living arrangement was easier and more affordable for him, though depriving of family 
fellowship. The income-poor without a doubt suffer direct deprivations of housing as well. 
  
The rich category of employees on the other hand might have been provided accommodation 
because of their position in and responsibilities to the firms. In Nigeria, top management are 
usually provided houses, housing allowances or housing loans as part of the remunerative 
package. Among the comfortable category of employees however, most live in rented 
accommodation, with relatives or benefit from the benevolence of their employers. 
 
The association between living standards and weekly expenditure on accommodation is also 
found to be significant statistically, with a chi-square statistic of 0.013. In the category of those 
paying between 0-1000 for their accommodation, the poor make up the largest percentage of 
about 61.11%. Those who report their living standards as comfortable make the largest 
percentage of 56.25%, 54.84%, 66.67%, and 4.1.8% in the 1,000-2,500, 2,501-5,000, 10,001-
15,000, and more than 15,000 categories respectively. Ironically, 41.18% of the poor indicated 
that they pay more than 15,000 per week for their accommodation. A number of respondents 
(16.30%) indicated that they did not pay for accommodation. Appendix Table 4.1 of this chapter 
shows these results.  
 
In considering the housing material used in the houses respondents stay, there are three main 
categories namely: natural, rudimentary, and finished. Natural material consists of earth, sand, 
                                                        




and mud, while coarse wood planks, palm/bamboo, and unpolished cement are classified as 
rudimentary material. Finished material encompass parquet or polished wood, marble, linoleum, 
ceramic tiles, cement (polished), carpet, and terrazzo material.  
 
According to a study by UN-Habitat (2010), on average, 79.35% of households in Africa 
constructed their dwelling units with finished material, 7.11% used rudimentary materials, and 
13.54% used natural materials. In the analysis, the Egyptian cities (Alexandria and Cairo) 
constructed almost 100% of all their households using finished material. Lagos topped the list of 
cities using rudimentary materials with 17.82%. A surprising result was the fact that those using 
natural materials were more than those using rudimentary ones, with Addis Ababa having the 
largest percent (45.83%) of those using natural materials. The study explained that the high 
percentage of finished material usage was because it was more readily available in the city 
compared to rudimentary and natural materials. It noted though that  
when other indicators of good shelter like secure tenure, sufficient living area, and spatial 
location e.g. regulated vs. non-regulated settlement, which help to better describe the 
quality of living of these households are included in the analysis, many of the households 
fall below the adequate and sufficient living quarters as recommended by UN-[Habitat]. 
(Ibid., p. 25) 
 
Among respondents in this study, 19.01% used natural, 38.84% rudimentary and 42.15% used 
finished materials for their homes (see Table 4.3 below). While the results of analysis associating 
type of housing material with respondents standard of living is not significant (sig. = 0.761), it is 
still worth mentioning that the largest percentage of the poor (45%), and rich (42.86%) live in 
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accommodation made of rudimentary materials. On the other hand, the comfortable have their 
largest percentage (47.17%) living in houses using finished materials. The “poor” and “rich” 
might have their largest percentages in the rudimentary materials category because the poor as 
well as the rich here are so described in relative terms and might be paying for accommodation 
that are located in neighborhoods commensurate with their available income brackets. On the 
other hand, accommodations that are rented, which those who are comfortable were more apt to 
live in, possibly have more finished materials used to build them as opposed to those inhabited 
by the owners themselves.  
 










(Coarse wood planks, 
palm /bamboo, 
unpolished cement) 
Finished (parquet or 
polished wood, 
marble, linoleum, 
ceramic tiles, cement) 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Poor and Surviving 7 17.50 18 45.00 15 37.50 40 100.00 
Comfortable 11 20.75 17 32.08 25 47.17 53 100.00 
Rich and Very Rich 5 17.86 12 42.86 11 39.29 28 100.00 
Total 23 19.01 47 38.84 51 42.15 121 100.00 
   Source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 1.860, Sig.=0.761 
 
Information on employees’ home conditions was also collected. In the cluster, more than a 
quarter (26.3%) of the employees who responded lived in houses where more than 3 people 
share a bedroom; an indicator of insufficient living condition by the UN-Habitat. More generally, 
as seen in Table 4.4 below, more than half live in houses which are in need of major repairs, 
while more than a quarter have houses located in a hazardous place, on or near a toxic waste, in a 





Table 4.4: Opinion of employees about dwelling units 
Opinion on dwelling units Respondents with affirmative 
response 
No. Percentage 
The dwelling is in need of major repair  83 53.2 
The location of the house is in a hazardous place 49 31.4 
The dwelling is located on or near toxic waste 49 31.4 
The dwelling is located in a flood plain 44 28.2 
The dwelling is located on a steep slope 48 30.8 
The dwelling is located in a dangerous right of way 
(e.g. close to rail, highway, airport, power lines) 
37 23.7 
More than three people share each bedroom 41 26.3 
 Data source: Author’s field survey (2013)  
 
As shown in the analysis above, informal sector employment directly affects the kind of shelter 
and infrastructure facilities that one has access to. The relationship of shelter factors with 
economic factors is evident because it is the relative wealth of households that determines 
whether they will have access to poor or superior shelter and housing infrastructure. Access to 
better housing in areas with good infrastructure is expectedly equally reflective of the level of 
income of households, as those with higher income tend to live in areas with better infrastructure 
and facilities. As one report puts it: 
Employment and income generation will also have a major impact upon what kinds of 
housing and infrastructure will be affordable to growing urban populations. These issues 
are both quantitative and qualitative: quantitative because absolute levels of income will 
be needed to finance specific types of housing and infrastructure, and qualitative because 
the stability and growth of income over time will permit certain financing options – for 
example, mortgages – while lower levels of income will not qualify for financing. (UN-
Habitat, 2005, p. 6)47 
 
                                                        
47 Formal credit facilities and availability of mortgage in Nigeria is particularly poor. Many build homes that they 
finance by themselves. 
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The majority of those who work in the informal sector also live in settlements which are 
conceptually defined as unregulated. These areas are often not properly served with adequate 
infrastructure. This in itself brings its own set of difficulties to workers who are poor because 
their income makes it impossible for them to have access to basic amenities such as water and 
electricity that are necessities to build a future and provide a healthy home for their family. 
Consequently, we arrive at a situation where the type of employment affects the type of income 
and benefits received, which in turn either limits the choice or creates opportunities for better 
living areas. Also, the type of shelter and infrastructure one has access to could also 
inadvertently limit work productivity and efficiency because of the impact of the human 
environment on health and wellbeing. For example poor families often spend up to 50% to 70% 
of their income on food (World Bank, 2012) forcing them to reduce spending on education, 
childcare and other costs. In the most deeply affected countries, families are compelled to reduce 
the quantity and quality number of meals they eat (Ibid.). Once in this vicious cycle, a worker 
running a poor household descends further into poverty, and invariably suffers a significant loss 
in household wellbeing.  
 
Living Standards and access to transport facilities. Workers face a cost of “going to 
work” which could include “transportation, child care, payroll taxes, work clothes” and so on 
(The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2004, p. 2). Cost of commuting would include the time spent 
in commuting and the actual amount spent on whatever mode of transportation used. For many 
of the poor who live in slum areas, job opportunities might be far from where they live – the 
spatial divide thus leading to unequal access to employment opportunities. In Mexico for 




every day” (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 82-83). In many cities in Africa like Lagos and Nairobi, the 
traffic involved in commuting to work is another major challenge that workers have to face.  
 
The income level of a household is also a strong determinant of access to, and what type of 
transport facilities they use. For the low-income earner buying and owning a car (The Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, 2004), or even a motorcycle could be quite expensive due to the associated 
costs of maintenance. The expansion of public transportation however provides more options for 
households to commute, and is one way of reducing inequalities (UN-Habitat, 2008). As a 
country becomes wealthier, it could also reflect in an increase in certain modes of transportation 
like personal cars and high-speed rail.  
 
In Lagos, many commute by walking, public transportation (buses, motorcycles), and private 
cars. However traffic congestion is a major problem in the state causing stress and frustration, 
fuel and time wastage, reduced productivity (D, Michelle, 2012), and a fall in quality family time 
as workers adjust their commuting time to avoid the traffic. In Lagos an “estimated 8 million 
travel to work via public transit each day [and m]any individuals live outside the city core where 
housing is affordable” (Ibid, 2012, slide 7). Some of the workers in Lagos commute to work 
from outside the state, living in places that are more affordable. Albeit the Lagos State 
government has introduced a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), resuscitated ferrying, and is repairing 
some of the major roads to attenuate some of the transport problems in the state.  
 
The surveys asked how employees commute to work, either by walking, taking public 
transportation, using own vehicle or transportation provided by their companies. Survey findings 
 166 
reveal that more than half (54.5%) of respondents use public transportation, while 15.4% use 
their own vehicles. 14.7% and 10.9% walk and use company transportation respectively.  
 
In this study, the correlation between living standards and the mode of transportation is found to 
be highly significant. As seen in Table 4.5 below, one finds that among those who walk, the poor 
(57.14%) make the largest percentage. Those who are comfortable make up the largest 
percentage of those who take public transportation (58.97%) while the rich make up the largest 
percentage (58.82%) of those who use “company” transportation.  
 








Comfortable Rich and Very 
Rich 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. 
Walk 12 57.14 3 14.29 6 28.57 21 
Public transportation 25 32.05 46 58.97 7 8.97 78 
Own vehicle 8 36.36 8 36.36 6 27.27 22 
Company 
transportation 
2 11.76 5 29.41 10 58.82 17 
Total 47 34.06 62 44.93 29 21.01 138 
 Source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 32.903, Sig.=0.000 
 
In terms of the amount of money spent on transportation, the largest percentage of poor 
respondents tend to spend between 1,001 and 2,000 per week, while the largest percentage of the 
comfortable and the rich fall into the 2,001 and 3,000 category. The difference between the two 
categories of expenditure on transportation is not that much. This could be because for 
commuting, while respondents might choose the means - walking, public transportation, own car 
if they have it, or company vehicle if they are entitled to it – as well as the frequency at which 




that will be spent becomes about the same. Table 4.2 in the appendix shows the results of this 
analysis. 
 
Living Standards and drinking water sources. The importance of water for industrial 
and domestic usage cannot be overestimated. Though Nigeria is well endowed with abundant 
water resources, having “an annual rainfall of about 4,000mm in the Southeast and 300mm in the 
extreme North-east as well as an estimated 319.2 billion cubic metres of surface and ground 
water resources… this enormous potential has remained largely untapped due to uncoordinated 
and haphazard implementation of policies and programmes” (National Technical Working Group 
on Water and Sanitation, 2009, p. 8).  Public water supply started in Nigeria in the 20th century in 
a few towns including Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ojebu Ode, Calabar and Enugu. Today, the 
different states and Abuja “have Water Boards/Corporations or Public Utilities Boards managing 
their public water supply” (Kashim, 2012, p. 8). By the 1970s, there was already a widening gap 
between the need and supply of water in urban areas in Nigeria (Oyebande, 1978), and today 
access to adequate and improved water and sanitation remains a challenge. According to the 
Nigerian government’s 2010 millennium development goal report, the proportion of the 
population with access to safe water and improved sanitation was 58.9% and 51.6% respectively 
(Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010). Table 4.3 in the appendix gives the 
percentage distribution of households by main source of drinking water. 
 
In many Nigerian cities and towns, water and sanitation systems are quite weak, old and 
unreliable, and supply is highly insufficient for domestic and personal hygiene (Nwaka, 2005).    
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In informal settlements water-borne and filth-related diseases, especially diarrhea and cholera are 
common. In 2012/2013 for example, cholera continued to claim many lives in Northern states. 
Less than half of urban households in Nigerian cities have piped water and flush toilets. The rest 
depend on crowded and sometimes distant communal water taps, or draw water from wells, 
streams, or from itinerant water vendors. Pit latrines and buckets are still in use, often shared by 
many families. People commonly defecate and urinate in the open or in nearby bushes, so that 
food and water can be easily contaminated from exposure to human waste. (Ibid, p. 6). 
 
The target of the MDG was to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water. The United Nations declared that the target had been reached by 2010:   
with the proportion of people using an improved water source rising from 76 per cent in 
1990 to 89 per cent in 2010. Between 1990 and 2010, over two billion people gained 
access to improved drinking water sources, such as piped supplies and protected wells. 
(United Nations, 2012, p. 4) 
 
In Africa, progress is adjudged to be too slow to reach the target of 78% by 2015. Though access 
in rural areas increased from 42% to 53% between 1990-2010, the percentage fell by 1 percent to 
85% from 86% in urban areas (AU; UNECA; AfDB; UNDP, 2012, p. 101). A report by the 
Nigerian government (2010) shows that access to safe water in the country remains a serious 
challenge. Up until 2005, little progress was made, however, “improvements since then have 
brought the proportion of the population accessing safe water to 58.9 per cent”. While there is a 
good/fair supportive environment, the potential for meeting the target is still estimated to be 




investments in water into effective access. This requires more involvement by communities to 
identify local needs, and better planning to deliver holistic and sustainable solutions” 
(Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, p. 6). 
 
Within the country there exists unequal access to improved drinking water. As seen in Map 4.1 
below, the southwestern states including Lagos have access to more improved water sources than 
most parts of the country, although much of the access is through private provision such as 
boreholes constructed by affluent individuals and the middle class. 
 
From this study’s survey, a significant percentage of Otigba employees have access to improved 
drinking water sources. In particular, 53.8% use water that was piped into dwelling, piped into 
compound/plot, bottle water, and public tap, 32.1% used open well in yard/plot, open public 
well, protected well in dwelling, protected well in yard/plot, protected public well and 8.3% got 
their drinking water from river, stream, pond, lake, rainwater, satchel, and tanker truck. This 
result could be reflective of most of the respondents living in Lagos which itself has a lower 












Map 4.1: Percentage of population by states using improved water sources in Nigeria 
Source: Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS), 2009 (as cited in Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 2010).48  
 
Unfortunately, there are those who seek to benefit from deplorable and scarce water situations 
and when “municipal authorities do attempt to extend water supply to poorer neighbourhoods 
they are often met with violence and intimidation from water tanker lobbies, “area boys” and 
other groups who benefit from the unequal distribution of water and the “micro-circuits” of 
exploitation which characterize slum life” (Gandy, 2006, p. 383). 
 
Looking more closely at Lagos, in the 2011 Lagos state household survey, among the sampled 
households, it was found that more than half of respondents (57%) got their water from the 
borehole. Other sources of water were as follows: 8% - piped water into dwelling, 3% - piped 
water to yard/plot, 4% - public tap/stand pipe, 10% - protected dug well, 3% - unprotected dug 
                                                        
48 Table 1.5 shows the difference between improved and unimproved drinking water sources. Lagos is the state on at 




well, 13% - small scale vendor and 2% - tanker truck (LBS, 2011, p.144). However, only 34% of 
households attested to treating their water to make it safer before drinking it (ibid, p. 153).49   
 
In comparing the perception of respondent’s living standard and their source of drinking water, 
the largest percentage of those classified in the poor (36.71%) and comfortable (55.70%) living 
standard categories were in the 1st category i.e. piped into dwelling, piped into compound/plot, 
bottle water, and public tap, while the largest percentage of the rich (40.91%) were in the second, 
which is largely equally good category i.e. open well in yard/plot, open public well, protected 
well in dwelling, protected well in yard/plot, and protected public well. Overall, there is 
conclusive evidence that those who work in the cluster and the ICT sector have good access to 
improved drinking water.  
 
Living Standards and Sanitation. Adequate sanitation infrastructure is important for 
many reasons. Inadequate or improper disposal of waste, lack of drainage, and toilet facilities 
can impact on the health of many in communities. Access to sanitation facilities can be an 
indicator of the income level of a community. In SSA, for example, it was found that “access to 
sanitation is highly correlated with wealth and residence” (AUC, UNECA, AFDB & UNDP, 
2012, p. 106). In many developing countries, low-income communities usually end up being 
inadequately served.50  
 
                                                        
49 Respondents added bleach/chlorine - 23%, boiled it - 25%, let it stand and settle - 27% or used ceramic, sand or 
composite water filters - 24% (LBS, 2011, p. 153).   
50 For specific examples of deficiencies in the provision and quality of water and sanitation, see Mitlin and 
Satterthtwaite (2013, p. 129-137) who draw on other studies to present examples from informal settlements in places 
like Mumbai, and Kenya.  
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The MDG for sanitation was to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to basic sanitation. While improvement has been achieved in many developing countries, 
according to a 2012 MDG report, the target is still out of reach for most of the countries (United 
Nations, 2012). In particular, the report showed that “over 90 per cent of the households in the 
richest urban quintile benefit from improved sanitation, while access in rural areas falls below 50 
per cent even among the wealthiest households. In the poorest rural quintile, over 60 per cent of 
households practice open defecation” (United Nations, 2012, p. 53). Urban access to improved 
sanitation (54%), while better than rural access (31%) dropped by 3% from 57% in 1990, to the 
54% in 2010. The “high cost of infrastructure and the low returns to investment for the private 
sector, especially in rural areas” are two constraints to the expansion of improved sanitation 
facilities and “explain why public-private partnerships are rare in sanitation”  (AUC, UNECA, 
AFDB & UNDP, 2012, p. 106).  
 
Nigeria is in the same category as other African countries that recorded declines in the 
proportion of its total population, including urban and rural areas, with access to improved 
sanitation facilities between 1990 to 2010 (Ibid., p. 106). In Nigeria, there is unequal access to 
improved sanitation (see Map 4.2 below), accentuated by deepening poverty and widening 











Map 4.2: Percentage of population by states using improved sanitation in Nigeria 
 
Source: Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS), 2009 (as cited in Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 2010). 
 
The reality within the country is however quite dismal as described in Box 4.2 below.  
 
Box 4.2: Sanitation, waste management, drainage and health in Nigeria 
More waste is generated from commercial and domestic activities in most Nigerian cities than can be properly 
managed with the rudimentary system available for collecting, transporting, and disposing of the wide variety of 
solid wastes.  The system is almost always overloaded, and large volumes of rubbish are left to litter the streets, or to 
accumulate in open dumps where flies and rats and other disease-carrying insects and rodents proliferate.  The 
drainage system is largely antiquated and most cities have open drains and narrow shallow trenches which are often 
clogged with discarded household or industrial appliances, sand, and refuse transported by flooding.  When the 
drains are not cleaned, they are unsightly and could be trigger sources of flooding.  Potholes in the streets, pools of 
stagnant water, and waste gushing from bathrooms and kitchens provide breeding sites for malarial mosquitoes and 
other spreaders of disease.  The level of environmental awareness is still low, especially in informal settlements, and 
the campaign for waste minimization and recycling has not advanced beyond the dangerous practice of picking and 
sorting through heaps of rubbish or moving from house to house to collect tin cans, plastics, empty bottles, paper, 
and discarded materials for possible recycling. 
Source: Nwaka (2005, p. 6)  
 
It is in this context that the Otigba cluster operates. Access to toilet facilities have been grouped 
into three categories; namely: Flush, Improved, and no facilities. Improved facilities consists of 
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traditional pit, ventilated improved pit, and latrine while people using bush, field, bucket, and 
pan for toilets are grouped as having no facilities.  
 
Survey results show that 56.4% of employees use flush toilets at home, followed by improved 
(21.2%) facilities. 16.7% do not have no toilet facilities at home.  It is found too that the 
relationship between standard of living and access to toilet facilities is highly significant (see 
Table 4.6). The highest percentage of respondents across all categories are using flush toilets. In 
particular the largest percentage of poor (33.75%) and comfortable (57.50%) respondents are to 
be found in this category, while the biggest percentage of the rich (40.63%) use other improved 
sources. About 17.64% of all respondents however have no facilities, with the poor (41.67%) 
making the largest percentage of this category, surprisingly followed by the rich (37.50%).  The 
percentage of those with no facilities on the national level is 28.2%, while that for urban areas is 
18.1% (HNLSS, 2009). 
 




Source of sanitation 
Poor Comfortable Rich and Very 
Rich 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. 
Flush 27 33.75 46 57.50 7 8.75 80 
Traditional pit, 
ventilated improved 
pit, and latrine 
10 31.25 9 28.13 13 40.63 32 
Bush, field, bucket 
and pan for toilets 
10 41.67 5 20.83 9 37.50 24 
Total 47 34.56 60 44.12 29 21.32 136 
 Data source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 22.987, Sig.=0.000 
 
In Lagos (LBS, 2011), many of the respondents indicated using flush toilets, albeit flushed to 




pit latrine (6%). 51% have their toilet facilities inside the house, while 49% and 1% respectively 
have it outside the house on plot, and outside the plot/public toilet.  
 
Living standards and energy use. The energy type and cooking facility an individual or 
household uses tend to reflect their living standard and level of deprivation. Consequently, it has 
implications on how much of their budget they would expend for energy, and the impact it has 
on their health. Although modern energy facilities are available, access is limited both between 
and within countries: about a third of the world’s population have not benefited from these 
facilities; about two billion people do not have electricity; and more than two billion use 
traditional fuels to cook (Gebre-Egziabher, 2006). Households, usually poor, who do not have 
access to modern energy sources and use such means as firewood, kerosene, charcoal for 
cooking and lanterns and candles in the house, are more susceptible to indoor fires, and air 
pollution from fumes. Additionally, the actual cost of using modern energy sources like 
electricity and LPG, could take a high proportion of household income, although this share is 
even more for the urban poor than those in higher income levels (Gebre-Egziabher, 2006, Mitlin 
and Satterwaithe, 2013). Furthermore, “the direct cost and opportunity cost of acquiring energy 
for the urban poor is increased by having to collect firewood and buy charcoal and kerosene in 
small amounts. And this burden is disproportionately borne by women and children” (Gebre-
Egziabher, 2006, p. 2). Indoor air pollution has been termed a “quiet” and “overlooked killer”, 
claiming an estimated three million lives per annum. Women who cook indoors with coal and 
biomass fuel, as well as their children who are often beside the mothers while they cook, are “at 
risk of chronic bronchitis and acute respiratory infections” (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 109).  
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For this study, employees’ responses on the cooking facility they use are grouped into three: 
modern fuel, which includes electricity, LPG, natural gas and biogas; improved fuel, which 
includes kerosene, coal, lignite and charcoal; and traditional fuel, which consists of firewood, 
straw and dung. A UN-Habitat study (2012) showed that 63% of sample households in SSA used 
modern fuel, while only 25% used improved fuels. Survey results show that respondents tended 
to use first modern (46.8%), followed by improved (37.8%) and then traditional (9%) fuel 
sources to cook. However, while a larger proportion of the comfortable and the rich used modern 
fuels, the largest percentage (48.21%) of those who self-identified as poor tended to use 
improved fuel sources. Surprisingly, among those who used traditional cooking facilities, the 
rich made the largest percentage. Results are shown in Appendix Table 4.4.  
 
The results support evidence that wealth affects the choice or access to basic amenities like 
cooking facilities that individuals and households use, and consequently, their standard of living. 
In the same manner, in considering lighting used in the homes for employees in the cluster, the 
poor and comfortable indicate that main electricity (which would mean from the public grid) is 
their main source of lighting. However, it is possible that the electricity that is received is not 
frequent. Indeed, survey (LBS, 2011) shows that in Lagos, 97% of respondents got their power 
supply from the federal agency in charge of electricity – the Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
(PHCN), while 3 percent got from other sources. However in considering the frequency of 
unexpected interruptions, up to 90% of the households experienced daily interruptions; 7 percent 
a few times a week; 1 percent only a few times a month, while a low 2 percent experienced no 
interruptions at all. Similarly, in terms of the frequency of electrical provision per day, 16% of 




respondents, 55% received between 1 to 5 hours; 19% between 6 to 10 hours; and 5 percent 
between 16 to 20 hours. Only 4% and 1% of respondents had between 11 to 15 hours and 21 to 
24 hours of electricity each day.  
 
Not surprisingly, among the rich in the survey, the largest percentage of respondents receive their 
main source of lighting from electrical generators (see Table 4.7 below). Evidently, these means 
are expensive and cause a lot of air and sound pollution; however, for both companies and 
individuals, given the failure of public services, they resort to private provision of these 
amenities. In light of the expenses associated with maintaining and fuelling electrical generator, 
and the inadequacies of publicly generated electricity, some respondents resort to the use of 
kerosene, gas and candles. 
 






Poor Comfortable Rich  Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. 
Kerosene 12 54.55 4 18.18 6 27.27 22 
Gas 5 38.46 8 61.54   13 
Main Electricity 16 32.00 31 62.00 3 6.00 50 
Electricity from 
generator 
4 12.90 11 35.48 16 51.61 31 
Candles 8 44.44 7 38.89 3 16.67 18 
Firewood 1 50.00 1 50.00   2 
Other     1 100.00 1 
Total 46 33.58 62 45.26 29 21.17 137 
 Data source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 42.465, Sig.=0.000 
 
Living standards and personal assets. Finally, survey results show a significant 
relationship between savings, change in personal assets and the living standards of workers. 
Within the cluster, there exists a considerable savings culture as seen in Table 4.8 below. 
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However, the comfortable tend to save the largest amount of money. For the poor, their ability to 
save could be achieved because many may not be expending on such necessities as housing, and 
other household goods, given they stay with relatives and kinsmen. Again, the poor and 
comfortable might be saving in order to move up the ladder within the cluster for example by 
becoming a trader or owning a shop of their own.  
 




Weekly spending in 
Naira 
Poor  Comfortable Rich  Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. 
0-1,000 7 50.00 3 21.43 4 28.57 14 
1,000-2,500 11 68.75 3 18.75 2 12.50 16 
2,501-5,000 11 44.00 7 28.00 7 28.00 25 
5,001-10,000 9 25.71 14 40.00 12 34.29 35 
10,001-15,000 3 15.79 15 78.95 1 5.26 19 
More than 15,000 1 7.14 12 85.71 1 7.14 14 
I don't save 4 36.36 6 54.55 1 9.09 11 
Total 46 34.33 60 44.78 28 20.90 134 
 Data source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 37.960, Sig.=0.000 
Working in a firm in the cluster has also improved the possession of personal assets such as 
radio, television, refrigerator, car, computer and generator for most workers in the cluster. 
Cluster employees own a wide variety of assets from radios to cars, nevertheless most seem to 
possess the least expensive and less the more expensive ones. Particularly, the largest number of 
respondents had radios (74.4%), then television (70.5%), computer (64.7%), refrigerator 
(62.2%), generator (55.8%) and car (34%).   
 
However, working in a firm in the cluster seems to have generally improved the possession of 
these personal assets. As demonstrated in Table 4.9 below, the poor and comfortable in particular 
have a greater percentage who attest to this improvement as opposed to the rich who might have 










Change in assets 
Poor  Comfortable Rich  Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Yes 28 32.18 48 55.17 11 12.64 87 100.00 
No  12 37.50 4 12.50 16 50.00 32 100.00 
Total 40 33.61 52 43.70 27 22.69 119 100.00 
  Data source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 24.335, Sig.=0.000 
 
4.5: Summing up  
This chapter has attempted to accomplish four things. Firstly, it has paid close attention to the 
nature and quality of employment, drawing attention to the discourse on informal versus formal 
employment, given that Otigba sits on an informal to formal continuum. Secondly, it has 
highlighted the living standards of employees within the cluster, using both self-reported and 
objective measurements; the latter being reflective of multidimensional poverty and slum 
household indicators. As surmised in Table 4.10 below, Otigba employees fare comparatively 
better than national urban averages on sanitation, drinking water and assets but tend to live in 
more crowded rooms, and use less electricity for cooking and energy sources. On most indicators 
– cooking fuel, drinking water, sanitation and assets (except cars), a larger percentage of 
employees are using/ have access to the more improved sources. Sometimes, this percentage is 
even greater than half, e.g. for drinking water, sanitation and all assets (except cars). For housing 
as well, apart from the situation where more than half live in houses which require major repairs, 
across the other indicators, approximately 68% do not fall under the other less desirable housing 




Table 4.10: Summary - Standardized measures of living standard among Otigba employees  
Multidimensional/Slum 
Household Indicators 
Cluster Employees’ Living Standard  
Compared to urban areas in 
Nigeria  
Otigba employees fare better in sanitation, drinking water and assets than 
national urban averages but tend to live in more crowded rooms, use more of 
kerosene or firewood as cooking fuel, and other means of lightening except 
electricity  
Housing More than half live in houses which are in need of major repairs (53.2%), while 
more than a quarter have houses located in a hazardous place (31.4%), on or near 
a toxic waste (31.4%), in a flood plain (28.2%) or on a steep slope (30.8%) 
Transportation Largest percentage (54.5%) using public transportation 
Drinking water Largest percentage (53.8%) using improved drinking water sources 
Sanitation - Access to toilet 
facilities 
Largest percentage (56.4%) use “flush” toilets at home 
Cooking fuel Largest percentage (46.8%) use modern fuel sources i.e. electricity, LPG, natural 
gas, and biogas 
Electricity Largest percentage (36.5%) use electricity from the public grid; however power 
supply can be irregular 
Assets More than half of the respondents have all personal assets, apart from cars (34%): 
radio (74.4%), television (70.5%), computer (64.7%), refrigerator (62.2%), 
generator (55.8%)  
Data source: Author’s field survey (2013) 
 
Finally, the chapter showed that the subjective and objective measurements corroborated each 
other. Using the contracted self-reported categorizations (poor = poor & surviving; comfortable; 
rich = rich & very rich), it was found that the poor fare poorer than the rich on most indicators. 
However, the poor and the rich tend to have similar benefits in terms of living arrangements, and 
type of housing material used. As explained above, this could be because the poor benefit from 
accommodation provided by the workplace which might be owned by a relative or kinsman. The 
comfortable tend to have some overlay with the poor (choice of lighting, source of drinking 
water, and access to toilet facilities), and the rich (cooking fuel). However, the rich are better 
able to make more ‘luxurious’ choices in terms of type of cooking facilities, lighting, and 
transportation used. Table 4.11 below shows the different assets, and as well the categories in 




found. In the next chapter, a close look is paid to the factors that might encourage a firm to pass 
on benefits to their workers, and the national social protection environment in general. 
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Table 4.11: Summary of living standards in Otigba cluster from field survey 





Sig. = 0.00 
Provided by the 
workplace 
Rented Provided by the workplace 





Sig = 0.030 
0-1,000 Naira 2,501 – 5,000 5,001 – 10,000 
 Type of housing 
material used; 
Chi-square = 1.860 
Sig = 0.761 
Rudimentary Finished Rudimentary 
Transport Mode of transport; 
Chi-square = 
32.903 
Sig. = 0.000 
Walking Public transportation Company transportation 
 Amount spent; 
Chi-square = 
24.326 
Sig. = 0.018  
1,001 – 2,000 2,001 – 3,000 2,001 – 3,000 




Sig. = 0.000 
Piped into dwelling, 
Piped into 
compound/plot, bottle 
water, and public tap 
Piped into dwelling, 
Piped into 
compound/plot, bottle 
water, and public tap 
Open well in yard/plot, 
Open public well, Protected 
well in dwelling, Protected 
well in yard/plot, and 
Protected public well 




Sig. = 0.000 
Flush Flush Improved 
Energy Cooking fuel; 
Chi-square = 
18.972 
Sig. = 0.001 
Improved: kerosene, 
coal, lignite & charcoal 
Modern: electricity, 
LPG, natural gas, 
biogas 
Modern: electricity, LPG, 




Sig. = 0.000 
Main electricity51 Main electricity Electricity from generator 




Sig. = 0.000 
1,000 to 2,500 & 
2,501-5,000 
10,001-15,000 5,001 – 10,000 
Assets Change in assets; 
Chi-square = 
24.336 
Sig. = 0.000 
Yes  Yes  No 
                                                        
51 The most used energy sources indicated after main electricity by the poor were kerosene and candle; while the 





Social Protection and Living Standards in Informal Industrial Clusters 
5.1. Introduction 
In previous chapters, clear relationships were established between income, poverty and 
employment. It was also evident that the wellbeing and quality of a worker’s life depends in 
large part on the nature of his or her work. For example, an insecure work status tends to create 
fear and ultimately life threatening vulnerabilities among workers. Personal and communal 
insecurity tend to rise as national economies experience widespread unemployment and 
inequalities, exacerbated by increasing informality, a domain with little or no social protection, 
with several implications.  
 
First, at the household level, employment does raise living standards and hence improve the 
stability of the family. Evidence shows that joblessness increases the chances of family break-up 
and has impacts not only individuals but neighborhoods (Wilson, 1996, 1998; Rowthorn and 
Webster, 2008; Webster, 2000). According to these studies, men tend to become melancholic 
and end up as bad partners if they are not earning a living; there are cases where such individuals 
suffer from depression when they lose their jobs. Job losses cascade down to offspring especially 
in cases of family break-up; children of single parents are more vulnerable to poverty than 
children of married couples. For example United States, it was found in 2012 that children in 
“single-parent families were nearly four times more likely to be poor than children in married- 
couple families” (Children’s Defense Fund, 2014, p. 4) This causes unforeseen tension in homes 
as household income drops and single parents are unable to devote enough time and attention to 
children. Where social protection is unavailable, research shows that joblessness affects 
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behavioural problems among children, including dropping out of school and engaging in 
vandalism and crime (UN-Habitat, 2007). In other words, macroeconomic policies should go 
beyond the traditional focus on controlling inflation and stabilization to a focus on human 
development in the long term facilitated through combining active social policies with economic 
planning (see UNDESA, 2011). This includes providing social safety nets and getting people to 
work when they are out of employment. Not surprising, access to employment opportunities is 
one of the two key pillars of the European Union’s model of social cohesion (European 
Commission, 1996).  
 
Social protection should also be designed to promote the wellbeing of not just individuals and 
households but extended to communities. The concept of ‘neighborhood effects’ or ‘area effects’ 
seeks to capture the way that concentrated unemployment and poverty within neighbourhoods 
can have cumulative effects through socialisation and peer pressure (Vartanian & Buck, 2005; 
OECD, 2008). Public education, health and other services are bound to be worse in places where 
they are under greater pressure from poor households.  
 
This chapter considers the issue of social protection and what motivates firm owners to pass on 
benefits to their workers. While chapter 2 looked at social protection in general, as well as actors 
providing social protection, section 5.1 looks at social protection in SSA and Nigeria in 
particular. Next, section 5.2 uses results from the case study to discuss what benefits firms are 
passing to workers and what factors characterize firms that are instrumental in raising the living 




provides the building block necessary to understand why employees’ living standards have 
improved, as seen in chapter 4.  
 
5.2. Social Protection and Employment: An Outline Framework  
Social protection in SSA. In many African countries, formal social protection is not 
new, yet coverage is limited and “expansion is constrained by the lack of formal wage 
employment among the poor” (Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, 2011, para. 4). In fact, there are three 
identifiable phases in its history in Africa: phase I from independence to around 2000; phase II 
between 2000 and 2004 with poverty reduction strategy papers and social protection; and phase 
III with the second generation poverty reduction strategy papers till date (Oduro, 2010). As 
Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2011, para. 1) highlight, social protection “programmes are 
politically, fiscally, and administratively feasible – even in low-income Sub-Saharan African 
countries – and on a scale and scope previously thought out of reach.” In 2008, the first ever 
African Union conference for ministers in charge of social development adopted the “African 
Social Policy Framework” that called for “strengthening of social protection systems, combating 
poverty and hunger, creating full employment and decent work opportunities for all, improving 
access to education and health-care services, promoting gender equality, and ensuring the social 
inclusion of the vulnerable groups in mainstream development” (Mutangadura and Eshetu, 2011, 
p. 7).  
 
Given different local peculiarities, needs, risks and vulnerabilities, one single strategy cannot be 
recommended for all African countries (Mutangadura, nd.). However, a number of African 
countries have put in place different social protection programs. They include Ghana - National 
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Health Insurance Scheme; Lesotho – Old Age Pension; Rwanda – Vision 2020 Umuregne 
Programme; Ethiopia – Productivity Safety Net Programme, and Kenya – Home Grown School 
Feeding Programme (Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2011). 
 
Taking a look at institutions for social inclusion and equity52 in SSA (International Development 
Association [IDA] eligible countries), one finds that the average ratings on a scale of 1 to 6 for 
these countries is around half across all indicators. Nigeria also shows similar ratings, as seen in 
Table 5.1 below.   
 
Table 5.1: International Development Association qualified SSA countries and  
Nigeria ratings for indicators on Policies for social inclusion and equity   
(2008 to 2012) 
Ratings for Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Building human resources 3.26|3 3.27|3 3.31|3 3.43|3 3.46|3.5 
Business regulatory environment 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Equity of public resource use  3.16|3.5 3.21|3.5 3.30|3.5 3.33|3.5 3.28|3.5 
Gender equality  3.23|3 3.21|3 3.25|3 3.24|3 3.19|3 
Policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average 3.12|3.2 3.12|3.2 3.17|3.2 3.22|3.3 3.19|3.4 
Policy and institutions for environmental sustainability 2.95|3 2.92|3 2.99|3 3.13|3.5 3.13|3.5 
Social protection and labor  2.99|3.5 2.99|3.5 2.97|3.5 2.96|3.5 2.90|3.5 
Source: The World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Database (2014). 
** The first number is for IDA-eligible SSA, and the second for Nigeria. The business regulatory environment rating 
is for Nigeria. All ratings range from 1 (low) to 6 (high).  
 
The ratings show that social protection and labor ratings for Nigeria have stayed at a constant 3.5 
from 2008 to 2012 while the policies for social inclusion and equity have improved from 3.2 to 
3.4 over the same period. There is still much room for improvement. In Nigeria, there is no 
explicit strategy or policy for social protection at the federal level, a pointer to the 
implementation of social protection at the level of the state since state institutions tend to mirror 
                                                        
52 The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) assess the quality of countries’ 
institutions and policies under four categories: economic management, structural policies, policies for social 





what happens at the center. Also, in relation to the size of the population, the scope and coverage 
of existing social protection programs tend to be small, and relatively weak where they exist 
(Holmes, Akinrimisi with Morgan and Bulk, 2011, p. 2). Nigeria’s expenditure on social 
protection is currently less than that of other SSA countries, with two-third of it going to the civil 
service (Wood and Chopra, 2012). A close scrutiny shows that social protection for the labor 
market and programmes include “federal- and state-level agricultural subsidies/inputs, youth 
skills and employment programmes – but these are not necessarily targeted at the poor and are 
often implemented at the discretion of the state rather than as part of a coordinated response to 
unemployment and underemployment and constraints to agricultural productivity” (Hagen-
Zanker and Holmes, 2012, p. v).  
 
Though this is the situation in Nigeria, and perhaps in many developing countries, an ideal 
situation in many of these countries, where a large number of workers are in the “informal” 
economy, and where the lines between the formal and informal economy are blurred, entails 
government playing a role in ensuring that basic benefits are provided for all workers; however 
this role is not always evident. How do cluster firms pass on benefits to their workers particularly 
in a milieu of weak formal social policies where institutions are either absent or poorly enforced? 
If indeed firms do give some form of social protection to their workers, is it sufficient, and does 
it free the state from this responsibility? Additionally, can non-state actions substitute for state 
type orthodox policies? Moreover, what informal institutions of protection are workers relying 
on when formal institutions fail?  
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In the cluster for example, one of the marked phenomena of the Otigba Village is the emergence 
of “area boys”, which was discussed in chapter three. These young men who often lack the right 
education and skills, take out their frustration on employers and customers within the cluster and 
in the process create a very unwelcome environment for business. People who come from 
outside of the Lagos area regard this particular group of people who also happen to live in 
deprived neighbourhoods as a nuisance; the stigma has stuck and most often private investors 
find it difficult to invest in these poor areas. Hopefully, a broader conception of social protection 
may assist to turn the situation around, foster higher rates of employment, lower poverty, 
improve the lives of these individuals as well as the area’s image as a place to live and invest. 
For example, at a time in Lagos, area boys were setting up roadblocks and extorting money from 
commuters. The government responded by setting up training programs where skills were 
acquired in baking, horticulture, soap making, hairdressing, bead making and so on. Through 
this, the area boys could earn a living in a more responsible way. 
 
Greater social protection that sees long run employment opportunities as a state’s objective can 
facilitate upward mobility or the progression of informal workers into more formal employment 
that pays better wages, which in the long term would create a resilient middle class in Africa 
(AFDB, 2012). A major feature of the Nigerian economy, as in major cities, and notable by its 
visibility in Otigba, is that of street trading which for many has become a key source of 
livelihood. Informally employed and out of job individuals see this avenue as a viable means out 
of poverty. Women workers, especially those who are unable to combine work and home care 
responsibilities without straining the family tend to resort to these means of livelihood. A 




is increasing in a time of high economic growth that is nonetheless accompanied by low formal 
job creation. 
 
5.3. Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Standard of Living 
In the previous section, I articulated the dynamics of key formal and informal institutions namely 
the State, the market, and informal kinship and ethnic based institutions that should or do provide 
social protection. Evidently, formal regulated institutions might be preferred to the informal, less 
structured and sometimes clientelist ones. This section considers factors that cause firms in the 
case of this cluster to pass on benefits to their employees in such a way as to impact on their 
standard of living. The analysis is reflective of those who answered affirmatively to the question 
“if having a business or working here has raised their standard of living.” Survey results 
presented in the Figures 5.1a and 5.1b below show that 74.7% of the CEOs/managers affirmed 
that having a business or working in their firms had raised their standard of living, while 25.3% 
responded that it had not. Similarly, 69.6% of employees opined that working in their firms had 




Figure 5.1: Positive or negative effect of firm on owners/managers (a) & employees (b) 
standard of living 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013); Figure 5.1a – owners/managers; 5.1b - employees 
 
Using discriminant analysis53 the following variables were found to be statistically significant for 
respondents who acknowledged a raise in their standard of living, from the employee survey – 
age of employee, experience in other firm, location of firm; and from the CEO/management 
survey – owner’s educational attainment, location of firm, and provision of vacation days.  
 
In looking at firms that passed on non-income benefits such as training, health insurance, 
pension, funding for further education, transportation allowance, feeding allowance, housing, 
car, company products, child care and other benefits to their workers, the following variables 
were found to be statistically significant from the employee survey – age of employee, firm size 
(measured by number of employees), length of service in the firm, location of the firm; and from 
the CEO/management survey – educational attainment, horizontal cooperation, and provision of 
vacation days. All these variables will be discussed in turn. 
                                                        










Analysis of variables. 
Age of employee. The age of a company’s employees could be reflective of the type of 
firm and the industry within which it is embedded. Age might be positively correlated with 
higher standards of living and greater contributions to the firm, because older employees might 
have more experience, skills and, though debatable, might be more productive than younger 
employees (Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2010). As Ours and Stoeldraijer (2010) note that while in a 
perfectly competitive market, there should be no age-related pay-productivity gap as workers 
would be paid in accordance to their marginal productivity; a gap might exist because of the 
effect of unions who might for example bid for better pays for older workers. They wrote 
however that:  
It is difficult to establish how age itself affects labor productivity not only because 
productivity is highly individual and sector-specific but also because of convolution of 
age, cohort and selection effects. Individual productivity is complex and multi-
dimensional. Several characteristics … relate to productivity including communication 
skills, information processing speed, strength and endurance, health, self-discipline, 
flexibility, administrative and strategic capacities, math proficiency, vocabulary size, 
education, motivation, energy and job experience. A study on the relationship between 
age and productivity requires data at the level of the firm because productivity is a firm-
level phenomenon (p. 3). 
Results of the survey show that the ICT industry, and the Computer Village in particular, has a 
comparatively higher young employee population. In particular, more than 75% of respondents 
were less than 31 years of age, with 7.8% being less than 20, 37.3% between the ages of 21-25, 
31.4% between the ages of 26-30, and less than a quarter being greater than 31. The cluster itself 
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is relatively young, having its origins in early 1990s; it is home to many young workers for 
whom it provides the opportunity for entrepreneurship and learning for people from various 
backgrounds. Given the lack of jobs available to young people in the formal and public sectors of 
society, it is not surprising that many come to the cluster for a chance to earn a living. Box 5.1 
below shows various entry opportunities into the cluster identified in the course of the research 
(see chapter 3 for details of various actors in the cluster). Forms of learning as previous studies 
(Bamiro, 2003) have also shown, include apprenticeship training and the more formal Students 
Industrial Work Experience Scheme (SIWES). Through SIWES, students engaged in the field of 
science and technology gain practical industrial experience in their areas of study. The cluster   
has become a popular place for student placements and they have been making positive 
impacts on the development of technical skills while some of the students have imbibed 
the entrepreneurial spirit freely exhibited in the cluster. Some of the present operators in 
this cluster had their first contact with IT through this route. (Bamiro, 2003, p. 28) 
 
Box 5.1: Entry opportunities for young people to the cluster  
With little or no capital, a young person can come to the cluster and serve as an intermediary or middle-man 
between a potential customer who does not know where to go, and a potential service provider, receiving a little 
commission in the process.  
A young person can come to the cluster and collect on credit some goods for example flash drives, and meander 
through the streets hawking them, while making some money by selling it at a higher price than what the sales price 
from the creditor was.   
People selling non-ICT related products like drinks, food, recharge card for mobile phones, belts, shoes, clothes, 
also come to the market to hawk their goods to make a living.  
Personal or social networks of relatives or friends is a veritable source of information for those looking for 
opportunities available in the cluster. 
Those whose businesses are geographically located outside the cluster do come to make purchases and make use of 
other services like repairs in the cluster. 
Training and apprenticeship in a firm this is a common entry point for youths particularly through kinship 
affiliation. 
Formal employment in a more established firm.  





The cluster tends to attract more young people because of the nature and the rigor of the work, as 
well as the dynamic atmosphere within the cluster. The general environment of the cluster could 
be considered quite rowdy, with a noisy background of music and generator sounds filling the 
air. Periodically, the state authorities come to clear roadside sellers to restore order in a milieu 
where vehicular and human traffic conjoin. Working hours could also be quite long with the need 
to commute to and from the cluster being a real challenge; particularly with the Lagos traffic law 
signed on 2nd of August 2012, which banned okadas i.e. commercial motorcycles from many of 
the major roads (Okojie, 2012). In an interview with an established ICT business owner located 
outside of the cluster, he described the “hustling” nature – (walking about with customers, 
helping to negotiate for good deals, covering about 20 miles in one day) within the cluster as a 
lifestyle that was not sustainable, and which one could not do for a long time. However, 
according to the informant, this seems to be the base level of the entrepreneurial trajectory in the 
cluster, as one can graduate from “hustling” to owning a small shop, to importing parts or 
finished goods, to assembling. He expressed that the sort of business he had, that of being an ICT 
solution provider, could be done for more than 40 years.   
 
Educational attainment of firm owner. The leadership of an organization is important in 
providing vision, direction, and purpose to the firm. One of the major ICT stores in Nigeria, 
which has established its presence in Nigeria, was started in 1998, and had about 20 flagship 
retail stores as at 2012. The visionary owner expressed interests in expanding to other parts of 
Africa within the next five years (Ware, 2012). The said owner of the organization is a graduate 
in electrical engineering. Among the surveyed firms, 41.6% of the firm owner’s had university 
degrees, 28.7% technical degrees, 6.9% high school, 4% elementary, 4% had no education, and 
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the remaining 14.9% were non-responses. Again, firm size and ownership tend to be closely 
connected because size has implications for the managerial capacity of the owner. 
In Nigeria, MSMEs are defined based on employment size and assets which exclude land and 
building (see appendix table 5.2 for details on MSMEs classifications and definitions). When 
there is a conflict between the two definitions, employment takes precedence (NBS & 
SMEDAN, 2012). Previously, the country did not have a universally acceptable definition of 
MSMEs as it had varied overtime and from sector to sector. However, a definition was adopted 
when a national policy on MSMEs was introduced. In 2010, the National Bureau of Statistics 
and the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria carried out a study on 
MSMEs (NBS and SMEDAN, 2010).  
 
The study, which defined the formal sector as small and medium enterprises while the informal 
sector comprised largely micro enterprises, found that 30.9% of business owners in the formal 
sector had BSc/HND, 21.3% had senior secondary school certificate, 25.9% had secondary 
education, 24.6% had primary education, 11.0% had no formal education, and 30.6% had no 
educational background. As seen in Table 5.2, in comparison to the national averages in Nigeria 
for owners of sole proprietorships, results from survey respondents show that sole proprietors in 
Otigba and in the ICT sector more generally, had much more university graduates than the 
typical “informal” sector, and about the same as the “formal” sector’s, when we take university 
and post-graduates percentages together. Among the surveyed firms, 41.6% of the firm owner’s 
had university degrees, 28.7% technical degrees, 6.9% high school, 4% elementary, 4% had no 





Table 5.2: Educational attainment of owners of sole proprietorships in Nigeria 
Educational attainment ICT Industry 
(%) 
Formal sector – Small 
and Medium enterprises 
(%)  
Informal sector – 
Micro enterprises (%) 
Post graduate  10.3 0.57 
University, Bsc, HND 41.6 30.9 2.25 
NCE/ND  12.8 3.69 
Technical  28.7 2.3 1.28 
High School/Secondary 6.9 21.3 25.94 
Elementary/Primary 4.0 10.2 24.59 
Non formal education  3.2 11.05 
No education 4.0 9.0 30.63 
Non-respondents 14.9   
Source: Author survey (2013), and NBS & SMEDAN (2012); columns 3 and 4 reflect national 
averages 
 
Firms whose owners are highly educated, tend to be able to attain a higher level of profitability 
and productivity for their firms. This in turn might enable more benefits to be passed on to their 
workers in ways in which they would impact on the standard of living of their workers. A 
positive relationship is thus expected between the educational attainment of the owners and 
benefits received by employees. In interviews with a manager at one of the bigger organizations 
in the industry, whose owner is a graduate, employees are given 2 months intensive training 
before they start working, and learning and training goes on. The company also allows and 
sponsors staff in academic programs when relevant to the mission of the firm. Another CEO 
sends his employers for training, and as at the time of the interview, he was sending two to China 
for training. For him, training exposes them to new techniques, widens their horizon and boosts 
their self-esteem and morale, and the welfare of the workers translates to the welfare of the 
business, because the greatest asset of the business is the manpower.   
 
Previous experience in other firms. 102 (73.9%) out of 138 respondents to the question 
“before working at this firm, did you work at some other organization?” responded affirmatively. 
Out of 125 respondents, 65.6% had previously worked with firms based within the cluster, while 
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the remaining 34.4% indicated that their previous firms were not within the cluster. Various 
reasons such as career development, desire for a dynamic technology market, time for self, 
seeking new challenge, need to break new ground, ability to go to a house of worship, because of 
contraband goods, desire for change, retrenchment, and to have a better understanding of 
marketing, were given for the move from their previous organizations. However, for better salary 
was the most common response. Within the cluster there is evidently a considerable movement 
of workers among firms, due in part to the advantages of proximity and information flows on 
changes in market conditions. Historically, scholars have acknowledged the social and economic 
advantages associated with the co-location of firms in clusters; for example proximity generates 
opportunities for the creation of markets, while advancing competition and entrepreneurship 
(Marshall, 1890; Weber, 1929).  
 
In addition, the flow of knowledge and people between firms within Otigba is consistent with 
clustering activities that foster close interactions between competitors, specialized local input 
suppliers, and intermediate input and service providers. The existence of a pool of specialized 
skills and knowledge promotes different forms of learning, as participants in the cluster gain 
from knowledge externalities through: the dissemination of ideas, continuous dialogue in social 
networks (learning-by-interaction), and as well learning-by-doing. Social networking engenders 
information and knowledge exchange in informal settings such as Otigba (Saxenian 1994). At 
the same time, information on which skills are required and by which firms flow freely. In other 
words, geographic proximity fosters the diffusion of innovation in clusters. Therefore in the 
cluster, it is not rare for someone to move from one employer to another or for an individual to 




complementary competitive relationship with the former boss. A case in point is a young man 
who sold electrical chargers and was sharing a small stall with two others, each paying N40,000 
a year for the rented place. He had previously worked for 2 years under someone in Computer 
Village before setting up his own business. He was an Igbo person from Anambra and had come 
to Lagos with his brothers, who were also into business but not within the cluster. He gets his 
supplies from within and outside the cluster. There are also those who initially came to the 
cluster to learn but due to the opportunities offered within this milieu end up setting up their own 
businesses. The cluster remains in a dynamic flux, admitting so many new comers.   
 
Consistent with our findings and the individual narratives, in the study by Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 
Adelaja and Abiola (2007, p. 82-83), they find out the following (presented in Box 5.2 below) 
with regards to managerial strategies and the behavior of labor for different firm sizes: 
 
Box 5.2: Managerial and labor behavior among firms in the Otigba cluster 
Micro-scale Enterprises (1-10): 
Usually no strong and set-down vision, nor clear direction for what the business is to be known for or to achieve.  
Focus is mainly on increasing sales volume and turnover. 
Find opportunities in different areas to quickly turn over their investment. 
Job specification is not well-defined, and staff play multiple roles. 
Recruitment is strictly by recommendation and apprenticeship. 
Staff training is usually on the job, formal training being less emphasized, though staff occasionally sent for 
technical seminars organised by IT organisations like HP, Intel, and Microsoft. 
Staff turnover is high mainly because of dissatisfaction. 
 
Small-scale (11-20): 
Among technocrats, there is a prevalence of set goals and clear visions.  
Among those in the business solely for trade, there is a vague vision for the business beyond immediate gains. 
Recruiting of staff is by recommendation or advertisement. 
Staff turnover is relatively low compared to the micro-scale enterprise segment, probably because the enterprises are 
more stable and job security is assured.  
“IT World has a policy of recruiting graduates with a second class upper (2.1).54 It motivates staff members by 
paying one of the best remunerations in the cluster, along with well-defined staff training and development 
                                                        
54 In the Nigerian education system, similar to the British system of education, a student graduates from the 
university either with the highest honors of a first class (1); a second class upper (2.1); a second class lower (2.2), or 
the lowest honors of a third class (3). Today, many organizations do not consider applicants who have less than a 
2.1.  
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programme…. However, according to Ezelue of Doztronics, qualified technical staff members are easily lost to 
more attractive packages, especially in telecommunications and other industries” (p.83). 
 
Medium-scale (21-50): 
Prevalence of strong focus and a clear vision for the firm, with strategies to sustain themselves as market leaders.  
Well-defined organizational and managerial structures with a skilled manager at the head of each department 
reporting to the General Manager who reports to the Managing Director or the CEO. 
Recruitment is usually through advertisement with the aid of recruitment agencies. 
Staff motivation is achieved through a series of programmes including good remuneration packages, reward for 
excellence, commission on secured business deals and promotion for outstanding performance. 
Staff turnover is usually low. 
“Gafunk is one enterprise that has been able to stem the high staff turnover rate by redesigning its remuneration 
packages and recruitment policy” (p. 83). 
Source: Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja and Abiola (2007, p. 82-83). 
 
Provision of Vacation Days. Article 3 of Convention 132 of the ILO concerns holiday 
with pay (1970). While only 36 countries have ratified the Convention on vacation days, with 
Nigeria not being one of them (ILO, 1970b), it shows that adequate vacation days for workers is 
of concern within the international community. In Nigeria, there are 9 officially recognized 
public holidays, in which “No person shall be compellable to do any act on a day appointed by or 
under the provisions of this Act to be kept as a public holiday which he would not be 
compellable to do on a Sunday.”55 All the public holidays are generally observed in Nigeria; 
however, this might not necessarily be the reality in all regions/state of Nigeria. As one 
interviewee within the cluster observed about business owners: “I don’t think many of the 
companies respect official vacation; and as the saying goes all work and no play make Jack dull. 
On public holidays, they still work because they expect those on holiday to patronize the shops at 
this time. There should be some kind of rest to the staff.” 
 
                                                        
55 These days are – New Year’s Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Worker’s Day (1st May); National Day (1st 
October); Christmas Day; such days as the Minister may declare to be a public holiday in celebration of the Muslim 





Generally, Nigeria adopted a host of international and national labor laws and standards that 
protect the rights of the workers, however the enforcement of, and compliance to these standards 
by employers, is weak or non-existence (Oginni & Adesanya, 2013). Igbuzor (2010) did a review 
of a book in which the authors examined the banking, oil and gas, and telecommunications 
sectors which are major contributors to the GDP, and came up with similar findings – “there are 
enough international instruments and national legislations to protect workers’ rights. The 
challenge is that the instruments and laws are not respected and enforced” (p. 3). In a different 
study of work-life balance (WLB) using 20 banks in Nigeria as case studies, with a total of 102 
middle line managers, authors Mordi, Mmieh and Ojo (2013) found that: 
Some of the respondents stated that they had concerns about using WLB initiatives 
because of the negative perception among senior managers in the banks in relation to 
junior members of staff who utilize WLB initiatives. The case studies reveal that people 
who make frequent use of WLB policies are sometimes seen as less committed to the 
organization’s business. The consequence of this negative perception is that such workers 
may be denied promotion and the opportunity to assume higher responsibilities. Senior 
management in the Nigerian banks always encourages the culture of working long hours 
and discourages workers from taking their leave or using other WLB initiatives. 
 
Another respondent from the survey when asked about flexible working arrangements said: “If 
there is flexible working arrangement, they must be giving it only to the big senior executives. 
We have no choice; we have to report to work every day – if not, we will lose our jobs. I think 
you know it is hard to get a job in Nigeria. We are suffering and smiling.” (Ibid., p.66). When 
asked if there were specific policies “to work fewer hours during school holidays or take time out 
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over the school holiday periods” a different respondent replied: “I have never heard about it in 
this bank. In any case, the maid would always sort the kids out. I can’t afford any reduction in 
salary” (Ibid., p.67-68).  
 
These sectors – banking, oil and gas, and telecommunications – are the more formal ones of the 
Nigerian economy, yet labor rights are scarcely upheld; within the informal sector, it is unlikely 
that the rights of workers will be better enforced. According to the International Labor 
Organization (website),  
The term ‘informal economy’ refers to all economic activities by workers and economic 
units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal 
arrangements. Their activities are not included in the law, which means that they are 
operating outside the formal reach of the law; or they are not covered in practice, which 
means that – although they are operating within the formal reach of the law, the law is not 
applied or not enforced; or the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, 
burdensome, or imposes excessive costs. 
In considering vacation days in particular, out of 88 respondents, 61.4% confirmed that 
employees do get vacation days while 38.6% responded negatively. Figure 5.2 below shows the 











Figure 5.2: What vacation days do you give your employees? 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
It is expected that there will be a positive relationship between firms that give vacation to their 
employees and passing on of benefits that improve the living standards of the workers.  
 
Firm size. Larger firms are usually better able to pass on benefits to workers. These benefits 
could include wage and non-wage benefits. Generally, larger firms are able to give better job 
security and benefits as opposed to sole proprietorships and SMEs. For example, larger 
enterprises might be less vulnerable to external shocks, or be able to give better coverage to their 
employees even when the enterprise is generally not doing as well. Furthermore, larger firms 
might be more likely to be informed of and follow national labour rules. Burke and Morton 
(1990, p. 35) for example found that “[s]maller establishments and service-producing industries 
typically provide fewer benefits than larger establishments and goods-producing industries, but 
the extent of benefit coverage varies widely within industrial and establishment-size groupings.” 
Mares (2001) explicates that large firms might be inclined to contributing to a social policy 
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From the employee survey (see Table 5.3 below), I found that many of the firms are micro in 
size, with 41.5% of respondents having between 1 to 5 employees in their organization. 17% 
having between 5 to 10, 19.7% between 10 to 20, 10.9% between 20 to 50, while another 10.9% 
had more than 50.  
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of firms by workforce 
Workforce Groups Respondents 
No. Percentage 
               1-5 61 41.5 
               5-10 25 17.0 
             10-20 29 19.7 
             20-50 16 10.9 
         More than 50 16 10.9 
              Total 147 100.0 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
From the CEO/Management survey, we find that close to 70% of firms in the industry have at 
least one more outlet or branch. Only 30.8% of firms responded to having no additional 
branches, while 69.2% had from 1 to more than 10 branches. Some of the branches were within 
the Computer Village, while others are in Nigeria, Africa and a few even outside of Africa (see 
tables 5.3 in the appendix for more details).  
 
A positive relationship is expected between the size of firm and the ability to pass on benefits to 
workers in ways in which it improves their standard of living.  
 
Length of service in the firm. The length of time an employee has worked in a firm has 
the ability to affect both the wage and non-wage benefits that they receive. The longer they work 




925) observed that “[i]n traditional human capital theory, real wages grow with experience 
because of on-the-job training.” Survey results (seen in Table 5.4 below) show that the highest 
percentage of employees (32.1%) had been at their firms for six months to one year. However, 
there were those (20.7%) who had been working in their firms for more than five years.  
 
Table 5.4: Duration of stay in the firm 
Duration  Respondents 
No. Percentage 
One to six months 16 11.4 
Six months to one year 45 32.1 
One to two years 27 19.3 
Two to five years 23 16.4 
More than five years 29 20.7 
Total 140 100.0 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
It is expected there to be a positive relationship between length of employees’ service in the firm 
and benefits received.  
 
Horizontal cooperation. Another variable with statistical significance is horizontal 
cooperation. Individuals and firms collaborate through horizontal and vertical linkages, and often 
develop various personal, business and social networks. These collaborations improve 
individual, firm, and cluster productivity, reduces transaction costs, and enhance trust. In turn 
collaboration leads to monetary and non-monetary benefits for workers resulting in improved 
living standards and poverty eradication. Firms might build their linkages based “on four broad 
types of relationships: family and ethnic cohesion, buyer-supplier relations, geographical 
proximity, and finally, ownership, investment, or organisational membership” (Perry, 1999) in 
[Adebowale and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2012, p. 200].  
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Literature explicitly shows the benefits of collaboration and taking advantage of social networks. 
Workers working within clusters are likely to acquire superior skills through constant 
interactions with competent peers. These skills and competencies can then lead to improvement 
in performance and productivity in firms (Chari, 2000; Mano et. al., 2012). Personal, kinship and 
social networks can be beneficial in gaining useful employment, much in the same way it helps 
in the diffusion of knowledge, and provision of capital for the adoption of a technology (Mano 
et. al, 2011; Kimura 2011). In addition, learning and upgrading can also be attained through 
social networks, and from multiple and domestic and regional value chains as opposed to single, 
and global value chains (Navas-Alemán, 2011), while trade and professional associations can 
also be useful in helping to overcome poverty traps in their advocacy role for better wage and 
working conditions (Mehrotra and Biggeri, 2005). 
 
Richman (2005) gives an example of Jewish dominance of the diamond industry in New York 
writing “[r]elying on a reputation mechanism that is supported by a distinctive set of industry, 
family, and community institutions, Jewish diamond merchants have been able to enforce such 
contracts and have thus maintained industry leadership for several centuries.” He further presents 
the cases of – “Chinese family businesses in Southeast Asia; the Jains and Angadias of India and 
their involvement in the diamond industry, as successful instances of “other ethnically 
homogeneous communities who have built prosperous networks of commerce.” (p. 45).  
 
Adebowale and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2012, p. 199-200) in their paper on “Determinants of 




the Otigba Computer Village, the Nnewi automotive components and the Aba garment and 
fashion clusters write:  
The evidence on determinants of productivity show clearly that clustering tend to 
promote firm-level interactive learning. The key determinants of productivity are the 
combined effect of human skills and education as well as past records of productivity. 
The impact of government policy is hardly felt. So how do enterprises compensate for the 
shortcomings of poor policies and institutions through collaboration learning? The 
absence of formal institutional structures has led manufacturers to find alternative private 
arrangements to fill the gaps left by the failures of the state. In particular, through 
personal relations and culturally grounded institutions that act as sophisticated networks, 
firms reduce information uncertainties and agency problems and enhance trust. They 
reduce the high transaction costs typically faced by African entrepreneurs seeking to 
enter industry.  
 
Schmitz (1999, p.1630), gives an example from Scott (1994) who compared a dynamic gem and 
jewelry cluster in Bangkok to a less dynamic one in Los Angeles, and found the difference to be 
that “remarkable collective activism … significant resources have been mobilized to create an 
infrastructure of supporting services, ranging from training and educational programs to 
international marketing and information providing agencies (p.260)… This contrasts with the 
collective inaction in the (less dynamic) US cluster.” Nadvi and Barrientos (2004) also explicate 
that joint action can help firms reduce costs, confront external threats and face challenges and 
vulnerabilities. The authors note that, “[l]ocal institutions such as business associations and 
collective service centres can help clustered firms acquire the skills, the technical abilities to 
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reduce their vulnerability to the exigencies of globalization, thereby enhancing the well-being of 
workers and producers” (p. 11).  
 
In Otigba, different forms of firm level collaborations do take place. Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 
Adelaja, & Abiola (2007) found that “[m]ore than 97% of the enterprises indicate that they 
cooperate with other firms within the cluster while 78% and 99% of the enterprises collaborate 
on sub-contracting and usage of industrial associations respectively.” Presently in the cluster, 
firms have continued to increase their cooperation with other firms. In particular survey results 
show that 91% of firms indicated an increase in their collaboration with other firms in the past 5 
years, while 50.9% and 54.2% had increased their subcontracting and use of industry association 
respectively in the last 5 years. Firms seem to have increased their cooperation with other firms, 
suppliers, sub-contractors, domestic and foreign buyers the most through the exchange of 
information and experiences. Chapter six provides more information about cooperation among 
firms and among employees within the cluster.  
 
Location of firm. The geographical location of a firm is important to its performance. As 
previously seen, location within an industrial cluster enables firms to enjoy collective efficiency, 
benefiting from from both external economies and joint action. Through external economies, 
firms within clusters benefit from market access, labour market pooling, access to intermediate 






Firms have the incentive to agglomerate due to benefits of external economies like market access 
(McCormick, 1998 & 1999). “Firms want to locate close to demand (or, more generally, in 
locations from which transport networks make it relatively cheap to reach markets) and models 
generally yield the result that increasing returns activities are pulled disproportionately towards 
locations with good market access”  (Henderson, Shalizi & Venables, 2001, p.83). The cluster 
has gained considerable reputation as the place to go for the products and services it produces, 
that is, all things related to ICT. Buyers therefore come from within Nigeria and outside of it, to 
purchase from the cluster, and individual firms benefit from that. Firms also gain from labor 
market pooling whereby the cluster becomes “the concentration of specialized skills … which 
occurs as a result both of skills upgrading within the cluster and of skilled labor being drawn 
from other places, benefits both workers and firms” (McCormick, 1999, p. 1533). 
 
Firms within clusters similarly get the advantage of having access to intermediate inputs. Within 
clusters one might find wholesalers and various middlemen who sell inputs to other producers. 
Some firms import goods that are sold to other enterprises, which may not have the capital to do 
the same. Firms within clusters further benefit from technological spillovers which involves the 
“diffusion of technological know-how and ideas” (McCormick, 1999, p. 1533). Trust, which 
enables inter-firm collaboration can help to foster the introduction of technology within the 
cluster (Asheim, 1994), as well as the “imitation, adaptation and diffusion of innovations among 
small- and medium firms” (Ibid, p. 97). 
 
The second aspect of collective efficiency, which has been previously discussed, is joint action. 
This is the deliberate force at work in addition to the incidental external economies, and can be 
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made up of two firms cooperating or multiple firms coming together as in an association or other 
institutional form (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). While clustering has many advantages, it also has 
its negative effects. These include congestion, high rents as space become limited and the extent 
of the market could cause firms to disperse (Henderson, Shalizi & Venables, 2001).   
 
5.4. Interpretation of Results 
Having looked at the various factors that have contributed to increasing the propensity of firms 
to improve standard of living, and secondly passing on non-income benefits to their workers, 
results of the discriminant analysis based on survey findings are reported in Table 5.5 below and 
then interpreted. 
 
Table 5.5: Discriminant analysis of firm benefits - summary of results  
Variables 1. SOL/E 2. NIB/E 3. SOL/CEO 4. NIB/CEO 
Age of employee 0.008*** 0.022**   
Sex of employee  0.169 0.887   
Educational attainment 0.624 0.878   
Firm size (Employees) 0.402 0.013**   
Length of service in the firm 0.593 0.020**   
Experience in other firm 0.001*** 0.739   
Location of firm  0.000*** 0.012** 0.090* .465 
Educational attainment of owner   0.006*** .100* 
Age of firm   0.236 .770 
Location of branches   0.128 .889 
Horizontal cooperation   0.410 .102* 
Mode of income payment    0.928 .771 
Provision of vacation days   0.000*** .042** 
Note: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, and * 10 % level of significance 
Where SOL: Standard of living; E: employee survey; NIB: Non-income benefit; CEO: 
CEO/Management survey  
 
5.3.1. Characteristics of firms that improve standard of living of employees. This 
statistical analysis is based on the question “has your working in this business raised your 




level. These were age of employee, experience in other firm and location of firm. The sex of the 
employee, educational attainment, firm size, and length of service in the firm were not 
significant in explaining those whose standard of living improved. In particular, employees that 
were older, and those who had previous experience in other firms, tended to have better standard 
of livings than those who were younger and didn’t have this experience. This result could be as a 
result of the former group having developed more skills and expertise over the years. 
Furthermore, and of great significance for this study, firms located in the cluster tended to have 
employees who reflected higher standards of living than those working in firms located outside 
the cluster. About 55.1% of employees who responded agreed that workers in Computer Village 
are faring better financially than those doing the same work outside of Computer Village. 
Although less than half (46.8%) admitted that workers in Computer Village are very satisfied, 
only 35.9% of respondents to the question indicated that most workers will go to work outside of 
Computer Village, given the opportunity (Table 5.6).  
 
For CEOs and management, 63.4% admitted that it was financially rewarding to be within the 
cluster, yet only 32.7% indicated that the firms in the cluster are doing better than the firms 
outside of the cluster yet in the same business. When asked however if most firms would move 
out of the Computer Village given the opportunity, only 15.8% responded positively, thus 
indicating the existence of certain benefits to firms of being located within the cluster.  
 
Table 5.6: Opinion of CEOs/Managers on owning a firm located in the Otigba cluster  
Opinion Respondents with TRUE response 
No. Percentage 
It is financially rewarding to have a firm within Computer 
Village.  
64 63.4 
Firms in Computer Village are faring better financially than 
those doing the same business outside of Computer Village.  
33 32.7 
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Most firm owners in Computer Village are satisfied. 20 19.8 
Given the opportunity, most firms would move out of 
Computer Village 
16 15.8 
For most workers, their standard of living improves when they 
begin working in Computer Village. 
38 37.6 
The more productive Computer Village is, the better for the 
individual firms 
49 48.5 
As profitability in my firm increases so does employee benefits 46 45.5 
The future of firms in Computer Village is bright 42 41.6 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
Indeed, there are many benefits to being located within the cluster, both for the employees, as 
well as the owner. Box 5.3 below draws from the opinion of a manager at one of the prominent 
firms to highlight the disadvantages and advantages of being located within the cluster as 
opposed to outside.  
 
Box 5.3: Disadvantage and advantages of being located within the cluster 
Disadvantage 
- The only disadvantage according to ICT companies that are based within Computer Village is that firms compete 
or have to compete intensely against each other; although competitiveness is good for firms in the long run. 
 
Advantages or benefits 
- They cooperate with each other to increase competitive advantage. The clustering of firms within the Village 
results in agglomeration benefits to the companies by raising their productivity(ies). The companies share 
knowledge and technology, experiences and information otherwise absent outside clusters. 
- It also provides the advantage of access to local capital resources as banks and other financial institutions will be 
comfortable with being present in the cluster’s environ as it aids referencing and lowers the cost of asset and 
portfolio monitoring. 
- Innovation by competitors within the cluster can be a benchmark or catalyst to improve productivity as well as 
providing staff the impetus to higher performance. 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
Characteristics of firms that pass on non-income benefits to employees. Again our 
analysis shows that the following attributes were significant in describing firms that employees 
identified as giving non-income benefits – age of employee, firm size, length of service in the 
firm, and location of firm. These were all significant at the 5% level. Older employees and those 




than others. This is similar to the firms whose employees indicate better standards of living. 
However, firm sizes as well as length of service in the firm are also significant here. That is, 
larger sized firms, measured by the number of employees, as well as individuals who have spent 
relatively long time in the firm, were more likely to have received non-income benefits.  
 
Given the informal nature of the cluster, it might be surprising that employees within the cluster 
are more likely to receive more non-income benefits than those who are outside it. One might 
say it could be the disproportionate amount of firms in the representative sample who are outside 
the cluster as opposed to inside the cluster. Alternatively, non-income benefits tend to replace 
formal compensations in the informal economy and as such this set of response could reflect the 
socio-economic environment in which labor in the country works. As seen in Figure 5.3 below, 
training, transport allowance, feeding allowance, company products and health insurance are the 
top five non-income benefits reported given by CEO/management and received by employees. 
The results are drawn from both the CEO/management and employee surveys. While the results 
are fairly the same, the CEO/managerial staff tend to depict that they give more than the 
employees receive.  
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of firms that give and employees that receive non-income benefits 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013)  
Most companies – whether formal or informal – usually train their employees. This training 
could take different forms such as on-the-job, apprenticeship or more formal training. However, 
the nature and form of transportation and feeding allowance that are given in the cluster are 
benefits that might be difficult to manage in big, structured firms where accounts are properly 
made. This is because in some cases, the owner might decide to give the employee or apprentice, 
as he or she seems fit; this benefit not being a recorded transaction. However, in SMEs, this 
might not be uncommon; in practice, an apprentice might be assisted with token amounts to 









































Characteristics of Firms that improve standard of living of owners, management 
and other employees. Next I consider the characteristics of firms that improve the standard of 
living of their owners, managerial staff and other employees. This statistical analysis is based on 
the question “has your owning or working in this business raised your standard of living.” Two 
variables – educational attainment of the owner and provision of vacation days – were found to 
be statistically significant at the 1% level, while the location of the firm was significant at the 
10% level of significance. That is, owners who were more educated tended to own and manage 
firms that led to improvement in the standard of living of their owners and workers. Likewise, 
firms who gave vacation days and were located within the cluster also improved the standard of 
living of their owners and workers. The variables that were found to be statistically insignificant 
included the age of the firm, the location of its branches, horizontal cooperation and mode of 
income payment, i.e. fixed, commission or both.  
 
Characteristics of firms that pass on non-income benefits to employees. Examining 
the firms that pass on non-income benefits to their employees, from the point of view of the 
CEOs and management, I find that at a 5% level of significance, firms that grant vacation days to 
their workers seemed to pass on non-income benefits to their employees. Furthermore, 
educational attainment of the owners and horizontal cooperation were found to be significant at a 
10% level. That is, firms whose owners were more educated and who tended to cooperate with 
other firms, buyers, sellers, customers, and sub-contractors passed on non-income benefits to 
their employees. The age of the firm, its location and that of its branches, as well as mode of 
income payment were not significant variables in this analysis. 
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5.5. Summing Up 
In this chapter the attributes that characterized firms that improve the standard of living of their 
employees and owners and as well pass on non-income benefits to workers have been 
highlighted and examined. Despite the fact that firms within the cluster are mostly informal 
micro and small firms, have asset levels that are relatively small on average and compared to the 
industry frontier, are owner-operators that are mainly managerially weak, and are “surviving” in 
a fierce competitive market, yet a large percentage of employees, managers and owners report an 
increase in standard of living. Moreover, different kinds of non-income benefits are being passed 
to employees. However, firm size cannot be ignored in the fact that larger firms are still more 
likely to pass on non-income benefits to their workers.  
 
Although this cluster ranks high in terms of the educational level of owners and management, it 
faces a hostile institutional milieu due to the weak support received from both national and 
municipal governments, the latter for the most part being more interested in extracting rent 
through multiple taxation rather than supporting the enterprises. In part due to the embryonic 
nature of social policy and its enforcement in Nigeria, no formal practice of social protection 
among all sizes of firms that is backed by the law was found. Notwithstanding, employees 
identified certain benefits that they received, while CEOs/managerial staff indicated what they 
gave, and through discriminant analysis a differentiation of the peculiar features that 
characterized firms that provided such benefits was made.  
 
In addition, it was found that social protection coded as benefits in this study, is hardly 




the absence of formal wage employment and the prevalence of the informal economy 
characterizing the Otigba cluster. The formal pension schemes for the powerful public civil 
servants and employees of large (formal) private enterprises do not extend to this category of 
firms and workers. Although an interviewed CEO mentioned that firms that wanted to pursue 
contracts with the government had to give proof of their workers’ pension plans. However, not 
many firms are large enough to seek contracts with the government, neither is the frequency with 
which such contracts are given large. These reasons make this enforcement mechanism 
inadequate in monitoring firms, particularly in this cluster. Second, from interviews with workers 
and observations made during fieldwork, there is the need for an environment that enables 
businesses to thrive. The socio-economic backdrop against which the cluster is embedded creates 
frustration for workers and Nigerians in general. While there is need for a universal safety net for 
the poor and vulnerable, there is also the perception that the state does not care about people. 
There is also a widespread fear of job loss in an environment of insecure jobs, and so workers 
endure whatever jobs they have, “suffering and smiling”, an aphorism of the powerlessness of 
the poor. Chapter six provides further depth about the role of the state, policies and institutions 









CHAPTER SIX:  
The State, Institutions and Policy Support for Clusters 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the role and performance of the state and its institutions in promoting 
industrial clusters as a means of employment generation and poverty eradication, as well as 
providing production-enhancing infrastructure. I pay attention to the role of state policies and 
state behavior for three reasons. First, the state is primarily the originator and custodian of 
policies, as well as the regulator and the enforcer of policies and institutions. Second, due in 
large part to a weak private sector, the state in Africa is for the most part the largest investor in 
public infrastructure. Third, government agencies provide measurements and standards that 
regulate the conduct of industry. The provision or failure to set up supportive institutions (such 
as on copyright, tariffs, and labor regulations) and provide enabling policies, and environments, 
could determine in large part sectoral and firm competiveness. Government failure to meet the 
above relates largely to the absence of these institutions and other basic public goods (Krueger, 
1990). After a long period of neo-liberal policies experimentation, there is a recognition of the 
need for the state to play an active role in the development process (UNCTAD, 2009, p. x). The 
“East Asian miracle” continues to be an example of how state bureaucracies played a central role 
in development, a fact that was eventually admitted by the World Bank (Evans, 1996, p. 1034). 
The importance of institutional mechanisms in enhancing development was evident in the growth 
and dynamism of the East Asian countries. A notable World Bank study expressed that:  
“governments in East Asia developed institutional mechanisms which allowed them to establish 





Consistent with its regulatory stance, the state and its agents evidently set the parameters for and 
play a key role in creating the right macroeconomic and policy environment for SMEs and 
clusters. This dissertation analyzes the impact of institutions and incentives on workers’ living 
standards measured against government performance in the supply of infrastructure and 
provision of incentives for non-state actors to play their roles. To achieve this objective it 
examines systematically both formal and informal institutional arrangements in Otigba, the latter 
assuming significant importance in the absence of state support or when formal institutions are 
absent, weak or not enforced. The chapter will draw on both secondary and primary data 
collected for this thesis to understand how far and in what ways policies have either supported or 
impeded the progress and dynamism of the Otigba industrial cluster.  
 
6.2. Institutions and Infrastructure in Cluster Performance 
In a number of developing countries like Nigeria, infrastructure remains a major challenge 
hindering dynamic industrialization and competitiveness. In particular, about 60% of the world’s 
infrastructure stock is located in high-income countries, 28% in middle-income countries and 
12% in low-income countries. In developing countries in 2009 there were about 1 billion people 
with no easy access to all-weather roads, about 1.5 billion people living without electricity, 800 
million without access to safe drinking water and 4.7 billion people without access to the 
internet. These infrastructure gaps jeopardize the efforts of domestic companies to raise their 
competitiveness (OECD, 2013, p. 14). 
 
In Nigeria, physical infrastructure that is necessary for modern and mass production remains 
inadequate (Akinwale, 2010), and the institutional environment including the system of taxation 
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and business environment have led to the loss of over 1.9 million jobs between 2001 and 2010. 
The president of the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) attributed the job loss to such 
challenges as “infrastructure including the dismal power supply, insecurity, multiple taxation and 
levies, and high fluctuating industrial fuel pricing” (Osagie, 2011). Other studies of the 
productive climate for firms including this one reveal that poor infrastructure, particularly 
widespread power outages and inconsistent power supply, lead to low capacity utilization and 
high costs of production (Tyler, 2002).  
 
From the 2008 World Bank enterprise surveys, poor infrastructure, particularly power supply, 
constitutes a severe obstacle to firm-level performance. According to Omoleke (2011), some of 
the operational bottle necks that the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) – the public 
entity in charge of (production, distribution) of electricity in the country – confront include a 
poor culture of tariff recovery resulting in lack of payment by consumers, vandalism of the 
PHCN’s equipment, inadequate funding, poor maintenance of equipment which sometimes leads 
to malfunctions, faulty town planning as areas zoned as residential have gotten an influx of 
industries, and bureaucratic corruption by staff of the company who collect money from 
customers without providing electricity for them.  
 
Access to land for expansion also poses considerable obstacles to domestic firms in Nigeria with 
26.59 % viewing it as a moderate obstacle. 19.47% of firms view telecommunications as a 
moderate constraint. This could be due to the improved telecommunications system with the 
privatization of the sector and introduction of mobile phones. Transportation is ranked as a major 




problems including faulty designs, inadequate drainage system, potholes, dilapidated pavements, 
fallen bridges and lack of maintenance” (Akinwale, 2010, p. 217). These problems combined 
with a large population often lead to traffic congestion in the urban areas. Many people therefore 
resort to commuting with commercial motorcycles (okadas) that could move faster through the 
traffic and access areas which are remote or not accessed by other forms of public transport. The 
present Lagos State government has taken steps towards improving the transportation system in 
the state – improving the roads and providing BRT.  
 
In the transport sector, Nigeria’s road networks are in poor condition from lack of maintenance; 
the rails were neglected and have fallen into disuse for several decades. It is estimated that to 
address the infrastructure shortcomings in the country, a continuous expenditure of almost $14.2 
billion per annum, or about 12% of GDP is needed over the next decade. Currently, about $6 
billion (about 5 percent of GDP) per annum is budgeted for federal infrastructure – though China 
in comparison in the mid-2000s expended about 15% of its GDP solely on infrastructure 
investment (Foster and Pushak, 2011). Even with the budgeted $6 billion, it is doubtful how 
much of this will be appropriately spent.  
 
A close examination of other institutional factors like the macroeconomic and political 
environment reveals that tax rates and tax administration is a main obstacle to the functioning of 
domestic firms in the country.  One issue in particular that businesses face is that of multiple 
taxation or multiplicity of taxes (Ugbor, 2012; Olapade, 2013). Four forms in which this takes 
place are:  
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1. various unlawful compulsory payments being collected by the local and state 
governments without appropriate legal backing through intimidation and harassment of 
the payers. Collection is characterised by the use of stickers, mounting of road blocks, 
use of revenue agents/consultants including motor park touts. 
2. situations where a taxpayer is faced with demands from two or more different levels of 
government either for the same or similar taxes. A good example here is the 
administration of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and Sales Tax simultaneously. 
3. the same level of government imposes two or more taxes on the same tax base. A good 
example is payment of Companies Income Tax, Education Tax and Technology Levy by 
the same company. 
4. cases whereby various government agencies “impose taxes” in the form of fees or 
charges. (Sanni, 2012, p. 229)   
In the hospitality sub-sector for instance, the heavy tax burden56 has made it hard for the 
companies to break-even, and some have closed their business or changed the use of their 
properties (Olopade, 2013). The telecommunications sector is another group that faces multiple 
taxation (Oyeyinka, 2006). The 2013 Doing Business Report (World Bank, 2013b), showed that 
Nigerian businesses make an average of 41 tax payments in one year, spend 956 hours in doing 
it, costing about 33.8% of their profit. Compared to about 185 economies studied, it ranked 155 
in the payment of tax indicator.   
 
                                                        
56 Some of the taxes and levies paid in the hospitality sub-sector include “registration of hospitality premises, stamp 
duty, Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSIT), Industrial Training Fund (ITF), National Pension Commission 
(PENCO), Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation (NTDC), Value Added Tax [VAT], Pay As You Earn 
[PAYE], Company Income Tax … Withholding Tax, Liquor Licence, Food Handlers and Health Certificate, visual 
Contravention Charges, Business Premises, Administration Charges for Environmental, Audit, Copyright Society of 
Nigeria [COSON], Water supply, Electricity supply … However copious levies by the federal, state and local 
governments as well as other fees charged by regulatory agencies across the sectors at the state and federal levels 




Access to finance is also a challenge in many developing countries, for while a considerable 
proportion of industry is composed of SMEs, making up about 85% of total employment in 
developing countries, they have no access to formal credit (OECD, 2013, p. 12 & 14). In Nigeria, 
domestic firms view access to finance as a serious obstacle, with 28% viewing it as a major one 
and 32.76 % as a very severe one (Table 6.1 below). In light of the business climate in Nigeria, 
the Vice Chairman of the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria in charge of Imo and Abia states 
noted that a “lot of manufacturing and other businesses in Nigeria have shutdown production and 
in some cases have relocated their factories to places which are perceived to be more investment-
friendly” (Ugbor, 2012, para. 11). 
 
Table 6.1: Infrastructure and institutions: Obstacles to domestic firms in Nigeria 
Category % % % % % 
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Source: Computed from World Bank (2007) Enterprise Survey.  
 
Following from the several interviews I had with firms, I agree with previous studies and thus,57 
conclude the following on the importance of efficient infrastructure for firms both within and 
outside clusters. Firstly, in the absence of necessary infrastructure and utilities, firms have to 
                                                        
57 Drawing heavily from Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2006b) 
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make alternative provisions, like boreholes and generators. In a survey of firms in Nigeria, it was 
found that 92% had their own private generators to “supplement for inadequate public supply” 
(Lee, Anas & Oh, 1996, p. II). Evidently, this places an undue burden on their resources as 
opposed to their counterparts in other economies, and raises their cost of production. In some 
cases, firms who cannot pay for such private facilities might be involuntarily excluded from 
entering into the industry. Others might cut down production, or in rare situations, share with 
other nearby firms. In clusters, sharing such facilities is made easier as the firms are in close 
proximity to one another.  
 
Secondly and following from the first, quality infrastructure and consequently decreased costs of 
production attract more firms to enter into an industry. This will likely lead to increased 
competition and innovation among firms, which raises industrial output and potentially lowers 
the prices for consumers.58 Importantly for this thesis also, existing infrastructure in a specific 
geographical location like industrial clusters, parks and estates, science parks and technology 
incubators spurs the agglomeration of firms, and the ensuing benefits of such agglomerations, 
like knowledge and technology.  
 
Thirdly, inadequate public infrastructure makes communicating and networking among firms 
difficult. The flow of information that concerns production, as well as the transportation of goods 
                                                        
58 “One perfect example of the influence that competition has on price is with respect to the ‘pay by second’ versus 
the existing ‘pay by minute’ pricing of GSM calls. When Globacom first started business in Nigeria, they introduced 
the pay by second system, whereby the consumer only paid for the seconds they used, as compared to the existing 
service offered by the other providers, whereby each call was rounded to the next highest minute, regardless of if 
they used the whole minute or only a few seconds of that minute. At the time, the other providers told Globacom 
that paying per second was an impossible service to introduce. However, when Globacom introduced this innovation 
and introduced their pay by second system, the other providers also found a way to do the same. The pay by second 




and services becomes a challenge where infrastructure is bad. Planning is also made more 
difficult when transportation is unpredictable and communication is erratic and unreliable.  
Finally, the absence of adequate infrastructure for the firm can impact consumer behavior as 
firms pass on increased or reduced cost of production to the consumers. However, efficient 
infrastructure for instance in electricity and communication can lead to improved communication 
which leads to “lower information search costs in much the same way that low cost transport and 
good roads lower transaction costs” (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006b, p. 114). 
 
In sum, when faced with the constraint of inefficient national infrastructure as is common in 
Nigeria, firms begin to focus and direct resources to providing these alternative ‘public goods’ 
instead of concentrating their efforts to more long-term innovative and profitable ventures. Firms 
in this situation are thus effectively “penalized for what is essentially failure of public policy, 
through the provision of alternative utilities” (Ibid, 2006b, p. 115). 
 
6.3. Government, Institutions and Otigba Cluster 
This section examines closely the role of the government, its agents and policies, particularly in 
the provision of basic infrastructure required for efficient functioning of firms such as electric 
power, roads, transport, internet/telephone and security. It also highlights formal and informal 
institutions such as the credit and finance system, and interactions between key actors such as the 
professional and trade associations that influence the performance of businesses in the Computer 
Village. In addition, I analyze interactions between the government and the people with the 
example of two recently enacted policies – the fuel subsidy removal by the federal government 
and the new traffic laws by the state government. 
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Infrastructure and Public Policies. In most parts of the country, infrastructure and 
power supply in particular has been a huge challenge for homes and firms (Sesebo, 2000; 
Akinmutimi, 2000), and the cluster in particular. This is corroborated by past research in the 
cluster, which found that 90% of firms in Otigba had their own electricity generators and 75% of 
them had their own boreholes (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & Abiola, 2007). The owner of one 
of the thriving businesses in the cluster remarked in a newspaper interview: “I think the major 
challenge most business face in Nigeria is the problem of power supply. It is really a very big 
issue in running a business in Nigeria. A situation where everyone has to power his business with 
generator on a daily bas[i]s calls for a serious concern. It has really taken a bulk of our profits 
away” (Elebeke, 2010b). When public provision of infrastructure is poor or absent, firms have to 
invest some of their capital and operational costs into providing alternative solutions. For 
instance, the survey by this author shows that that firms spend more than a quarter of their capital 
budget (27.43%) and operational budget (38.78%) on infrastructure. The cost of fuel namely 
petrol or diesel for, and maintenance of electricity generators or recharge cards to top up mobile 
phones in the absence of landlines could be very significant.   
 
Economic growth in Nigeria has in large part been held back due to inadequate supply of 
electrical power; this situation is befuddling because the country has the required raw materials 
such as coal, gas, and hydro resources to achieve the requisite power supply level. Part of the 
reason for the abysmal level of electricity supply is the lack of investment over a long period: 
Nigeria did not increase its installed capacity between 1990 and 2005, a period of 15 years. 




megawatts from 1991 to 2010 (Fact fish, 2014). Over the years, the state of electricity supply in 
the country deteriorated in spite of the huge financial resources expended on the energy sector. 
Not surprising, firms rank inadequate power supply as the most severe obstacle and there is a 
striking correlation between firm level productivity and infrastructural variables listed earlier 
(see table 1). Figure 6.1 below shows in a summary form how respondents rank public provision 
of roads, water, telephone, electricity, internet, telephone and security. More than 50% of 
respondents view public provision of security (56.5%), electricity (54.5%), transport (51.1%) as 
not good or fair, while about 40% viewed public provision of roads (43.8%) and water (44.2%) 
in that category. More than 25% of respondents rank public provision of roads (35.9%), water 
(27.9%) and telephone (25.8%) as very good or excellent. Roads might be seen in a more 
positive light as the Lagos state government has been taking steps towards repairing the roads in 
the state.  
 
Much has been discussed on the general infrastructural condition in Nigeria, and the case within 
the cluster is not much different. In the survey conducted in Lagos (LBS, 2011), respondents 
from the Ikeja local government area where the cluster is located, reported that 100% of their 
electricity was from electrical generators. At the state level, 24% of responders spent more than 




Figure 6.1: Ratings of public provision of certain services  
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013).  
 
Another notable infrastructural challenge faced by the ordinary urban worker on a daily basis 
which was evident in the course of this research was how urban transport benefits are unequally 
and unfairly distributed. Clearly modes of transport as with other social services are subject to 
pervasive inequalities in terms of access to transport infrastructure.  I found that access to 
services depended in large part on income differentials, social and physical differences 
(including gender, ethnicity, age or disabilities). Government policies tend to recognize the tenet 
that to achieve social sustainability, policies and institutions need to be rooted in the principle of 
accessibility wherein equality exists among all groups in terms of access to basic goods, services 
and activities – such as work, education, medical care, shopping, socializing – and to enable 
people participate in civic and business life. In practice this is notable by the absence of both 
accessibility and affordability be it in housing, water, or transport. For the state to fulfil the 
promise of affordable water, power and transportation it needs to take policy steps that allow all 
citizens, including those with low incomes, access to basic services and activities (healthcare, 


















For the majority of urban dwellers in developing countries like Nigeria, the availability of 
reliable and affordable public infrastructure such as transport services often mark the difference 
between being economically and socially excluded or included into the life of a city. When high 
cost of services takes out a disproportionally high percentage of a person’s income, life could 
become very difficult as the survey shows for Lagos residents and workers within the cluster. In 
Lagos “the public-sector bus company failed under the weight of low fares and unsustainable 
subsidies”, its mobility role taken over by “danfos” (mini-buses providing frequent and 
affordable services), but characterized by overcrowding and aggressive driving (Mitric, 2008, p. 
49; Pirie, 2011). The lower investments required from operators of informal transport services is 
a key incentive for entry into this sector. 
 
In situations where governments are unable to provide and subsidize public transport services, 
commuters often have to pay large, sometimes exorbitant percentages of their incomes to private, 
and often times informal transit operators. These operators set their own prices at “whatever the 
market will bear”, which could exceed that of publicly provided services (Cervero, 2011, p. 5). 
In Lagos for example, the operators might charge different rates at different times and routes 
depending on the demand for their services. For poor households in Lagos, transport makes up 
about 20% of their budget.59 The city also had the highest accident rate in the world as at the 
early 2000s (Mitric, 2008, p. 50) while time costs can be very high due to perennial traffic 
congestion.60 Workers in Otigba have to resort to this type of informal transport which is firmly 
                                                        
59. Studies show that similar to the situation in Lagos, “taking a series of informal minibuses and motorized 
tricycles to and from work can cost 20 to 25 per cent of daily wages in rapidly growing cities like Delhi (India), 
Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Manila (the Philippines), and as much as 30 per cent in Nairobi (Kenya), Pretoria 
(South Africa) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)” (UN-habitat, 2013, p. 10).  
60 In Mexico City, 20 percent of travelers spend more than three hours commuting to and from work (World Bank & 
ADB, p. 6). 
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entrenched in Lagos as with most cities in developing-country cities, often accounting for over 
half of all motorized trips. In Lagos as with much of Africa, private carriers dominate, mainly 
minibuses and shared taxis with schedules and fares varying with demand, routes being semi-
fixed, and stopping points unregulated.  
 
One recent policy that illustrates the institutional environment of business in Nigeria that has 
increased the cost of transportation, goods and services in the country and impacted citizens’ cost 
of living is the removal of the fuel subsidy on the 1st of January, 2012 by the Federal 
Government. Nigeria’s refineries were not functioning properly and the country though a 
producer of crude oil, began to import fuel. The fuel subsidy, intended to last 6 months, had been 
introduced in 1980s to maintain the citizens’ standard of living. It however lasted for 24 years 
(Bako, 2012). In public discussions, the government argued that removing the fuel subsidy was 
necessary because: only a few people benefited from it; it would help expose the corrupt people 
and fight corruption; it would save the country N479 billion; this money could be redirected to 
building infrastructure; and the outcome of the lifting of the subsidy would be that it would 
attract foreign investments. The people on the other hand countered with various points: the 
removal of the subsidy was not a bad idea in itself, but the present time was not the right time to 
implement it; it would be a political “whip” on the masses who would bear the brunt of the pain; 
social amenities and infrastructure should be put in place by the government before the subsidy 
was removed; the prior removal of subsidies on diesel and kerosene had not led to any 
identifiable positive outcomes; and petroleum was a product that the average Nigerian travelers, 
commercial drivers, goods transporters, skilled and unskilled workers, capitalized on as a source 





Despite the counter arguments, the subsidy was removed, and in an abrupt manner. Instead of the 
pre-agreed time of April 2012, it was implemented in January 2012. Consequently, prices of 
products and services for individuals and households like school fees, rent, transportation and 
medicine increased, as well as intermediary and final products of businesses; in some cases, 
these prices more than doubled (Aljazeera, 2012; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2012; 
Busari, 2012; Kolawole & Oritse, 2013; Ogundipe, 2013). One interviewee recounted that her 
transport fare doubled from N250 to N500, but her salary was still the same. Price of other things 
such as clothing, school fees and accommodation had also increased, but income was still the 
same. And the government had not put any measures in place. In her view, if transport, [and] 
power is solved, things will be better. From the surveys, we find that the fuel subsidy removal 
also affected many employees adversely; clearly there is a strong correlation between energy 
cost and the broader issue of workers’ mobility as we see with transportation. 
 
Figure 6.2 below shows the effect of the subsidy on employees, while Figure 6.3 shows the 
effect on management and CEOs, and their businesses. For both employees and management, at 
least 50% were affected “very much” or a lot by the removal of the subsidy. 46.6% reported the 
impact to be “very much” or a lot on their business, while it somewhat affected about 30.7% of 
businesses. What this demonstrates is the precarious situation of urban workers who often easily 
slip from “comfortable” when social protection is absent and an aspect of policy is changed 
abruptly. From our survey, 24% of respondents use their own vehicle to get to work, 55% utilize 
public transport while 15% walk, not for leisure but purely because of lack of access to other 
modes of transportation.  
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Figure 6.2: Adverse effect of fuel subsidy removal and okada banning on employees 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
Figure 6.3: Adverse effect of okada banning on CEO/Management and their businesses 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
The rate of motor vehicle ownership in developing countries remains significantly lower than in 
developed countries. The rapid and often unmanageable growth in the number of two- and three-
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growth and operation in Lagos as was done earlier in some Asian cities. An example of this, 
which also helps to understand the institutional posture of the state to the conditions of the poor 
is the case of the new traffic law initiated by the state government. The law, which became 
operational in August 2012, banned okadas (two wheel motorcycles) from certain routes in 
Lagos, and was set up to regulate the movement of traffic within certain urban corridors. It was 
however received with mixed reactions. On the one hand, the benefits of the law are recognized 
in light of the “madness” associated with driving on Lagos streets, and as well avoidable deaths 
caused by reckless driving. On the other hand, one point of view from a senior lecturer at the 
University of Lagos’ Faculty of Law, sees it as not being in line with the public interest and an 
over-reaction by the government, saying the law “does not seem equitable, generally accepted or 
in accordance with the rights of Lagosians ... The penal sanctions, heavy fines (up to N50,000) 
and outright forfeiture of vehicles seem unnecessarily draconian and out of step with democratic 
norms” (Okojie, 2012, para. 15 from end).  
 
The law indeed reveals the tension between government’s responsibilities and how in the face of 
underinvestment in social services this might conflict with the common interest of the people. 
Lagos is an important state in Nigeria and as well for investors, however it is also a state 
characterized with income extremities and inequalities; an exemplar of a country with high levels 
of poverty, unemployment, and inequality co-existing with astonishing personal affluence. The 
banning of the commercial motorcycles (who are often notoriously reckless in driving) from 
some of the major roads and corridors, leads to a closing off of another avenue of livelihood, a 
low barrier entry source of employment for citizens, and youth, without much provision for a 
substitute. Furthermore, many road users had used the okadas as an alternative source of 
 232 
transportation to get to reduce time spent in traffic and waiting for public buses and to reach 
remote areas. With the banning of the okadas, waiting times have lengthened for public transport 
users while traffic has been diverted to other places.  
 
Within the cluster, about half (51.8%) of the employees were affected a lot or very much by the 
banning of the okadas (Figure 6.2). On the other hand, for CEOs or managers, only 32.2% of 
them were affected in this same measure (Figure 6.3). The employees are more likely to use 
public transport than the CEOs/management. Significantly, from the survey, 57% of employees 
use public transportation in commuting from home to work while 16.1% use their own vehicles, 
as opposed to 36.4% of CEO/management who use public transport, and 45.5% their own 
vehicles. A similar percentage of employees (11.4%) and CEO/management (10.2%) however 
commute to work with company transportation. Additionally, while 86.2% of CEO/management 
that responded have cars, only 37.1% of employees actually own their own vehicles.  
 
Institutional environment. The institutional environment in the Computer Village is 
largely informal, with the firms being described as “self-starting” and “self-sustaining” 
(Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & Adebowale, 2007, p. 53). Informal rules and constraints have 
arisen to guide learning, training, rent, and lending; while private solutions have arisen to 
infrastructural problems. Firms collaborate with different actors mostly to tap into the flow of 
information and engage in knowledge exchange. There are several patterns of this cooperation. 
First, enterprises with small internal assets engage in collaborations that leverage inter-firm 
flows of knowledge, sometimes to take advantage of complementary skills. Another may involve 




relations. Other modes of interaction relate to how state support institutions assist enterprises to 
gain access to hard to come by and expensive information about processes, products and 
competitors. These are services which firms would traditionally access as ‘public goods,’ just as 
they would different types of publically provided infrastructure such as “power supply, water and 
telecommunication, but which are often completely absent or poorly provided” (Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka, 2006b, p. 67).  
 
Again firms could cooperate with other firms that are outside of the country or within a wider 
array of relationships within the domestic economy. Developing countries like Nigeria, and 
given the advanced nature of the goods at Otigba, tend to depend largely on foreign linkages for 
the supply of technology and in some respects technical skills. Scholarly studies on domestic 
network formation within the Computer Village have been carried over the last ten years and this 
study builds on it albeit asking a different set of questions of the enterprises under study. As 
previously mentioned, firms within clusters are all in some dynamic form engaged in promoting 
collaboration as a result of geographic proximity although critically are more related by cultural, 
ethnic, and economic affinities that help them to reduce transactional costs. 
 
Collaboration to mitigate lack of social protection. What comes out clearly in this 
study is that both external pressures and internal domestic shortages arising from the 
macroeconomic environments and failed institutions (deficit infrastructure, harassment from 
state agents and non-inclusive decisions that affect individuals and firms in profound ways), 
induce enterprises to seek collaboration with other economic actors. However, socio-cultural 
contexts (belonging to different ethnic groups for example) may undermine network formation 
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and growth, due to the trust factor, although linkages facilitated by close geographical proximity, 
which promote transactions help to build trust in the long term.  
 
In this next section, the primary objective is to understand the nature of collaboration among 
Otigba firms within an institutional framework and more critically how the established 
relationships help to mitigate state failure in social protection and if in any substantial ways, such 
relationships influence or determine the performance of firms producing within this informal 
network of enterprises and other social and economic actors. Firms were asked to rate the 
significance of the identified parameter on a Likert scale (1=not significant; 5=very significant 
etc). Cooperation, a perceptive response, was rated on a Likert scale (1= weak, 5= strong 
increase) and includes interactions along different domains including information exchange, 
interaction to improve product quality, joint skills training, and joint marketing (such as trade 
fairs commonly organized by professional associations).  
 
Evidently firms in the cluster actively cooperate, that is act jointly both between firms and as a 
group participating in an association. For the latter, this takes place through participation in 
CAPDAN. According to Uphoff (1992), such local associations are good for sustainable 
development as they can encourage people to take a long-term perspective and cooperate look 
beyond their individual needs.  
 
The Computer Village being an open market has traders who engage in both legal and not so 
legal businesses. Although the cluster attracted the reputation of being the place to go for ICT 




Furthermore, much to the chagrin of such companies as Microsoft, many dealers in the cluster 
trade in pirated software. With the threat of it being shut down, actors in the cluster came 
together to form CAPDAN. Aptly put by Bamiro (2004, p. 18-19): 
The rapid growth of the cluster ushered in problems of security and unwholesome 
practices that gave the cluster a bad image. A number of potential clients stayed away out 
of fear while those who patronised the cluster were usually safety conscious. According 
to Victor, of Rofem Cybernetics “we realised that things were getting out of hands and 
already hurting business. This led to the formation of CAPDAN to sanitise the system 
and clean up the bad image of the cluster as a haven for hoodlums.” The initial one or 
two associations formed in the cluster attracted only a few members and were rather 
ineffective until problems threatening the existence of the entire cluster surfaced.  
 
The businesses in the cluster register with CAPDAN, and the association has helped to tackle 
problems related to infrastructure, security, street trading and software piracy that the cluster is 
confronted with. Recognized by the government, it also stands as an intermediary between the 
government and the cluster (Bamiro, 2004).  
 
Similarly, survey results show that there is a high level of horizontal cooperation between firms 
as well as vertical cooperation with their suppliers, sub-contractors, domestic and foreign buyers. 
For example, 71.1% of the firms report a strong increase in the exchange of information and 
experiences, while over 50% of firms strongly increased, their cooperation with other firms in 
order to ensure quality improvement. Table 6.2 below shows how the horizontal linkages in the 
firms have changed over the past 5 years.  
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Table 6.2: Change in cooperation in Computer Village over the past 5 years61 
 Strong increase Increase Remain the same 
Change in cooperation with firms over past 5 years  65.3 30.7 2.7 
Change in subcontracting over past 5 years  23.0 27.9 37.7 
Change in use of industry association over past 5 years  35.6 18.6 27.1 
Area of cooperation with other firms    
Exchange of information and experiences 71.1 18.1 6.0 
Quality improvement 50.6 34.2 8.9 
Joint labor training 26.0 26.0 30.1 
Joint marketing 29.5 21.8 30.8 
Backward cooperation with suppliers    
Exchange of information and experiences 76.7 16.3 5.8 
Quality improvement 60.0 26.2 11.2 
Speeding up delivery 49.4 22.8 16.5 
Joint labor training 21.0 35.8 22.2 
Joint marketing 27.5 32.5 21.2 
Cooperation with sub-contractors    
Exchange of information and experiences 59.0 30.1 3.6 
Technological upgrading 46.8 35.4 7.6 
Quality improvement 29.3 41.5 17.1 
Labor training 16.0 46.7 16.0 
Change in forward cooperation with buyers    
Exchange of information and experiences 72.6 14.3 7.1 
Quality improvement 34.6 50.6 13.6 
Setting of product specification 53.7 20.7 17.1 
Organization of products  26.6 41.8 17.7 
Change in forward cooperation with foreign buyers    
Exchange of information and experiences 56.4 29.5 2.6 
Quality improvement 51.3 28.2 9.0 
Setting of product specification 28.4 44.6 16.2 
Organization of products  25.0 32.9 27.6 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
In the cluster, employees as well engage in informal social arrangements, evidenced in different 
forms of joint action. As previously described, joint action is the deliberate effort of firms to 
cooperate in a local district. Table 6.3 below shows different ways in which workers collaborate 
in Computer Village. These include sharing knowledge that is useful for their work, sharing 
information about monetary and non-monetary benefits, organizing with workers to negotiate 
better working conditions because of the asymmetric power relations between workers and 
                                                        
61 In all categories, less than 10% record a decrease, or strong decrease in the various activities. With the exception 
of 13.3% and 10.5% who had never engaged in labor training and joint marketing with sub-contractors as well, 





owners; and as well cooperating to reduce their cost of living. A significant percentage of the 
employees (74.4%) engage in knowledge dissemination, while 44.9% of respondents organize 
with other workers to negotiate better working conditions, and to try to reduce cost of living for 
example by sharing transportation, helping with child care and so on.  
 








Do you collaborate with other workers in sharing knowledge 
that would be useful to improve your work? 
116/148 78.4 
Do you share information with other workers about the 
monetary benefits like income, you receive? 
79/150 52.7 
Do you share information with other workers about the non-
monetary benefits you receive? 
76/149 51.0 
Do you organize with other workers to negotiate better working 
conditions? 
70/147 47.6 
Do you cooperate with other workers to try to reduce cost of 
living for example by sharing transportation, helping with child 
care and so on? 
70/145 48.3 
  Source: Author’s field survey (2013). 
 
Unlike many clusters in Africa, Otigba is highly knowledge intensive given it is within the 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry. Different types of skills are 
needed for the different aspects of the industry including information on what and when to buy 
and sell what type of goods, as well as exchange rate information for those who are engaged in 
trading; computer hardware assemblers, hardware servicers, and hardware repairers need to 
posses the technical know-how to do this, as well as how to use the various equipments for 
carrying out the job; and while software installers usually follow manuals, capability for software 
development in the cluster is critically absent (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). As Bamiro (2004, p. 
14) noted, “[e]very aspect of computer business – trading or production – requires, in varying 
degree, technical knowledge of computer hardware and software. This point was buttressed by 
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one of the respondents who noted that ‘many businesses owned by computer illiterate managers 
have since gone under due to their inability to meet up with the constant demanding and dynamic 
trends in the global computer industry’” (Bamiro, 2004, p. 14).   
 
One local knowledge institution that fosters and encourages the dissemination of knowledge, and 
the skills formation within the cluster, is that of apprenticeship (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & 
Abiola, 2007, p. 48).62 Here, a firm takes in someone who can learn, and gain experience and 
skills from more experienced people. He or she might be paid some money during the period of 
apprenticeship. 
 
Informal credit and financial institutions. Formal sources of finance are also a 
constraint within the cluster. Out of 60 respondents, 36.7% viewed it as a severe problem, 18.3% 
saw it as a serious problem, while 20% considered it to be a problem. As with any business, 
money is needed for various things – as capital to start the business, for furniture and equipment, 
for the daily running of the business, buying goods to trade, paying of salaries, maintenance of 
equipment, rent, for electric generators, bore-holes and so on. Interests on loans from 
commercial banks are quite high and might not be available to all. In an interview with a bank, I 
was told that they gave loans, albeit to established businesses, i.e. those having shops, and their 
interest rates were between 27% to 30% depending on the plan. With soaring rent prices for 
stores, for as high as N350,000 or N500,000 per annum, a certain category of people are 
immediately barred from entering the cluster at a certain level. Some people therefore start off as 
hawkers and hustlers on the street before they become more established within the cluster; see 
chapter three for a full elaboration.  
                                                        





Despite high interest rates, entrepreneurs still find ways to run their businesses, through 
borrowing, or depending on self, friends, family or other sources. Over the past five years for 
example, about 50% of respondents received credit from private banks, 37.6% from development 
banks, and 28.7% from special government credit. However, one finds a huge dependence on 
own finances whereby 51.5% of respondents used their own money for financial credit. There is 
also an inclination to rely on family and friends, and 38.6% received loans from these sources 
(Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4: Sources of financial credit in the past 5 years 
 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013) 
 
Firms have also built a considerable level of trust within the cluster, as evidenced by the inter-
firm credit facilities that also exist within the cluster. For example, a firm might require 

























from another firm on credit (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Adelaja & Abiola (2007). Furthermore, some 
of the street traders can collect products to sell from storeowners on credit and remit the cost 
price, as well as unsold products to them.  
 
Employees and apprentices within the cluster quite often depend on family and friends for 
accommodation, and job referrals; some working within the firms owned by people they know 
and due to kinship relationships. Dependence on family, friends and relatives can be found in 
many developing countries, where poverty and inequality abound, or among those less well-off, 
and where formal institutions for welfare are lacking. Thus whereas only 3.5% of CEO and 
managerial staff stayed with relatives or friends, 19.1% of employees stayed with relatives or 
friends. 40.4% of the employees came to work in their firms because of a friend (18.4%), family 
member (9.6%) or kinsman (12.5%) while 28.7% and 22.8% came because of their employer and 
their own initiative respectively. Moreover more than half (57.9%) of employees worked in firms 
that were owned by a friend (21.8%), family member (15%) or kinsman (21.1%). 
 
One socially embedded institution that might be at play in the cluster and explain the high 
dependence on family and kinship is the onye aghala nwanne ya which means “never abandon a 
brother or sister” value, or literally “be your brother’s keeper” among the Igbo.63 The Igbo are 
one of the three largest tribes in Nigeria, and hail predominantly from the southeastern states of 
Nigeria.  To the Igbo, “nwanne (my mother’s child) or nwanna (my father’s child)” which is my 
sister or brother is more widely encompassing than the western notion of the nuclear family 
where brother or sister symbolizes having the same father and mother. Here, nwanne “include 
distant relations, real or imaginary. The real or imaginary mean that the chain of relationship 
                                                        




could be traced back to many generations as far as a common ancestral origin could be proved or 
assumed” (Ikpenwa, 2009, p. 316-317).  The Igbo thus have the embedded rule of:  
“helping one’s brother or sister to get up.” In other words, the more successful people are, 
the more they are expected to play the role of their brothers’ or sisters’ keepers … The 
Igbo social structure is one that seeks to promote the general welfare for all…. 
Individuals may become very successful or distinguished in their activities or 
occupations, but their success is measured by how much others benefit from it. (Ogbaa, 
1995, p. 26) 
The Igbo therefore have a strong sense of communal ownership (Ikpenwa, 2009). In the business 
environment, a successful business owner can bring his brother from the village and help him 
start a business, providing him with adequate training, credit, and even provide accommodation 
for him before he is established. Statistical analysis also show a significant and clear relationship 
between increase in the standard of living of employees and their social networks, specifically 
family members and kinsmen. In Table 6.4 below, 70.37% and 60% of employees whose 
companies were owned by kinsmen and family members respectively, show an increase in their 
standard of living.  
 
Table 6.4: Association between income benefit and joint action 
Is the firm you are 
working for owned 
by? 
Income benefit: Has your working in this 




 No. % No. % 
A friend 13 48.15 14 51.85 27 
A family member 12 60.00 8 40.00 20 
A kinsman 19 70.37 8 29.63 27 
None 43 89.58 5 10.42 48 
Total 87 71.31 35 28.69 122 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Figures in parentheses are row percentage; Chi-
square = 16.177; Sig. = 0.001 
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Awon omo onile, the Area Boys phenomenon, on the other hand, groups who are looking to fend 
for themselves by exploiting others in the process, stand in contrast to this institution. Aptly put 
by Uphoff (1992, p. 2): 
To the extent institutions are regarded as legitimate, people comply without (or with 
fewer) inducements and sanctions. However, it must be recognized that local institutions 
can produce practices that do not favour sustainability. If factionalism prevails, some 
groups may use them to exploit local resources to their short-run advantage and others’ 
loss.   
 
6.4. Summing Up 
This chapter systematically examined the nature, and behavior of the diverse formal and informal 
institutions shaping the evolution of the Otigba Computer Village. Clearly the emerging 
dynamics of the Village has much to do with the three prominent institutions identified in our 
review. First, positive political institutions have for the most part been conspicuous by their 
absence; when they manifest, their impact on the vulnerable have been seen to be negative. The 
case of the fuel subsidy removal to the average worker demonstrated the insensitivity of 
Nigeria’s political elites who control but refuse or are unwilling to utilize government resources 
for socially beneficial ends. Positive political and legal institutions will structure elite and 
government actions to put in place mechanisms of social protection; for now they are absent. For 
instance, formal legal institutions that foster private contracts and facilitate reduction of 





Lack of investment in knowledge and physical infrastructure has created a hostile economic and 
production environment that forces enterprises to expend significant proportions of capital and 
operating expenses on alternative facilities such as generators and water boreholes. Worse is the 
lack of formal credit sources that necessitates the emergence of credit institutions based on 
kinship and ethnic affiliations.  Against this socio-economic and political backdrop, actors in the 
cluster have established mechanisms for a high level of cooperation between firms and among 
employees. This has enabled knowledge diffusion and collaboration in the improvement of the 
quality of goods. On the other hand, institutions such as the onye aghala nwanne ya among the 
Igbos have been critical substitutes for the largely absent industrial and social policies and has 
enabled better standards of living for employees. Still, in the absence of formal institutions, rent-
seeking from the awon omo onile have arisen in the cluster, constituting a negative institution 
both in reality and in the minds of the public.  
 
Second, failed political institutions have spawned diverse governing social institutions and 
networks that organize human relationships along ethnic and professional lines in order to assist 
firms and workers to attain benefits related to social security, health, and education, ordinarily 
available through formal social protection. For example social institutions in mature economies 
foster a legal regime that gives some level of security to firms and their workers in the labor 
market – for example protect firms from illegal taxation and utilize tax for social services such as 
regular power supply – in addition they provide access to basic health and transport systems.  
 
Third, this thesis reveals clearly the pervasiveness of informal institutions that emerged to fill the 
vacuum left by weak, absent or unenforced formal institutions (embodied by state agencies and 
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enforcement rules). The prominence of informal institutions – usually found in the domain of the 
civic, religious, and other non-state bodies and rules – equally reveal the weakness or absence of 
governmental policy and actions. In this cluster, for instance informal kinship-based credit 
system institutions rely on self-reinforcing ethnic networks where the state that should ordinarily 
act as a third party in transactions is completely absent. While these informal institutions are 
currently playing a useful role, they rely on non-systematic socially shared rules, oral and usually 
unwritten, that may be impossible to replicate and enforce outside of the narrow network in 
which they are operating. In other words, it is doubtful if this system is sustainable in the long 
run especially as industrialization becomes more dynamic. This does not imply that informal 
institutions are weak or ineffective, but there is a need to interrogate their performance compared 
to formal rules that have been systematically codified over time.  
 
Finally, this chapter addressed the role of the government in creating a conducive environment 
for firms and workers in clusters through the provision of adequate infrastructure and 
institutions. Evidently, in Nigeria, the government has been ineffective in fulfilling this role 
adequately and due to this historical failure other non-formal actors have arisen to fulfill these 
public functions. At times, as evidenced by the case of the removal of the fuel subsidy and the 
banning of the okadas, the state is sometimes viewed as not concerned about the welfare of the 
public. 
 
The question for the future is, can the self-sustaining and non-state institutions drive the cluster 
to improve to continue to achieve dynamic economic growth, be innovative, compete in 





Industrial Clusters and Poverty  
7.1. Introduction 
Industrialization has been viewed as a pathway to development since the British industrial 
revolution. Over time, several countries have structurally transformed their economies from 
agriculture to manufacturing by adopting various industrial means. Industrial clustering, being a 
unique form of industrial organization has been found to have the capacity to promote firm 
productivity and economic growth through benefits that accrue from agglomeration, and as well 
active cooperation, or joint action by individuals and firms in the cluster. However, recent focus 
on widening inequality, widespread poverty and different forms of unemployment calls for a re-
examination of extant modes of economic growth. The sustainable development debate 
challenges the academic, planning and policy communities to necessitate growth pathways that 
place human development at the centre. This dissertation analyzed cluster pathways to 
industrialization with a focus on key living standard indicators.  
 
While several studies on industrial clusters in different geographical regions exist, there are 
hardly any that have systematically studied the relationship between industrial clusters and the 
multidimensional aspects of poverty. This study thus sought to contribute theoretically and 
methodologically to understanding the link between industrial dynamism using industrial clusters 
as a pathway, and the development literature which lays emphasis on issues of employment, 
poverty and inequality in a multidimensional framework; and how at the policy level, industrial 
clusters could help to advance not only economic growth, but more importantly promote human 
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development by generating wealth, reducing unemployment, poverty, inequality, and raising 
living standards.   
 
The dissertation used the firm within the industrial cluster as the unit of analysis, and 
interrogated the conditions under which firms in clusters passed on benefits to workers in ways 
that impacted poverty as evidenced by living standards. Three main hypotheses were put forward 
with regards to the question. Firstly, firms in clusters influence the living standards of workers 
by passing on work-place benefits such as their overall capability (proxied by the types of 
internal technological knowledge and skills they possess), which they build upon and impart to 
workers because it is in their interest to raise the productivity of these workers. Secondly, firms 
in clusters might choose not to provide other work-based and place-based benefits like health, 
transportation, or housing in the work place though it would impact the living standards of the 
workers because social policies do not compel them to do so, and they do not see the direct 
benefit to the firm of doing so. Thirdly, firms in clusters might pass on one or more of these 
work-based and place-based benefits to workers because it is at a low cost to the firm, and/or 
they seek to gain and/or deepen the loyalty of the workers to the firm.    
 
Several methodological approaches including the use of surveys, formal and informal interviews, 
and archival research were adopted to answer the research question, with the case study of the 
the Otigba Information, Communications and Technology cluster in Lagos, Nigeria at the heart 
of it. This productive cluster was a good fit as it was set against the backdrop of an economy that 
had experienced good economic growth in the past decade, and yet had poor human development 





In this concluding chapter, I highlight the main findings and themes that have emerged from this 
dissertation, some of which corroborate the hypotheses. I also discuss the implications for policy 
and provide recommendations for future research.  
 
7.2. Themes 
The study concerned itself with the impact of clusters on poverty, with poverty measured within 
a multidimensional framework. In particular, it sought to understand the extent to which a 
productive industrial cluster could impact the living standards of the workers within them. The 
findings of the study based on quantitative and qualitative data from the Otigba cluster showed 
that the cluster did improve the living standards of a majority of both firm owners and workers 
employed within it. 75% of owners and managerial staff and 70% of employees specifically 
agreed that owning a firm or working in a firm respectively had improved their living standards. 
Field research at Otigba showed that the cluster impacts on poverty by providing direct and 
indirect employment. Many including unskilled and skilled workers, individuals with varying 
levels of education including university graduates have been able to make an income from direct 
employment and trading with firms within the cluster. Through the multiplier effect, the cluster 
has also attracted a host of support services such as banking, insurance, postage and shipping 
services; and as well trade in drink, food, and other necessities that have sprung up within the 
cluster. Workers in these services benefit from having some form of gainful employment.  
 
Similarly, and in support of the first hypothesis, findings show that workers within the cluster 
enjoy work-place benefits such as skills and technological knowledge that increase the 
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productivity of the workers. This of course is advantageous to the firms since employees largely 
acquire these skills on-the-job, thus improving their productivity. Many in the cluster have the 
ability to clone computers, and I received a verbal demonstration of how it is done in the course 
of the fieldwork.  
 
One way in which firms in the cluster use knowledge and skill acquisition to help improve the 
living standards of workers is through apprenticeships – whether formal for example industrial 
training or less formal. People who were not trained in ICT or are in need of practical training in 
ICT become apprentices in firms within the cluster where they gain these skills and technical 
know-how. After their training period, the apprentices might continue to work within the firm, 
find employment elsewhere, or start their own business within or outside the cluster. Given the 
apprentices now have their own business or become employed because of their newly acquired 
skills, their living standards are increased from what it was before. 
 
The cluster also implicitly and explicitly encourages specialization and as well, the generation 
and transfer of knowledge. One reason being that the cluster has gained a reputation as “the place 
to go” to solve ICT related issues, there are always one or more individuals within the cluster 
who have the knowledge of how a particular problem can be solved. Workers might refer 
problems that they cannot solve to colleagues in other firms and enthused workers might be 
motivated to learn how to solve even novel problems.  
 
Another finding which follows from the second and third hypothesis is that firms in the Otigba 




feeding allowance, company products, health insurance, housing, and cars to their workers even 
when they are not required by law to do so. In Nigeria in particular, no explicit strategy or policy 
for social protection exists at the federal level, and formal pension schemes that apply to civil 
servants and large private sector organizations are not enforced in most firms in Otigba. In the 
absence of binding legal instruments, firms still pass on benefits to their workers. Using 
discriminant analysis, the age of the employee, the size of the firm as measured by the number of 
employees, the length of service of the employee in the firm, and location of firm, were found to 
be significant at a 5% level, and characterized employees that received benefits from firms. That 
is, older employees and employees who had spent a longer time in the firm were more likely to 
receive non-income benefits from their firms. In addition, larger sized firms and firms located 
within the Computer Village tended to give more non-income benefits to their workers. These 
factors might be equally relevant in explaining firm behavior beyond the Otigba cluster. Figure 
7.1 depicts the channels through which firms improve living standards within the cluster.  
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Figure 7.1: Channels by which firms pass on benefits 
 
Source: Author, 2013 
 
However, more specific to explaining social protection within the Otigba cluster was the 
significant presence of social, family and kinsmen ties. 57.9% of employees worked in firms that 
were owned by a friend (21.8%), family member (15%) or kinsman (21.1%). An underlying 
institution that was therefore at play in the cluster which explained the high dependence on 
family and kinship is the onye aghala nwanne ya which means “never abandon a brother or 
sister”, or literally “be your brother’s keeper” among the Igbo. This social institution thus helps 
to understand why an employee might receive such benefits as housing, transport allowance, and 
feeding allowance from their firms; not surprising also because of the predominance of small 
family-owned enterprises. Table 7.1 below highlights the three hypothesis and how they have 





Table 7.1: Summary of hypothesis addressed 
Hypothesis Result Chapter that 
analyzes it 
1a. Firms in clusters influence the living standards of workers; 1b. 
by passing on work-place benefits such as their overall capability 
(proxied by the types of internal technological knowledge and 
skills they possess), which they build upon and impart to workers 
because it is in their interest to raise the productivity of these 
workers.   
1a. Proven – firms in the 
clusters do influence the 
living standards  
1b. Not proven. There might 
be other causative factors 





Chapter 4 and 5 
2. Firms in clusters might choose not to provide other work-based 
and place-based benefits like health, transportation, or housing, in 
the work place though it would impact the living standards of the 
workers because social policies do not compel them to do so, and 
they do not see the direct benefit to the firm of doing so.  
2. Proven. Though not 
required by social policy, 
some firms opted to pass on 
benefits to their workers, 
but other firms did not.  
Chapter 5 
3a. Firms in clusters might pass on one or more work-based and 
place-based benefits to workers; 3b. because it is at a low cost to 
the firm, and/or they seek to gain and/or deepen the loyalty of the 
workers to the firm.    
3a. Proven 
3b. Not proven 
Chapter 5 
 
Methodologically, the subjective and objective means of analysis corroborated one another. That 
is, the perceptions of employees of their standard of living compared to that of their peers, 
corroborated with objective indicators of multidimensional poverty. Using the compressed self-
reported categories of “poor”, “comfortable” and “rich” and considering the living standards of 
the employees within a multidimensional frame which analyzed such indicators as access to 
effective water and sanitation, source of lighting and cooking fuel, electricity, results show that 
the poor tended to be less well-off than the rich on most indicators. However, the poor and the 
rich tended to have similar benefits in terms of living arrangements, and type of housing material 
used. This could be because the poor benefited from accommodation provided by the workplace 
that might be owned by a relative or kinsman. Those who were comfortable also had some 
overlay with the poor with regards to the choice of lighting, source of drinking water, and access 
to toilet facilities, and with the rich with cooking fuel used. However, the rich were better able to 
make more ‘luxurious’ choices in terms of type of cooking facilities, lighting, and mode of 
transportation to work.  
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Based on this categorization therefore of poor, comfortable, and rich, I find that the cluster 
impacts the living standards of workers differently. In addition, actors within the cluster can be 
differentiated based on the type of business they do and the location of their business. It was 
found that actors do not experience the same type and intensity of vulnerabilities which include 
vulnerabilities to the weather, government regulations, exploitative actors e.g. awon omo onile,64 
and work-related vulnerabilities such as demand for their goods, and access to financial capital. 
For example shop owners and employees working within the shops are less affected by these 
afore-mentioned vulnerabilities than the street vendors within the cluster (please see chapter 3 
for more information on the various actors in Otigba). 
 
Finally, all firms are situated within a business environment whereby formal institutions of state 
that should provide adequate physical infrastructure while promoting investment in knowledge 
and governing business transactions, are weak and in some cases absent. On the one hand, firms 
are penalized for this by having to expend business funds that would otherwise be invested in 
more profitable ventures to provide for substitutes to weak or absent infrastructure. On the other 
hand, it has led to a high level of horizontal and joint cooperation exemplified by the emergence 
of the umbrella association – CAPDAN; and also the prominence of alternative non-state 
institutions based on family and kinship i.e. the onye aghala nwanne ya and the more 
manipulative functioning of the awon omo onile in the cluster. While the professional and 
kinship networks have played a somewhat positive role within the cluster, CAPDAN is limited in 
its ability to introduce, and enforce such changes as would make the cluster as dynamic as it can 
be. The kinship based networks as well which have helped to raise living standards do not cover 
                                                        




all actors within the cluster. Furthermore, the awon omo onile phenomenon is exploitative and 
adds to the frustrations that some actors in the cluster face. While the informal institutions have 
thus far been useful, they cannot totally substitute for the roles that formal institutions can play in 
providing an enabling environment for firms to thrive, for trade to be carried out, and a 
workforce which is well-protected.  
 
7.3. Contributions and Policy Implications  
This research has brought to light certain themes that pertain to citizens, workers and their 
standard of living that are relevant for planners and policy makers not only in Lagos, but in other 
localities and countries. However, given the historical nature of institutions, a caveat is in order: 
while this thesis centered on a specific Nigerian cluster and may well have implications for other 
agglomerative arrangements, I reiterate the fact that no two clusters are the same. They are 
economically, geographically, historically, politically, and socially distinct from other clusters, 
and the institutions that are at play within them also differ. Nevertheless this dissertation has 
taken a useful step towards providing a framework through which other clusters might be 
analyzed in finding out the mechanisms, if any, through which firms are passing on benefits to 
their workers in ways in which they improve their living standards. The entry point followed 
from Nadvi and Barrientos (2004) who proposed looking at the clusters’ features (cluster’s 
location, the type of firms within it, and type of employment generated), processes 
(agglomeration gains, joint action, cluster institutions and social capital) and dynamics (cluster 
growth, upgrading, and differentiation). Other studies have mapped clusters in this way but 
mostly focused on learning and innovation, joint action and collaboration without the key 
elements of this thesis, namely the nexus of productive clusters and living standards.  
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A second step would then consider the linkages between these categories and poverty analyzed 
within a multidimensional framework, as was done in this study. That is subjective questions on 
living standards might be asked of workers and managerial staff, and as well objective measures 
of basic services and infrastructure such as housing conditions, water, sanitation, cooking 
facilities, energy and transportation can be retrieved. In this study, living standard indicators of 
the MPI and UN-Habitat’s slum household indicators were used as objective measurements of 
living standards. Such an analysis would give policy makers a good overview of the impact that 
the cluster is making on the living standards of their workers, and provide insight into areas in 
which interventions can be made.  
 
Secondly, this study has also shown the resilience and depth of entrepreneurship that is possible 
within an economy rife with unemployment, poverty and inequality. It shows that there is a 
considerable level of on-going industrial activity among SMEs. A message this sends to policy 
makers is the possibilities to support existing businesses to evolve into dynamic enterprises. 
Secondary research shows that governments have proposed new initiatives and projects to 
mitigate the challenges faced by firms. In my interviews for example, I found that there are on-
going plans for enterprise zones to be established in about three locations in Lagos. These 
industrial policies tend to follow the standard prescriptions but are not directed towards 
providing assistance to already existing clusters such as Otigba; neither is the efficacy of the 
policies in mitigating poverty clear. At the moment, while enormous benefits from the Computer 
Village are being derived, the general perception in the cluster is that of government neglect and 





At this juncture, one might seek to address a pertinent issue in industrial policy as to which form 
of industrial agglomeration is better and should be encouraged by the government; that is, 
spontaneous clusters like Otigba or those that are enacted by policy like the industrial parks, 
SEZs and EPZs. Fowler and Kleit (2013) who found that the presence of economic clusters in 
the United States tended to reduce poverty rates did not distinguish between the spontaneous and 
policy-induced clusters, and acknowledged that it might be an area for further research, 
particularly with regards to poverty connections. I would agree with these authors. Indeed it 
would be good to pursue which of these two models leads to what type of outcomes, particularly 
viewing them not only within an economically beneficial lens, but also within a 
multidimensional poverty frame.  
 
That said, policy makers can use spontaneous clusters as a signal as to what kind and type of 
other industries they can encourage. Fowler and Kleit (2013, p. 129) noted that “regions with a 
higher share of employment in clusters, and with that employment dispersed across many 
industries within the same cluster, fare even better than those where employment is concentrated 
in a single industry”. From this, in addition to creating an enabling environment for an existing 
cluster, industrial policy can also be used to advance other industries that might already have 
been budding as they support the present one. 
 
Following from the above, the case study also shows the need for effective communication 
between the government, and private actors. One of such channels of communication and 
understanding might be through representative associations such as CAPDAN in this cluster. 
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State-private dialogue becomes critical to resolve the evolving conflicts of objectives. For 
example, the Lagos state urban renewal plans involve new urban designs and the beautification 
of the city. This sometimes compels the state government to sanitize the cluster, clearing it of 
street hawkers and movable shops, which line the streets of the cluster, and give an impression of 
a chaotic mess of human and vehicle traffic. From the point of view of the workers, this action 
destroys the livelihoods of traders who cannot afford to pay for a shop because rents are high, 
and shops are scarce. For workers who survive on small margins to eat and make a living, which 
the cluster enables them to do, the only recourse might be illicit activities that conflict with state 
welfare goals. Communication thus needs to be effectively managed between the local, state, and 
federal governments and their agencies, and the workers in the clusters in order to reach a 
collective goal beneficial to most, if not all parties involved.  
 
Additionally, it is crucial for planners and policy makers to be aware that there are various 
categories of workers and vulnerabilities within each cluster. For the Otigba cluster for example, 
conventional wisdom that circulates among the populace is the illusion that there is a lot of 
money being generated within the cluster. This might well be true if not for the skewed nature of 
wealth generation within all categories of actors. The fact is that there are poor people and 
entrepreneurs who are exposed to various kinds of vulnerabilities. Planners and policy makers 
are thus advised to carry out a mapping of clusters and ask questions which help to distinguish 
between actors and the types of protection that are necessary to be given to them. Drawing from 
Lund and Srinivas (2000, p. 13), this line of questioning enables us to analyze the following:  
how far down each sectoral strand or chain we can extend existing measures of 




mechanisms be made to penetrate towards the less formal and less protected end… At 
what point down the chain should the State be active? Or employers? Or the private 
insurance industry.... At what point down the chain do workers have to be unionized or 
organized in some other way in order to get access to protection measures?  
 
Within the Otigba cluster for example, differentiating between ICT hardware entrepreneurs, 
software entrepreneurs, wholesalers, retailers, non-ICT businesses, street hawkers, recent 
graduates, male and female workers, enables planners to know how their needs differ, how best 
they can be supported, and which is the best institution to provide this support.  
 
In the same vein, this dissertation further makes the point that there is a role for the state to work 
with extant actors to strengthen existing institutions that are helping to reduce vulnerabilities or 
fill in the gap where these are absent. For example, while this study has highlighted the role that 
social networks are playing in helping to provide work-place, work-, and place-based benefits to 
workers, even when social policies that require them to do so are lacking or not enforced, a state 
that is concerned about the welfare of its people can probe deeper to see how to strengthen these 
benefits for workers. Furthermore, because some of these networks are based on personal, 
kinship and familial ties, they exclude some actors from these benefits. In this case, perhaps 
professional networks like CAPDAN can be strengthened to identify the needs of these excluded 
actors.  
 
Additionally, other cluster benefits like access to bank loans and health insurance are limited to 
certain actors within the cluster. The latter for example pertain to those who own, work with or 
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are affiliated with established ICT firms in the cluster. This categorization exempts street traders, 
hawkers and those who do not fall under the categorization. How might these be best helped; for 
one benefit of clusters which can be leveraged by social policy is that actors are already 
geographically located within a particular space and thus place-based solutions like a health 
insurance scheme can be easier to pursue in this sphere. 
 
Again, clusters like Otigba can become even more dynamic if they are given an ‘enabling 
environment’. This dissertation has highlighted the importance of institutions and infrastructure 
for firms, and how their absence can act as an obstacle for firms in Nigeria. Presently, more than 
half of the firms in the cluster view public provision of security of security, electricity and 
transport as not good or fair. Lack of investment in knowledge and physical infrastructure are 
causing firms to allocate significant proportions of their capital and operational expenses to 
alternative facilities such as generators and water boreholes. Public provision of such 
infrastructure could enable firms to allocate these funds to growing their businesses. Public 
provision could also prove cheaper in the long run as there would be economies of scale that 
would be attained through mass provision. Additionally, it could help to reduce the noise and air 
pollution that has ensued within the cluster with private generators.  
 
There are other support systems that the government can also help to enhance cluster 
productivity, and in some cases concurrently generate employment for other sectors and 
industries. These include the provision and development of good transportation facilities for 






Finally, an area that can be explored further is strengthening institutions that can foster increased 
productivity and welfare for clusters. These could involve existing clusters within the cluster like 
CAPDAN, and within the ICT industry in general like the Computer Society of Nigeria, or the 
establishment of new ones. For example, collaborations with universities can be fostered to 
encourage knowledge spillovers, as well as research and development of new technologies. 
Trade associations that would help to market the cluster both within Nigeria and outside can be 
set up. According to Wood and Kaplan (2005), the South African wine cluster for example has 
various institutions from which it receives support. It received technical support “through the 
partially state-funded science council for the agricultural industry, the Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC)”, while ARC Infruitec-Nietvoorbij also conducts wine related research for 
example on “soil science, disease management, pest management, … technology management 
and transfer” in addition to providing technical support (p. 111).  
 
The Wine Industry Network for Expertise and Technology serves as a coordinator for the 
technicians and scientists from ARC Infruitec-Nietvoorbij and the universities, and ensures the 
“dissemination of research to end users” (Ibid. p. 112). The South African Wine Industry 
Information and Systems assists “industry players in their marketing activities”, while Wines of 
South Africa (WOSA) is responsible for the international promotion of South African wines 
(Ibid., p. 113). WOSA also works closely with the “Western Cape Tourism Board to advance 
Cape wine tourism” (Ibid., p. 112).  
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South Africa’s wine cluster is just one example for clusters within Nigeria such as Otigba, and 
outside of Nigeria, to show that there are numerous possibilities for institutions that can foster 
research, marketing, and in essence the dynamism, productivity and reach of the cluster. In 
Otigba, the umbrella association CAPDAN is already in existence, and firms are collaborating 
with one another (see chapter six), but these collaborations can be extended far beyond the 
current scope. Furthermore, institutions that would promote equitable and inclusive development 
(World Bank, 2003; see chapter two), and as well as those which promote consistency of markets 
and social cohesion (Ocampo, 2007; see chapter three) can be developed.  
 
More generally however, I propose that the State and its agencies acknowledge existing self-
starting, self-sustaining and informal entrepreneurial workers and firms as critical actors in 
reducing unemployment and poverty, incorporate them into national economic development 
agendas, and make considerable effort to understand their various vulnerabilities while 
supporting and enhancing their productivity.  
 
7.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
This work has taken a considerable step towards understanding the link between industrial 
dynamism and human development, using industrial clusters as an entry point and firms as the 
unit of analysis. While it has generated a lot of pertinent data from the Otigba cluster, it has also 
illuminated some possibilities for further research. Firstly, additional case studies that 
systematically examine under what conditions clusters impact on the welfare of workers within 




enrich the limited body of knowledge that systematically analyze cluster productivity as a 
pathway for raising living standards. 
 
Secondly and as alluded to in the section above, the relationship between clusters and poverty 
alleviation can be carried out based on different clustering models and districts, for example, 
those enacted by policy versus the spontaneous cluster or the Marshallian type districts versus 
the hub-and-spoke, satellite industrial and state-centered districts (Markusen, 1996), and so on, 
with particular attention to their impacts on multidimensional poverty. 
 
Thirdly, a major finding of this study was that beyond general rationales for why firms might 
pass on benefits to their workers for example – age of the worker, and experience in the firms – 
workers within clusters tend to be receiving more benefits than those outside the cluster. This 
finding is significant and shows that clusters do not only have the capacity to enhance the 
productivity of firms, but also the welfare of those within it. This finding should therefore be 
explored further because what had been an anecdotal proposition has been supported by clear 
empirical evidence.  
 
In addition, the Otigba cluster study shows that benefits such as feeding, transportation, housing, 
and health benefits were being provided to workers, even where formal laws do not necessitate 
this. However, a surprising finding was the systematic structure of a social non-state institution 
which plays out among the Igbos in Nigeria namely onye aghala nwanne ya. Previous research 
has shown the role of personal and social networks in employment (Mano et. al, 2011), the 
diffusion and adoption of technology (Kimura, 2011), improving innovation levels (Murphy, 
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2002) and so on, howbeit, subsequent studies can probe deeper to know how and under what 
conditions personal and social networks do help in passing on support and benefits to workers in 
ways that help to improve their standard of living. Are they based mainly along ethnic lines? 
Ethnicity and perhaps religion, which were not collected during this study, might be useful 
variables for subsequent research. Similarly, can these actions be formalized, augmented, or be 
complementary to more formal means of social protection? Can state industrial policy 
incorporate elements of kinship and social institution? 
 
Fifthly, this study limited the scope of worker’s employment to lie solely within their work in the 
particular firm with which they were employed – either within or outside of the cluster. In this 
sense, it fails to account for the possibility of multiple jobs and sources of income that would 
affect both the workers and the households in which they live. Furthermore, while a considerable 
number of questions directly addressed elements of workers’ welfare (mode of transportation to 
work, amount spent on transportation, perception of standard of living compared to peers, 
perceptions on working in the Computer Village, perception of impact of working in the firm on 
standard of living), others (house location, form of sanitation in the home, source of drinking 
water, source of energy supply) were reflective of the households in which they lived, reflecting 
factors over which they might not have any control. These factors could affect the ability of the 
study in making a link between the impact of the worker’s job situation and living standards. 
Subsequent research could thus probe further into other sources of income that were available to 





Finally, in this study, both face-to-face interview questions and survey questionnaires were used. 
The interviews covered such questions as those that pertained to work, working conditions, the 
firms and the cluster. However, information that was considered sensitive and perhaps 
embarrassing for the interviewee as relating to the multidimensional aspects of poverty, were 
restricted to the survey questionnaires. Furthermore, most interviews took place within work 
environments and the cluster; exceptions being if the interviewee or informant lived and had 
their businesses in the same space. Thus case stories that linked the work place and the living 
conditions of the workers were lacking from this study, but could further enrich other studies of 
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Chapter 1 appendix 
Appendix Table 1.1: Currency conversions 













Chapter 3 appendix 
Appendix Box 3.1: Nigerian Relative poverty measurement  
Relative Measure:  
Although the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) produces other poverty indicators including 
Absolute (Objective) or Food Energy in-take measurement approach, Subjective Poverty 
Measurement approach and Dollar per day measurement approach, the relative poverty 
measurement was the official poverty measurement approach reported by the NBS for 2004 and 
2010. The main component in the computation of Relative Poverty measurement is the 
household expenditure. Expenditure refers to all goods and services for use in the household. It 
also includes all monetary transactions (e.g. Donations, Savings, Esusu contribution etc). 
 
An analytical attempt was made in summing the expenditure of the household. This household 
expenditure was deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The objective of deflating the 
figures obtained was to correct for seasonal and regional variations of the expenditure data 
itemiser Capita household expenditure. Households with expenditure greater than two-thirds of 
the Total Household Per Capita expenditure are NON-POOR whereas those below it are POOR. 
Further desegregation showed that households with less than one-third of total Household Per 
Capita expenditure are CORE-POOR (EXTREME POOR) while those Households greater than 
one-third of total expenditure but less than two-thirds of the total expenditure are MODERATE 
POOR. In the end the relative poverty measure showed that 69% or 112,470,000 of Nigerians are 
living in poverty. 





Appendix Table 3.1: Share of governmental responsibilities 
Federal Government State Government Local Government 
Defence and Security 
External Relations 
















Town and Country Planning 
Sewage Disposal 





Crafts and Small Industries 
Source: Cabinet Office, Report of the Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation (Lagos, 
1977). As modified by the 1979 Constitution. As cited in Olowu (1990, p.22)  
 
Appendix Table 3.2: Key indicators for Nigeria 
Indicators  Source 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
HDI position 
0.471 for 2012 
153 out of 187 countries 
HDR, 2013 
Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) 0.276 for 2012 HDR, 2013 
Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI) 
0.31 at 2008 HDR, 2013 
Estimated real growth rate 7.36% as at 2011 NBS, 2012 
Unemployment  21.1% as at 2010 Agu and Evoh, 2011, 
p.16 
Poverty  69.0% as at 2010 NBS, 2010 
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Comfortable Rich and 
Very Rich 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No
. 
% 
0-1,000 11 61.11 4 22.22 3 16.67 18 100 
1,000-2,500 6 37.50 9 56.25 1 6.25 16 100 
2,501-5,000 9 29.03 17 54.84 5 16.13 31 100 
5,001-10,000 6 21.43 9 32.14 13 46.43 28 100 
10,001-15,000 0 0.00 2 66.67 1 33.33 3 100 
 294 
More than 15,000 7 41.18 7 41.18 3 17.65 17 100 
I don't pay for 
accommodation 
8 36.36 11 50.00 3 13.64 22 100 
Total 47 34.81 59 43.70 29 21.48 13
5 
100 
Data source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 22.794, Sig.=0.030 
 
Appendix Table 4.2: Association between standards of living and weekly expenditure  








Comfortable Rich and 
Very Rich 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. 
0-500 7 41.18 4 23.53 6 35.29 17 
501-1,000 5 27.78 12 66.67 1 5.56 18 
1,001-2,000 13 44.83 10 34.48 6 20.69 29 
2,001-3,000 10 27.03 13 35.14 14 37.84 37 
3,001-4,000 4 23.53 12 70.59 1 5.88 17 
More than 4,000 7 46.67 7 46.67 1 6.67 15 
I don't pay for 
transportation 
2 66.67 1 33.33   3 
Total 48 35.29 59 43.38 29 21.32 136 
 Data source: Author’s field survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 24.326, Sig.=0.018 
 
Appendix Table 4.3: Percentage distribution of households by main source of drinking  
water (improved) 
















National 3.3 1.5 6.7 27.6 14.0 0.5 1.8 
Urban 6.6 3.4 12.6 33.6 19.8 0.4 1.2 
Rural 2.0 0.8 4.5 24.4 12.1 0.6 2.0 
FCT 
Abuja 
9.8 0.8 0.3 36.4 4.2 0.2 0.0 
Lagos  7.7 4.5 7.4 44.8 8.5 0.5 0.3 
South 
West 
2.8 1.9 12.5 26.5 28.1 0.4 0.7 







Appendix Table 4.3: Percentage distribution of households by main source of drinking 
water (unimproved & other) 
Source: Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS), 2009 
 




Source of water 
Poor  Comfortable Rich  Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. 
Electricity, LPG, 
Natural Gas, and 
Biogas 




27 48.21 23 41.07 6 10.71 56 
Firewood, Straw, 
and Dung 
5 41.67 1 8.33 6 50.00 12 
Total 47 34.81 60 44.44 28 20.74 135 
Author’s survey (2013); Note: Chi-square= 18.972, Sig.=0.001 
 
Appendix Table 4.5: Association between standards of living and weekly  









Comfortable Rich and 
Very Rich 
Total 
No. % No. % No
. 
% No. 
0-500 13 37.14 19 54.29 3 8.57 35 
501-1,000 12 38.71 17 54.84 2 6.45 31 





















National 15.6 1.2 0.4 0.1 3.5 0.9 1.3 21.3 0.4 
Urban 5.0 0.3 0.8 0.2 4.9 0.4 3.7 6.6 0.4 
Rural 19.9 1.4 0.2 0.1 3.0 1.0 0.5 26.8 0.4 
FCT 
Abuja 
1.5 0.3 0.0 0.3 19.0 0.0 0.8 25.9 0.3 
Lagos  3.6 0.1 1.5 1.0 3.7 0.1 15.9 0.4 0.2 
South 
West 
2.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.6 4.3 17.3 0.1 
 296 
2,001-3,000 5 21.74 5 21.74 13 56.52 23 
3,001-4,000 3 60.00 1 20.00 1 20.00 5 
More than 4,000 1 14.29 2 28.57 4 57.14 7 
I don't pay for 
drinking water 
5 45.45 4 36.36 2 18.18 11 
Total 48 35.29 59 43.38 29 21.32 136 
Note: Chi-square= 32.710, Sig.=0.001 
 




















bottle water, and 
public tap 
29 36.71 44 55.70 6 7.59 79 
Open well in 
yard/plot, Open 
public well, 
Protected well in 
dwelling, 










3 23.08 5 38.46 5 38.46 13 
Total 48 35.29 59 43.38 29 21.32 136 
Note: Chi-square= 24.458, Sig.=0.000 
Appendix Table 4.7: Percentage distribution of households by type of toilet facility 














National 7.9 4.8 3.4 1.0 26.7 0.8 




Rural 4.8 2.0 2.3 0.8 25.0 0.9 
FCT 
Abuja 
6.5 18.9 6.6 0.5 15.3 0.5 
Lagos  37.8 19.4 10.3 1.5 17.9 0.6 
South 
West 
13.1 8.6 4.0 1.1 24.8 0.4 
Source: Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS), 2009  
 
Appendix Table 4.7 contd.: Percentage distribution of households by type of toilet facility 

















National 0.2 0.4 21.1 0.1 3.5 28.2 1.8 
Urban 0.3 0.2 9.6 0.1 2.0 18.1 1.1 
Rural 0.2 0.4 25.4 0.1 4.0 32.0 2.1 
FCT 
Abuja 
3.2 0.2 4.8 0.0 1.7 41.2 0.5 
Lagos  0.3 0.2 2.7 0.0 1.2 7.5 0.6 
South 
West 
0.1 0.1 1.7 0.1 3.3 41.3 1.7 
Source: Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS), 2009  
 
Chapter 5 appendix 
Appendix Table 5.1: Age of employees  
Characteristics of employees Respondents 
Age group  No. Percentage 
< 20 12 7.8 
21 – 25 57 37.3 
26 – 30 48 31.4 
31 + 36 23.5 
Total 153 100.0 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013) 
 
Appendix Table 5.2: Classification of MSMEs in Nigeria 
Size Category Employment Assets (=N=Million) 
(excl. land and 
buildings) 





10 to 49 5 to less than 50 
Medium 
enterprises 
50 to 199 50 to less than 500 
   Source: National Policy on MSMEs in NBS & SMEDAN (2012)  
    
    Appendix Table 5.3: Total number of firm’s branches  
No. of other 
branches  
No. Percentage 
0 28 30.8 
1 25 27.5 
2 to 5 24 26.4 
5 to 10 9 9.9 
More than 10 5 5.5 
Total 91 100.0 
Source: Author’s field survey (2013) 
 
Appendix Box 5.1: Provision of vacation days  
Article 3 of the Convention 132, concerning holidays with pay of the International Labour 
Organisation says: 
Every person to whom this Convention applies shall be entitled to an annual paid holiday of a 
specified minimum length.  
Each member which ratifies this Convention shall specify the length of the holiday in a 
declaration appended to its ratification 
The holiday shall in no case be less than three working weeks for one year of service… 
 
Article 6 of the same Convention says: 
Public and customary holidays, whether or not they fall during the annual holiday, shall not be 
counted as part of the minimum annual holiday with pay prescribed in Article 3, paragraph 3, of 
this convention.  
Under conditions to be determined by the competent authority or through the appropriate 
machinery in each country, periods of incapacity for work resulting from sickness or injury may 
not be counted as part of the minimum annual holiday with pay prescribed in Article 3, 






Chapter 6 appendix 
Appendix Box 6.1: Lagos State new traffic law  
Control of Motorcycles, Tricycles 
(1) No person shall ride, drive or propel a cart, wheel barrow, motorcycle or tricycle on any of 
the routes specified in Schedule II to this Law.  
(2) No person shall operate a motorcycle or tricycle without a Rider’s Card issued by the Lagos 
State Motor Vehicle Administration Agency. 
(3) No person shall operate a motorcycle or tricycle either as a rider or a passenger without 
wearing a standard protective crash helmet as may be prescribed under the Regulations to this 
Law 
(4) No motorcycle operator shall carry more than one (1) passenger at a time, provided that a 
pregnant woman, a child below the age of 12 years, or an adult with a baby or heavy/large load 
placed on the head or which obstruct normal sitting on the motorcycle shall not be carried as a 
passenger.  
(5) Any person who fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Section commits an 
offence and shall be liable on conviction to –  
(i) imprisonment for a term of three (3) years or to render community service in   accordance 
with the provisions of Section 347 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State; 
and  
(ii) have his vehicle forfeited to the State. 
Schedule II – Major Highways in Lagos 
Lagos Ibadan Expressway 
Apapa Oshodi Expressway 
Oworoshoki Oshodi Expressway 
Lagos Ikorodu Expressway 
Lagos Abeokuta Expressway 
Babangida Bouleverde 
Eti-Osa Lekki Epe Expressway 
Lagos Badagry Expressway 
Funsho Williams Avenue 
Agege Motor Road 
Eti-Osa Lekki Coastal Road 
Source: New Road Traffic Law, The Nation (2012, p. 2-3, 29) 
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Appendix Table 6.1: Achievements and challenges in Nigeria’s infrastructure sectors
 













Appendix Survey 1: Employee survey 
1.0. GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Position in enterprise ....................................................................... 
 
1.2 Age of respondent …………………………………………….. 
 
1.3 Gender of respondent: a) Female    b) Male  
 
1.4 What is your educational level? 
 
a) University Degree   b) Technical   c) High School  d) Elementary   e) No education 
 
1.5 The firm I own or work with is:  
a) An ICT firm based in Computer Village  
b) An ICT firm based in Lagos but not in Computer Village 
c) An ICT firm based outside Lagos but in Nigeria 
d) An ICT firm based outside of Nigeria 
e) Not an ICT firm  
 
1.6 If your firm is not located in Computer Village [that is Ikeja, Lagos], what area and state 
is it located? ………………………………………………. 
 
2.0. EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION 
 
2.1 In terms of employees, how many does the firm you work for have? (Tick one) 
a) 1-5    b) 5-10   c) 10-20   d) 20-50    e) More than 50  
 
2.2 What are the main products and services of the organization? (Please tick “YES” for the 
products and services your firm deals in, and “NO” for those they do not deal in) 
 
 Products & Services YES NO 
1 Laptop – new   
2 Laptop - used   
3 Laptop accessories   
4 Desktop – new   
5 Desktop - used   
6 Desktop accessories   
7 Phones (GSM) - new   
8 Phones (GSM) - used   
9 Phone accessories   
10 Other ICT products (Ipad, tablets…)   
11 Retailing   
12 Wholesale   
13 Repairs and servicing of laptop   
14 Repairs and servicing of desktop   
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15 Cloning of computers   
16 Installation   
17 Downloading   
18 Cyber café services   
19 Marketing   
20 ICT Solutions/applications    
21 Non-ICT products - Food    
22 Non-ICT products - Clothes   
23 Non-ICT products - Shoes   
24 Other:  
 
2.3. For “ICT Solutions/applications” is your firm a developer/manufacturer of the software 
or software (as opposed to a vendor) of these products?  
a) Yes      b) No  
If yes, please indicate the particular area or areas your firm specializes in:  
 
 ICT Solutions/applications YES NO 
1 ICT solutions/applications: Accounting   
2 ICT solutions/applications: Asset management   
3 ICT solutions/applications: Banking   
4 ICT solutions/applications: Billing software   
5 ICT solutions/applications: Capital market   
6 ICT solutions/applications: Customer relationship 
management 
  
7 ICT solutions/applications: Education   
8 ICT solutions/applications: E-government solution   
9 ICT solutions/applications: Enterprise resource 
planning 
  
10 ICT solutions/applications: Hotel management   
11 ICT solutions/applications: Human resource 
management 
  
12 ICT solutions/applications: Insurance   
13 ICT solutions/applications: Investment   
14 ICT solutions/applications: Land   
15 ICT solutions/applications: Library   
16 ICT solutions/applications: Loan   
17 ICT solutions/applications: Marketing   
18 ICT solutions/applications: Medical   
19 ICT solutions/applications: Media   
20 ICT solutions/applications: Payroll and personnel   
21 ICT solutions/applications: Pension management   
22 ICT solutions/applications: Stock control   
23 ICT solutions/applications: Supply chain 
management 
  




25 ICT solutions/applications: Transport   
26 ICT solutions/applications: Other   
 
 
2.4 About how long have you worked in this firm? (Tick one) 
a) One to six months   b) Six months to one year      c) One to two years      
d) Two to five years        e) More than five years   
 





2.6 Before working at this firm, did you work at some other organization? 
a) Yes    b) No     
 
If yes, was it:  
2.7 A firm based in Computer Village?      a) Yes    b) No 
 
Please explain in a short sentence reason for your movement…………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 Please tick either True or False to the following statements, based on your opinion of the 
Computer Village:  
 
No Statement True False 
2.8 Workers doing the same work but in different companies in Computer 
Village get different financial rewards.  
  
2.9 Workers in Computer Village are faring better financially than those 
doing the same work outside of Computer Village.  
  
2.10 Job security within Computer Village is good (that is, there is no fear 
of losing one’s job)  
  
2.11 Most workers working in Computer Village are very satisfied    
2.12 Given the opportunity, most workers will go to work outside Computer 
Village 
  
2.13 For most workers, their standard of living improves when they begin 




3.0. JOINT ACTION 
 
3.1 How did you come to work in this firm? Because of:  
a) A friend  b) A family member   c) A kinsman   d) An employer      e) Own initiative  f) 
Other  
 
3.2 Is the firm you are working for owned by:  
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a) A friend b) A family member   c) A kinsman   d) None 
 
3.3 Do you collaborate with other workers in sharing knowledge that would be useful to 
improve your work?  
a) Yes     b) No  
 
3.4 Do you share information with other workers about the monetary benefits like income, 
you receive?  
a) Yes      b) No 
 
3.5 Do you share information with other workers about the non-monetary benefits you 
receive?  
a) Yes      b) No 
 
3.6 Do you organize with other workers to negotiate better working conditions?  
a) Yes      b) No 
 
3.7 Do you cooperate with other workers to try to reduce cost of living for example by 
sharing transportation, helping with child care and so on.  
a) Yes    b) No   
 
=> Are you a part of any of work-related associations or unions or societies?  
(Please tick “YES” for those you are a member of, and “NO” for those you do not belong 
to) 
 
 Association, Union, Society YES NO 
3.8 Computer Society of Nigeria   
3.9 CAPDAN (The Computer and Allied Products Dealers Association of 
Nigeria) 
  
3.10 Information Technology Association of Nigeria (ITAN)   
3.12 Computer Software Developers Association   





4.0. WELFARE  
 
4.1 About how much do you make on average every week (in Naira)?  
a) 0 - 1000 b) 1001 – 5000 c) 5001 to 10,000 d) 10,001-50,000 e) Above 50,000 
 
4.2 Is the income you receive:  
a) Fixed     b) Based on commission    c) Both (some fixed, some on commission)       






 Do you receive any of these non-income benefits from your employer? (Please tick 
“YES” for the benefits you receive, and “NO” for those you do not) 
 
 Benefits YES NO 
4.3 Training   
4.4 Health insurance   
4.5 Pension   
4.6 Funding for further education   
4.7 Transportation allowance   
4.8 Feeding allowance   
4.9 Housing   
4.10 Car   
4.11 Company products    
4.12 Child care   
4.13 Other? Please list: 
 
 
4.14 Are there any associations that cater to the well-being of the workers at Computer 
Village?  
a) Yes     b) No   c) I don’t know 
 
4.15 Has your working in this company raised your standard of living? 
a) Yes    b) No 
 
4.16 Between when you started working here and today, how much has your standard of living 
changed?  
a) Drastically reduced   b) Reduced    c) Remained the same   d) Increased      
e) Drastically increased 
 
4.17 Between when you started working here and today, about how much has your income 
changed over time?  
a) Drastically reduced      b) Reduced   c) Remained the same      d) Increased       
e) Drastically increased  
 
4.18 Since working here, about how much have your personal assets changed over time? (For 
example television, radio, houses, cars, generator….) 
a) Drastically reduced    b) Reduced   c) Remained the same    d) Increased       
e) Drastically increased  
 
4.19 Since working here, how has your support (monetary and non-monetary) to people 
around you changed over time?  
a) Drastically reduced        b) Reduced         c) Remained the same      d) Increased    





4.20 Since working here, how has your health changed over time?  
a) Drastically deteriorated    b) Deteriorated   c) Remained the same   d) Improved   
e) Drastically improved  
 
4.21 How will you describe your current standard of living compared to your peers? 
a) Poor    b) Surviving    c) Comfortable      d) Rich      e) Very Rich 
 
 
5.0. COST OF LIVING 
5.1 Since the lifting of the fuel subsidy in Nigeria on the 2nd of January, 2012 how adversely 
have you been affected ?  
a) Very much   b) A lot    c) Somewhat     d) A little    e) Not at all  
 
5.2 Has the banning of okadas in Lagos State affected you adversely? 
a) Very much   b) A lot    c) Somewhat     d) A little    e) Not at all  
 
5.3 What is the name of the area where you live? ………………………….. 
 
5.4 On average, how long does it take you to get to work from where you live? 
a) Less than 30 minutes   b) Between 30 minutes to one hour    c) Between one hour to 
two hours    d) Between two hours and three hours   e) More than three hours   
 
5.5 In terms of your living arrangements, do you: 
a) Live in your own accommodation which you built   b) Rent from someone else    
c) Stay with relatives or friends   d) Accommodation provided by your workplace   e) 
Other ……………………………….. 
 
5.6 For the most part, what material is your home built with? (Tick one)  
a)   Natural (Earth, sand, mud)  
b) Rudimentary (Coarse wood planks, palm/bamboo, unpolished cement ) 
c) Finished (parquet or polished wood, marble, linoleum, ceramic tiles, cement 
(polished), carpet, and terrazzo material)  
 
 Which of the following statements apply to the home where you live?  
 
 Statements YES  NO 
5.7 The dwelling is in need of major repair    
5.8 The location of the house is in a hazardous place   
5.9 The dwelling is located on or near toxic waste   
5.10 The dwelling is located in a flood plain   
5.11 The dwelling is located on a steep slope   
5.12 The dwelling is located in a dangerous right of way (e.g. close to rail, 
highway, airport, power lines) 
  






5.14 On average, about how much do you spend on accommodation each week in Naira?  
a) 0-1,000   b) 1,001-2,500   c) 2,501 - 5,000  d) 5,001-10,000 e) 10,001 – 15,000  
f) More than 15,000 g) I, don’t pay for accommodation 
 
5.15 Usually, how do you get to work from home?  
a) Walk    b) Public transportation   c) Own vehicle   d) Company transportation    
 
5.16 On average, about how much do you spend on transportation (for work and other 
activities) each week in Naira? [Transportation includes public transport or fuel for car] 
a) 0-500    b) 501-1,000      c) 1,001-2,000      d) 2,001-3,000      e) 3,001 – 4000  
f) More than 4,000 g) I don’t pay for transportation 
 
5.17 On average, about how much of your income do you save every month in Naira?  
a) 0-1,000    b) 1,001-2,500   c) 2,501 - 5,000     d) 5,001-10,000     e) 10,001 – 15,000  
f) More than 15,000 g) I, don’t save 
 
5.18 On average, about how much do you spend on drinking water every week in Naira?  
a) 0-500       b) 501-1,000     c) 1,001-2,000       d) 2,001-3,000        e) 3,001 – 4000  
f) More than 4,000 g) I don’t pay for drinking water 
 
5.19 Which of the following categories (a, b, or c) best describes your source for drinking 
water at home?  
a) Piped into dwelling, Piped into compound/plot, bottle water, and public tap 
b) Open well in yard/plot, Open public well, Protected well in dwelling, Protected well in 
yard/plot, and Protected public well 
c) River, Stream, Pond, Lake, Rainwater, Satchel, and Tanker truck 
 
5.20 Which category (a, b, or c) best describes your access to toilet facilities at home: 
a) Flush 
b) Traditional pit, ventilated improved pit, and latrine  
c) Bush, field, bucket, and pan for toilets  
 
5.21 What category (a, b, or c) best describes your cooking facility at home: 
a) Electricity, LPG, Natural Gas, and Biogas   
b) Kerosene, Coal, Lignite, and Charcoal 
c) Firewood, Straw, and Dung  
 
5.22 What is the main source of lighting for your dwelling?  
 a) Kerosene     b) Gas    c) Main Electricity   d) Electricity from generator    e) Battery     
 f) Candles        g) Firewood    h) Other …………………. 
 
5.23  On average how often do you receive public power (electricity) supply:  
a) All the time  b) A few hours a day  c) A few times a week   d) Once a week    




 Please indicate yes or no to the following: 
I personally own: 
 
  Yes No 
5.24 Radio   
5.25 Television   
5.26 Refrigerator   
5.27 Car   
5.28 Computer   
5.29 Generator   
 
 
5.30 Has your position as a worker in either the Computer Village or the ICT industry  
changed any of the above (5.4-5.29) for the better? 
 (a) Yes    (b) No 
 
PLEASE NOTE THAT INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL. IF YOU 
WANT A COPY OF THE OUTPUT OF THIS RESEARCH PLEASE SEND AN EMAIL TO 
oo2149@columbia.edu, AND MAKE THE SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 


















Appendix Survey 2: CEO/Management survey 
1.0.      GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1       Are you the owner of the enterprise? 
1) Yes      2) No  
If No, what is your position in the enterprise? .................................................................... 
 
1.2      Year of establishment… ...................................................................... 
 
1.3       In terms of employees, how many does the firm have? (Tick one) 
a) 1-5    b) 5-10   c) 10-20   d) 20-50    e) More than 50  
 
 Employment record (Number Employed) 
 
  2011 2012 
1.4 Management   
1.5 Technical staff (local)   
1.6 Technical staff  (foreign)   
1.7 Others (unskilled)   
1.8 Total   
 
1.9      The firm I own or work with is:  
f) An ICT firm based in Computer Village  
g) An ICT firm based in Lagos but not in Computer Village 
h) An ICT firm based outside Lagos but in Nigeria 
i) An ICT firm based outside of Nigeria 
j) Not an ICT firm  
 
1.10 If your firm is not located in Computer Village [that is Ikeja, Lagos], what area and state  
is it located? ………………………………………………. 
 
1.11 How much in investment was used to start this organization in Naira?   
a) N0 – N50,000           b) N50,001 – N100,000               c) N100,001- N500,000           
d)  N500,001 – N1,000,000        e) N1,000,001 – N5,000,000                                         
f)  N5,000,001-N10,000,000          g) Above N10,000,000 
 
1.12 How much is the organization now worth in Naira?  
a) N0 – N50,000                    b) N50,001 – N100,000         c) N100,001- N500,000  
d) N500,001 – N1,000,000               e) N1,000,001 – N5,000,000                                           
f) N5,000,001-N10,000,000               g) N10,000,0001 – N50,000,000                                    










2.0.  BASIC INFORMATION 
 
2.1 What are the main products and services of the organization? (Please tick “YES” for the  
products and services your firm deals in, and “NO” for those they do not deal in) 
 
 Products & Services YES NO 
1 Laptop – new   
2 Laptop - used   
3 Laptop accessories   
4 Desktop – new   
5 Desktop - used   
6 Desktop accessories   
7 Phones (GSM) - new   
8 Phones (GSM) - used   
9 Phone accessories   
10 Other ICT products (Ipad, tablets…)   
11 Retailing   
12 Wholesale   
13 Repairs and servicing of laptop   
14 Repairs and servicing of desktop   
15 Cloning of computers   
16 Installation   
17 Downloading   
18 Cyber café services   
19 Marketing   
20 ICT Solutions/applications    
21 Non-ICT products - Food    
22 Non-ICT products - Clothes   
23 Non-ICT products - Shoes   
24 Other:  
 
2.2        For “ICT Solutions/applications” is your firm a developer/manufacturer of the 
software or hardware (as opposed to a vendor) of these products?  
b) Yes      b) No  
If yes, please indicate the particular area or areas your firm specializes in:  
 
 ICT Solutions/applications YES NO 
1 ICT solutions/applications: Accounting   
2 ICT solutions/applications: Asset management   




4 ICT solutions/applications: Billing software   
5 ICT solutions/applications: Capital market   
6 ICT solutions/applications: Customer relationship management   
7 ICT solutions/applications: Education   
8 ICT solutions/applications: E-government solution   
9 ICT solutions/applications: Enterprise resource planning   
10 ICT solutions/applications: Hotel management   
11 ICT solutions/applications: Human resource management   
12 ICT solutions/applications: Insurance   
13 ICT solutions/applications: Investment   
14 ICT solutions/applications: Land   
15 ICT solutions/applications: Library   
16 ICT solutions/applications: Loan   
17 ICT solutions/applications: Marketing   
18 ICT solutions/applications: Medical   
19 ICT solutions/applications: Media   
20 ICT solutions/applications: Payroll and personnel   
21 ICT solutions/applications: Pension management   
22 ICT solutions/applications: Stock control   
23 ICT solutions/applications: Supply chain management   
24 ICT solutions/applications: Tax   
25 ICT solutions/applications: Transport   
26 ICT solutions/applications: Other   
 
 
2.3 How many other branches does your firm have? 
a) None  b) One   c) Two to Five   d) Five to Ten  e) More than ten 
 
2.4     If your company has other branches, are they located (tick all that apply) 
a) In Computer Village b) In Lagos but outside Computer Village  c) In Nigeria but 
outside Lagos  d) Outside Nigeria but in Africa  e) Outside Africa 
 
2.5     What is the educational level attained by the firm’s owner? 
a) University Degree        b) Technical       c) High School                               
d) Elementary             e) No Education    
 
 
COLLABORATION: Inter firm Learning 
 
 Horizontal cooperation with other firms 
 (++) Strong increase  (+) Increase (=)  Remain the same 
 (-) Decrease  (--) Strong decrease      (o) Never engaged in this action 
 
  ++ + = - -- o 
2.6 Do you now cooperate with other firms more than       
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five years ago?    
a) Yes      b) No     If yes, please tick 
appropriate box 
2.7 Do you now subcontract more than five years ago?                 
 a) Yes      b) No     If yes, please tick 
appropriate box 
    
2.8 Do you use the Industry Association more than 
five years ago? 
 a) Yes      b) No     If yes, please tick 
appropriate box 




2.9 In what areas do you co-operate with other firms in the last five years ago? Please specify  
 
 ++ + = - -- o 
Exchange of information and 
experiences 
      
Quality improvement       
Joint labour training       
Joint marketing       
 
Backward Cooperation with Suppliers of Components 
 
2.10   Has co-operation with your main suppliers changed over the last five years?     
 Specify for the following areas:  (++)  Strong increase   (+) Increase (=)  Remain the same       
(-)   Decrease  (--)  Strong decrease   (o) Never engaged in this action 
 
 ++ + = - -- o 
Exchange of information and experiences       
Quality improvement       
Speeding up delivery       
Joint labour training       
Joint marketing       
 
2.11  Has co-operation with your sub-contractors changed over the last five years?  
Specify for the following areas: (++)  Strong increase   (+) Increase (=)  Remain 
the same       (-)   Decrease  (--)  Strong decrease  (o) Never engaged in this action 
 
 ++ + = - -- o 
Exchange of information and 
experiences 
      
Technological upgrading       
Quality improvement       




Joint Marketing       
 
Forward Cooperation With Buyers 
2.12 Has co-operation with your main domestic buyers changed over the last five years? 
Specify for the following areas:   (++)  Strong increase         (+) Increase (=)  Remain 
the same       (-)   Decrease  (--)  Strong decrease  (o) Never engaged in this action 
 
 ++ + = - -- o 
Exchange of information and experiences       
Quality improvement       
Setting of product specification       
Organization of production       
 
2.13 Has co-operation with your main foreign buyers changed over last 5 years? Specify for 
the following areas: (++)  Strong increase         (+) Increase (=)  Remain the same       
(-)   Decrease  (--)  Strong decrease  (o) Never engaged in this action 
 
 ++ + = - -- o 
Exchange of information and experiences       
Quality improvement       
Setting of product specification       




3.0  FINANCIAL SUPPORT & PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 For what types of investment have you required financial support in the last five years? 
(Please tick all that apply) 
a) Start-up business       b)  New products development        c)   Export     
d)  Others …………………………………… 
 
3.0.   What financial sources have you previously used for your business?  
 
  Source  YES NO 
3.1 Private bank   
3.2 Development bank   
3.3 Special Government credit   
3.4 Loan from friend & relatives   
3.5 Own money   
3.6 Other sources   
 
3.7     How do you rate financial support as a constraint? (1=not a problem; 5=very severe) 
Rating: (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)................................................. 
 
3.8 Do you own your own? (Please tick what apply) 
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a) Electricity generator      
b) Bore-holes                   
c) Telephone/radio facility   
d) Security system       
 
 How would you rate public provision of the following? 
  Excellent Very 
good 
Good Fair Not good 
3.9 Roads      
3.10 Water      
3.11 Telephone      
3.12 Electricity      
3.13 Internet      
3.14 Transport 
services 
     
3.15 Security      
 
In the last five years how do you rate public provision of the following?  
  Decreasing Remain the same Improved 
3.16 Roads    
3.17 Water    
3.18 Electricity    
3.19 Telephone    
3.20 Security    
 
 
3.21     In your production activities is access/non-access to infrastructure a constraint?  
a)  Yes             b)  No     
 
3.22  On a scale of 1-5 (1 = None; 5 = Serious), how do you rate the effect of infrastructure?  
   1 2 3 4 5  (Tick one) 
 
3.23  Approximately what proportion of your Capital…..….%; Operational…..….%    
budget do you spend on alternative Infrastructure (Electricity, water & others) 
 
3.24 Has lack of infrastructure led to abandoned operation of certain services?  
a)  Yes      b)  No      
 
 
4.0.  EMPLOYEES  
 
4.1  Do you give non-income benefits to the staff?  





 Do you give any of these non-income benefits to your employees? (Please tick “YES” for 
the benefits you give, and “NO” for those you do not) 
 
 Benefits YES NO 
4.2 Training   
4.3 Health insurance   
4.4 Pension   
4.5 Funding for further education   
4.6 Transportation allowance   
4.7 Feeding allowance   
4.8 Housing   
4.9 Car   
4.10 Company products    
4.11 Child care   
4.12 Other? Please list: 
 
 
4.13  About what percentage of company’s profit goes to pay employees? ………..% 
 
4.14.  Is income for employees:  
a) Fixed     b) Based on commission  c) A combination of the two (fixed and commission) 
 
4.15. Compared to other organizations, how would you rate the benefits given to your 
employees?  
a) Much less    b) Less    c) Same    d) Better     e) Much better  
 
4.16.  Do employees get vacation days?  
a) Yes      b) No 
 
4.17. If yes, do they get (please tick all that apply) 
a) Some public holidays    b) All public holidays   c) 1 week a year   d) 2 weeks a year    




5.1 About how much profit does the firm make on average every week, in local currency?  
a) 0- 1000 b) 1001 – 5000 c) 5001 to 10,000 d) 10,001-50,000 e) Above 50,000 
 
5.2. Has owning this business or working here raised your standard of living? 
a) Yes    b) No 
 
5.3.  Between when you started the business (or working) here and today, how much has your 
standard of living changed?  
a) Drastically reduced   b) Reduced    c) Remained the same   d) Increased     
e) Drastically increased 
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5.4.  Between when you started the business (or working) here and today, about how much has 
your income changed over time?  
a) Drastically reduced      b) Reduced   c) Remained the same      d) Increased       
e) Drastically increased  
 
5.5.  Since starting the business (or working here), about how much have your personal assets 
changed over time? (For example television, radio, houses, cars, generator….) 
a) Drastically reduced    b) Reduced   c) Remained the same    d) Increased      e) 
Drastically increased  
 
5.6. Since starting the business (or working here), how has your support (monetary and non-
monetary) to people around you changed over time?  
a) Drastically reduced b) Reduced   c) Remained the same d) Increased   e) Drastically 
increased  
 
5.7.  How will you describe your current standard of living compared to your peers? 
(a) Poor    (b) Surviving    (c) Comfortable      (d) Rich      (e) Very Rich 
 
5.8.  Are there any associations that cater to the well-being of the workers here at Computer 
Village?  
a) Yes     b) No 
 
=> When you think of the Computer Village, which of the following statements do you think are 
True or False:  
No Statement True False I can’t 
say 
5.9 It is financially rewarding to have a firm within 
Computer Village.  
   
5.10 Firms in Computer Village are faring better 
financially than those doing the same business 
outside of Computer Village.  
   
5.11 Most firm owners in Computer Village are 
satisfied. 
   
5.12 Given the opportunity, most firms would move out 
of Computer Village 
   
5.13 For most workers, their standard of living improves 
when they begin working in Computer Village. 
   
5.14 The more productive Computer Village is, the 
better for the individual firms 
   
5.15 As profitability in my firm increases so does 
employee benefits 
   








6.0. COST OF LIVING 
 
6.1 Since the lifting of the fuel subsidy in Nigeria on the 2nd of January, 2012 how adversely 
have you been affected?  
d) Very much   b) A lot    c) Somewhat     d) A little    e) Not at all  
 
6.2 Since the lifting of the fuel subsidy in Nigeria on the 2nd of January, 2012, how adversely 
has your business been affected?  
a) Very much   b) A lot    c) Somewhat     d) A little    e) Not at all  
 
6.3 Has the banning of okadas in Lagos State affected you adversely? 
a) Very much   b) A lot    c) Somewhat     d) A little    e) Not at all  
 
6.4 What is the name of the area where you live? ………………………….. 
 
6.5 On average, how long does it take you to get to work from where you live? …………. 
a) Less than 30 minutes   b) Between 30 minutes to one hour    c) Between one hour to 
two hours    d) Between two hours and three hours   e) More than three hours   
 
6.6 In terms of your living arrangements, do you: 
a) Live in your own accommodation which you built   b) Rent from someone else   c) 
Stay with relatives or friends   d) Accommodation provided by your workplace   e) Other 
……………………………….. 
 
6.7  For the most part, what material is your home built with? (Tick one)  
a) Natural (Earth, sand, mud)  
b) Rudimentary (Coarse wood planks, palm/bamboo, unpolished cement ) 
c) Finished (parquet or polished wood, marble, linoleum, ceramic tiles, cement 
(polished), carpet, and terrazzo material)  
 
 Which of the following statements apply to the home where you live?  
 
 Statements Yes  No 
6.8 The dwelling is in need of major repair    
6.9 The location of the house is in a hazardous place   
6.10 The dwelling is located on or near toxic waste   
6.11 The dwelling is located in a flood plain   
6.12 The dwelling is located on a steep slope   
6.13 The dwelling is located in a dangerous right of way (e.g. close to rail, highway, 
airport, power lines) 
  
6.14 More than three people share each bedroom   
 
6.15 On average, about how much do you spend on accommodation each week?  
a) 0-1,000   b) 1,001-2,500   c) 2,501 - 5,000  d) 5,001-10,000 e) 10,001 – 15,000 f) More 
than 15,000 g) I, don’t pay for accommodation 
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6.16  Usually, how do you get to work from home?  
a) Walk    b) Public transportation   c) Own vehicle   d) Company transportation    
 
6.17 On average, about how much do you spend on transportation (for work and other 
activities) each week? [Transportation includes public transport or fuel for car] 
a) 0-500  b) 501-1,000   c) 1,001-2,000 d) 2,001-3,000 e) 3,001 – 4000 f) More than 
4,000 g) I don’t pay for transportation 
 
6.18 On average, about how much of your income do you save every month?  
a) 0-1,000   b) 1,001-2,500   c) 2,501 - 5,000  d) 5,001-10,000 e) 10,001 – 15,000 f) More 
than 15,000 g) I, don’t save 
 
6.19 On average, about how much do you spend on drinking water every week?  
a) 0-500  b) 501-1,000   c) 1,001-2,000 d) 2,001-3,000 e) 3,001 – 4000 f) More than 
4,000 g) I don’t pay for drinking water 
 
 
6.20 Which of the following categories (a, b, or c) best describes your source for drinking 
water at home?  
a) Piped into dwelling, Piped into compound/plot, bottle water, and public tap 
b) Open well in yard/plot, Open public well, Protected well in dwelling, Protected well in 
yard/plot, and Protected public well 
c) River, Stream, Pond, Lake, Rainwater, Satchel, and Tanker truck 
 
6.21 Which category (a, b, or c) best describes your access to toilet facilities at home: 
a) Flush 
b) traditional pit, ventilated improved pit, and latrine  
c) bush, field, bucket, and pan for toilets  
 
6.22 What category (a, b, or c) best describes your cooking facility at home: 
a) Electricity, LPG, Natural Gas, and Biogas   
b) Kerosene, Coal, Lignite, and Charcoal 
c) Firewood, Straw, and Dung  
 
6.23 What is the main source of lighting for your dwelling?  
 a) Kerosene     b) Gas    c) Main Electricity   d) Electricity from generator    e) Battery     
 f) Candles        g) Firewood    h) Other …………………. 
 
6.24 On average how often do you receive public power (electricity) supply:  










 Please indicate yes or no to the following: 
I personally own: 
 
  Yes No 
6.25 Radio   
6.26 Television   
6.27 Refrigerator   
6.28 Car   
6.29 Computer   
6.30 Generator   
 
 
6.31 Has your position as a business owner or worker in either the Computer Village or the 
ICT industry  changed any of the above (6.5-6.30) for the better? 
 (a) Yes    (b) No 
 
 
PLEASE NOTE THAT INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL. IF YOU 
WANT A COPY OF THE OUTPUT OF THIS RESEARCH PLEASE SEND AN EMAIL TO 
oo2149@columbia.edu, AND MAKE THE SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 
RESEARCH OUTPUT.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
